Essays on post-crisis fiscal policy by Xuan Hai Dinh (7195538)
  
Essays on Post-Crisis Fiscal Policy 
 
by 
Xuan Hai Dinh 
 
 
A Doctoral Thesis 
Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements 
For the Award of 
Doctor of Philosophy  
School of Business and Economics 
of Loughborough University 
 
 
 
May 2017 
 
 
© by Xuan Hai Dinh (2017) 
 iv 
 
Table of Contents 
List of Tables ..................................................................................................... vii 
List of Figures ................................................................................................... viii 
Acknowledgements ............................................................................................ x 
Abstract of thesis ................................................................................................ xi 
Chapter 1. Introduction ....................................................................................... 1 
1.1 Background ............................................................................................... 1 
1.2 Contribution and Principal Results ............................................................ 3 
Chapter 2. Fiscal Policy: A Review of the Literature ........................................... 7 
2.1 Introduction ............................................................................................... 7 
2.2. The effectiveness of fiscal policy: a theoretical review ............................. 7 
2.2.1 Keynesian view about the relationship between government spending 
and output .................................................................................................... 7 
2.2.2 Ricardian equivalence theorem......................................................... 13 
2.2.3 Neoclassical Theory on the relationship between public spending and 
output growth ............................................................................................. 14 
2.2.4 New Keynesian theory ...................................................................... 17 
2.2.5 Institutional aspects of fiscal policy ................................................... 18 
2.2.6 Fiscal sustainability ........................................................................... 20 
2.3 The effectiveness of fiscal policy: empirical evidence ............................. 21 
2.3.1 Fiscal multiplier: empirical studies..................................................... 21 
2.3.2 Fiscal consolidation and output ......................................................... 32 
2.3.3 Fiscal consolidation and the ratio of public debt to GDP ................... 37 
2.4 Fiscal policy under a sudden stop ........................................................... 39 
2.4.1 Sudden stop and determination ........................................................ 39 
2.4.2 Sudden stop and policies .................................................................. 40 
2.4.3 Theoretical models of sudden stop ................................................... 43 
2.5 Conclusions............................................................................................. 50 
Chapter 3. External debt reduction: shock therapy versus gradualism ............. 52 
3.1 Introduction ............................................................................................. 52 
3.2 Literature review ...................................................................................... 54 
 v 
 
3.2.1 The speed of external debt reduction: arguments within the literature 
about the speed of economic transition ..................................................... 54 
3.2.2 Theoretical models of sudden stops ................................................. 57 
3.3 The model ............................................................................................... 60 
3.3.1 Households ....................................................................................... 61 
3.3.2 Firms ................................................................................................. 62 
3.3.3 Government ...................................................................................... 63 
3.3.4 Aggregation and equilibrium ............................................................. 63 
3.3.5 Steady state (result in Appendix 2) ................................................... 64 
3.3.6 Calibration ......................................................................................... 64 
3.4 Simulation results .................................................................................... 66 
3.4.1 Simulation from old steady state to new steady state ....................... 66 
3.4.2 Simulation from out of steady state to a new steady state ................ 70 
3.4.3 Model with default ............................................................................. 73 
3.5 Sensitivity analysis .................................................................................. 75 
3.6 Summary and Conclusions ..................................................................... 76 
Appendix 1. First condition equations in steady state ................................... 79 
Appendix 2. Equilibrium in steady state ........................................................ 79 
Appendix 3. Model in which the total external debt is constrained by a fraction 
of nominal GDP ............................................................................................. 82 
Appendix 4. Simulation results for modified model with alternative parameter 
η - Elasticity of substitution between tradable and non-tradable goods ......... 85 
Chapter 4. The impact of changes in government consumption on economic 
output ............................................................................................................... 87 
4.1 Introduction and summary ....................................................................... 87 
4.2 Literature review ...................................................................................... 89 
4.3 Methodology............................................................................................ 92 
4.3.1 Identification of the fiscal multiplier ................................................... 92 
4.3.2 SVAR for a single country ................................................................. 93 
4.3.3 Panel-SVAR ...................................................................................... 94 
4.3.4 Lag structure ..................................................................................... 95 
4.3.5 Calculating multipliers ....................................................................... 96 
4.4 Data ........................................................................................................ 97 
 vi 
 
4.5 Results and interpretation ....................................................................... 98 
4.5.1 Results .............................................................................................. 98 
4.5.2 Interpretation ................................................................................... 108 
4.5.3 Robustness check........................................................................... 111 
4.6 Summary and conclusions .................................................................... 113 
Appendix 1. Data overview ......................................................................... 116 
Appendix 2. Forward-mean differencing transformation .............................. 125 
Chapter 5. What determines fiscal policy choices? Case studies of 
unsustainable fiscal deficits in Greece, Latvia, Turkey and Pakistan ............. 126 
5.1 Introduction ........................................................................................... 126 
5.2 Factors affecting fiscal policy: general discussion ................................. 128 
5.2.1 Economic shocks and fiscal sustainability ...................................... 128 
5.2.2 The interaction of fiscal and monetary policy .................................. 133 
5.2.3 The interaction between financial market and fiscal policy ............. 137 
5.2.4 Political economy, credibility and fiscal choice ................................ 138 
5.3 Review of case studies ......................................................................... 140 
5.3.1 Fiscal situation ................................................................................ 140 
5.3.2 Preceding economic conditions ...................................................... 143 
5.3.3 Monetary policy and inflation .......................................................... 146 
5.3.4 Political economy and credibility ..................................................... 149 
5.4 Conclusions........................................................................................... 151 
Appendix 1. Greece .................................................................................... 152 
Appendix 2. Latvia ....................................................................................... 156 
Appendix 3. Pakistan .................................................................................. 159 
Appendix 4. Turkey ..................................................................................... 162 
Chapter 6. Summary and conclusions ............................................................ 164 
References ..................................................................................................... 167 
 
 
 
 
 vii 
 
List of Tables 
Table 2.1 Fiscal multiplier – Estimating by Macro-model simulation ................ 25 
Table 2.2 Fiscal multiplier – Estimating by VAR model .................................... 28 
Table 2.3 Evidence of Expansionary Fiscal Contractions ................................. 34 
Table 2.4 Models of Sudden Stop .................................................................... 44 
Table 3.1 Value and description of parameters ................................................ 65 
Table 3.2 Total expected utility in case of default and no default ..................... 74 
Table 3.3 Value of main variables in steady state ............................................ 81 
Table 4.1 Government Consumption (% GDP) and Number of observations for 
samples .......................................................................................................... 116 
Table 4.2 List of Countries.............................................................................. 117 
Table 4.3 High level of financial openness countries and low level of financial 
openness countries ........................................................................................ 118 
Table 4.4 List of high level of financial development countries and low level of 
financial development countries ..................................................................... 119 
Table 4.5 List of “open” economies and “closed” economies ......................... 120 
Table 4.6 List of countries with flexible exchange rate regimes and countries 
with fixed exchange rate regimes ................................................................... 121 
Table 4.7 List of countries with low level of external debt and countries with high 
level of external debt ...................................................................................... 122 
Table 4.8 List of countries with high levels of “index of financial integration” (IFI) 
and countries with low levels of IFI ................................................................. 123 
Table 4.9 List of countries with low levels of net foreign liabilities and countries 
with high levels of net foreign liabilities ........................................................... 124 
 
 
 
 
 
 viii 
 
List of Figures 
Figure 2.1 IS-LM model .................................................................................... 10 
Figure 3.1 Tradable goods consumed by Households ..................................... 66 
Figure 3.2 Non-tradable goods consumed by Households ............................... 67 
Figure 3.3 Total consumption basket ............................................................... 67 
Figure 3.4 Price of non-tradable goods (real exchange rate) ........................... 68 
Figure 3.5 Wage rate in non-tradable goods production sector ........................ 69 
Figure 3.6 Total external debt ........................................................................... 69 
Figure 3.7 Compare percentage change in main variables .............................. 70 
Figure 3.8 Dynamics of ratio of total external debt for out of steady state shocks
 ......................................................................................................................... 72 
Figure 3.9 Dynamic of ratio of total external debt ............................................. 72 
Figure 3.10 Dynamic of ratio of total external debt - default versus no default . 75 
Figure 3.11 Dynamic of the ratio of total external debt to nominal GDP ........... 82 
Figure 3.12 Dynamic of main variables (index) ................................................ 83 
Figure 4.1 Government consumption multiplier – High level of Financial 
Openness group versus Low level of Financial Openness group ..................... 99 
Figure 4.2 Government consumption multiplier – High level of Financial 
Openness Countries and Low level of Financial Openness Countries ........... 101 
Figure 4.3 Cumulative multiplier – Low external debt countries and High 
external debt countries ................................................................................... 102 
Figure 4.4 Cumulative multiplier – Low level financial development countries 
and High level financial development countries .............................................. 104 
Figure 4.5 Cumulative multiplier – Open economies and Closed economies . 105 
Figure 4.6 Cumulative multiplier - Flexible Exchange Rate Regime Countries 
and Fixed Exchange Rate Regime Countries ................................................. 107 
Figure 4.7 Cumulative multiplier – Net Foreign Liabilities ............................... 112 
Figure 5.1 Government general budget balance from 2004 to 2015 .............. 141 
Figure 5.2 Government primary budget balance ............................................ 142 
Figure 5.3 Total government debt from 2004 to 2015 .................................... 143 
Figure 5.4 Real GDP growth rate from 2004 to 2015 ..................................... 144 
Figure 5.5 Gross external debt (total external public and private debt) .......... 145 
Figure 5.6 Current account balance ............................................................... 146 
 ix 
 
Figure 5.7 Exchange rate movements from 2006 ........................................... 147 
Figure 5.8 The inflation rate from 2006 to 2014 .............................................. 148 
Figure 5.9 5-year Sovereign CDS spreads (monthly average denominated in 
USD)............................................................................................................... 150 
Figure 5.10 Net borrowing of Greece’s economy from 2000 to 2008 ............. 153 
Figure 5.11 Current account balance and external balance on goods and 
services in Greece .......................................................................................... 153 
Figure 5.12 Latvia’s current account balance ................................................. 156 
Figure 5.13 Pakistan’s public debt to GDP ..................................................... 159 
Figure 5.14 Current account balance and external balance on goods and 
services in Pakistan ........................................................................................ 160 
Figure 5.15 Turkish current account balance ................................................. 163 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 x 
 
Acknowledgements  
Researching and writing this thesis have not been easy for me, especially during 
my first days at Loughborough University as a PhD student. Fortunately, through 
my entire PhD journey at Loughborough University, I received a lot of help and 
support from professors, administrative staff, friends and family members. 
Firstly, I would like to express my sincere gratitude to my supervisor Professor 
Alistair Milne for his continuous support throughout my PhD study. His guidance 
helped me when it came to researching and writing this thesis, and I especially 
appreciate his patience with me as he spent a considerable amount of time 
helping me. Professor Milne always encouraged me, even when he was writing 
comments; he always chose “positive words” so as to help build my confidence. 
I cannot imagine how I could have finished this PhD thesis without his guidance.  
I would also like to thank my second supervisor Professor Eric Pentecost; he 
spent a great deal of time reading my writing and gave me valuable comments. 
His guidance helped me a lot in presenting my own research in English, and he 
was always more than welcome to help me whenever I had any questions about 
economic knowledge.  
Besides my supervisors, I would also like to thank Professor Paul Turner, who 
attended annual review meetings with me and gave me lots of advice which 
helped me to improve my research.  
I would like to thank my colleagues, who also are PhD students at Loughborough 
University, for their help and for all the fun we have had together over last four 
years, and my sincerest appreciation to my friends who have always encouraged 
me to try my best to do this PhD thesis.  
Last but not least, I would like to thank my family, especially my parents and my 
brother for their continuous financial and spiritual support throughout the writing 
of this thesis and my life in general. I would also like to thank my wife for always 
encouraging and supporting me, especially when I faced difficulties doing this 
thesis. Finally, I would like to thank my two little daughters; whose mere presence 
encourages me to overcome all difficulties. 
 xi 
 
Abstract of thesis 
This thesis comprises of four essays on fiscal policy and fiscal policy adjustment. 
The first of these essays, Chapter 2, reviews a wide range of literature about 
fiscal policy. This chapter also discusses the sudden stop and fiscal policy during 
sudden stops episodes.  
Chapter 3 constructs a simple dynamic deterministic model to study how the 
speed of adjustment to a sustainable level of debt affects economic welfare. The 
simulation results in Chapter 3 suggest that in order to bring the level of external 
debt to a sustainable level as required by foreign lenders, the small open 
economy will attempt to delay adjustment as long as possible.  
Chapter 4 uses a Structural Vector Autoregression Model to estimate government 
consumption multipliers for groups of countries. The empirical results suggest 
that: (i) The higher degree of financial openness, the larger the government 
consumption multiplier. (ii) The government consumption multiplier is significantly 
bigger in countries with higher levels of external debt. (iii) The higher the level of 
financial development, the smaller the government consumption multiplier. (iv) 
The government consumption multiplier in countries with fixed exchange rates 
seems to be bigger than in countries with a flexible exchange rate regime.  
Chapter 5 of this thesis analyses four case study countries including Greece, 
Latvia, Pakistan and Turkey. This chapter finds that fiscal policy choice varies 
across countries because there are many possible determinants for this. It will 
also be determined that all factors including the level of public debt, level of 
external debt and monetary policy, especially exchange rate regime, affects the 
fiscal policy choice of each country. Furthermore, Chapter 5 also points out that 
political economy can influence fiscal policy directly and indirectly. 
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Chapter 1. Introduction 
1.1 Background 
Until the late 1970s, many governments used fiscal policy as a tool to stabilize 
the economy. The failure of fiscal policy to restore economic growth from the 
1970s economic crisis led many economists to doubt its effectiveness in handling 
smooth cyclical fluctuations (Beetsma and Giuliodori, 2011). This together with 
large fiscal deficits and high public debts in the 1980s also made economists pay 
less attention to the active use of fiscal policy. Blinder (2006) proposed that 
monetary policy should be used as the primary tool for macroeconomic 
stabilization. However, he also argues that fiscal policy may play an important 
role as a tool for macroeconomic stabilization under unusual circumstances, such 
as during a deep or long recession period or when the nominal interest rate is 
below zero, a viewpoint which is also supported by Sims and Blanchard.  
Following the global financial and economic crisis of 2007-2009, most 
governments have relied heavily on fiscal policy as the ideal response to the 
subsequent recession, especially since the monetary policy choices have been 
severely restricted due to the very low interest rate. Many countries have 
implemented fiscal stimulus packages, such as the European Economic 
Recovery Plan, which is equivalent to 1.5% of the EU GDP in 2008 (Beetsma and 
Giuliodori, 2011) and the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 
which equals 5.5% of the US GDP (Auerbach, 2012). There is still a debate about 
the effectiveness of fiscal policy in relation to a high and increasing level of fiscal 
deficits and public debts.  
The debate about the effectiveness of fiscal policy has attracted even greater 
attention since the Eurozone fiscal crisis begin in 2010. Greece, Ireland, Italy, 
Portugal and Spain were the most affected members in the EU. As a 
consequence, many countries implemented fiscal consolidation programs in 
response to the deteriorating fiscal balance. Since 2009, although economic 
growth has remained low and the unemployment rate has remained high in many 
European countries, fiscal adjustments have still been undertaken (Auerbach, 
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2012). The main focus of research has shifted from using fiscal stimulus to 
manage aggregated demand, to the effectiveness of fiscal austerity programs 
used to reduce deficits and debt to long term sustainable levels. This shift in policy 
concerns is a vital aspect of the research presented in this thesis, all of which 
examines the challenges of fiscal policy adjustment that have emerged since the 
global financial and economic crisis of 2007-2009.  
Since the global financial and economic crisis of 2007-2009, the external debt in 
many countries increased rapidly, the reason for this is because these countries 
needed to borrow vast amounts from other countries to escape the harsh aspects 
of the recession. However, this borrowing can lead to other challenges, such as 
the fear of “sudden stop” or default. These risks require countries with 
unsustainable external debt levels to undertake fiscal adjustments in order to 
bring their external debt to a sustainable level. While the need for such 
adjustment is understandable, the appropriate speed of adjustment is always up 
for debate.  
The outcomes of fiscal policies used in different countries during and after the 
financial and economic crisis of 2007-2009 as well as the European public finance 
crisis, demonstrates the ability of fiscal policy to effectively reduce debt and deficit 
ratios to sustainable levels, can vary across countries and periods. Unfortunately, 
this has not been documented well in previous research, meaning the factors 
which lead to these differences are not really understood.  
Furthermore, since the global and financial economic crisis of 2007-2009, fiscal 
policy choices are no longer simple and clearly defined, for instance, many people 
consider an expansionary fiscal policy as the optimal choice in a time of 
recession, whilst a tight fiscal policy would be the ideal choice of most 
governments facing high levels of public debts and fiscal deficits. In fact, there 
are many factors which determine one’s fiscal policy choice; although, there is 
still limited research about fiscal policy choice.      
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1.2 Contribution and Principal Results 
The first research chapter, Chapter 3, constructs a simple dynamic deterministic 
model, presenting simulations to critically analyse how the speed of adjustment 
to a sustainable level of debt can affect economic welfare. In the model used in 
Chapter 3, foreign lenders require domestic borrowers to reduce their external 
debt level to a lower and sustainable level by a certain time. Most studies 
involving unsustainable external debts in a small open economy solely focus on 
unanticipated shocks in external debt capacity, which may lead to a sudden stop 
in access to external borrowing. One drawback to these studies is that a small 
open economy is not allowed to choose an optimal path to manage a sudden 
stop.  
Chapter 3 constructs a dynamic deterministic model with two types of goods, 
including tradable and non-tradable goods. In this model, a small open economy 
faces anticipated shocks in the external debt capacity. As the shocks are 
foreseen, the small open economy has the ability to choose an optimal path to 
prevent a sudden stop of inflow capital, while at the same time reducing the risk 
of debt default. This foresight assumption may appear to be somewhat artificial, 
but it can be interpreted as a period allowed by multilateral lenders such as the 
IMF, to enable a country to respond optimally to the reduced borrowing capacity. 
One of the main assumptions of this model is that the total external debt of the 
borrowers is limited by a fraction of the total tradable goods output of the 
economy. It can also be noted that the analysis examines the total borrowing of 
all domestic borrowers: the government and private sector are consolidated 
together for the purpose of this welfare analysis.     
The simulation results of this chapter confirm that borrowers will try to delay 
adjustments for as long as possible. This is reasonable because one key 
assumption used in this model is that borrowers are impatient. When borrowers 
are unable to delay the adjustment process anymore, they will reduce 
consumption of tradable goods in order to repay part of the external debt. During 
the adjustment process, the consumption of non-tradable goods almost remains 
stable, while there is a significant depreciation in real exchange rates (the relative 
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price between non-tradable and tradable goods). An interesting feature of this 
chapter is that the financial constraint, i.e. the constraint of total external debt, is 
not binding during the adjustment path.  
This chapter also extends the baseline model by altering the financial constraint. 
In this modified model, the total external debt is limited by a fraction of the nominal 
GDP. Many of the main simulation results in the modified model are similar to the 
results in the baseline model; although, one of the simulation results in the 
modified model determines that the financial constraint is binding during the 
adjustment path. This can be explained by the effects of change in relative prices, 
especially as the GDP in the financial constraint is nominal. Chapter 3 also 
simulates the model from an out of steady state to a new steady state; this 
enables us to study the effects of credibility, as well as the ability to pre-commit 
to a debt path and not default on payments on the policy outcome.  
Chapter 4 is an empirical work which uses panel-SVAR to estimate the 
government consumption multiplier for a group of 30 countries including 
Australia, Canada, Japan, United States and 26 European countries. As 
mentioned above, there are a limited number of empirical studies about factors 
that affect the fiscal multiplier, which can be considered as an index to evaluate 
the effectiveness of fiscal policy. Furthermore, most empirical studies estimate 
fiscal multipliers for individual countries; this can be a problem when it comes to 
examining factors which affect the size of a fiscal multiplier. Ilzetzki et al (2013) 
is one of the first studies which filled the gap in research literature; although, their 
study only examines how several factors, such as the openness level of the 
economy, the exchange rate regime and the level of public debt, affect the size 
of a fiscal multiplier.  
To enhance this literature, this chapter examines whether the level of financial 
openness, the level of external debt, the level of financial development, the level 
of trade openness and the exchange rate regime affect the size of fiscal 
multipliers. Chapter 4 focuses on the interaction between financial markets (the 
level of financial openness, the level of financial development and the level of 
external debt) and fiscal policy, something which is not studied much by Ilzetzki 
 5 
 
et al (2013). There are four main results discovered in chapter 4: firstly, the 
government consumption multiplier seems to be bigger in countries with higher 
levels of financial openness than in countries with lower levels of financial 
openness. Secondly, the higher the level of external debt, the bigger the 
government consumption multiplier is. Thirdly, the higher the level of financial 
development the smaller the government consumption multiplier is. Finally, the 
government consumption multiplier tends to be bigger in countries with a fixed 
exchange rate regime.  
Chapter 5 is a case study: this chapter analyses fiscal policies in four countries 
including Greece, Latvia, Pakistan and Turkey from 2006 to 2015. This chapter 
together with Chapter 4 helps us to understand in greater detail fiscal policy, and 
why the effectiveness of fiscal policy may vary across countries and across time 
periods. This chapter suggests that policy-makers should design fiscal policy in 
a broader view, with careful consideration of other factors including economic 
conditions, monetary policy and political economy.  
Chapter 5 discovers that even though all of these countries decided to incorporate 
fiscal adjustments to cope with unsustainable fiscal deficits, the effectiveness of 
these decisions vary amongst countries: there are various possible determinants 
for this, even though Chapter 5 only focuses on several factors. To begin with, a 
higher level of public debt and external debt may limit the effectiveness of tight 
fiscal policy in terms of reducing public debt. In fact, the ratio of public debt to 
GDP in Greece - which had a much higher level of public debt and external debt 
ratio than other country - still increased dramatically after implementing fiscal 
adjustments. This is completely different to the changes in public debt ratio that 
occurred in Latvia, Pakistan and Turkey.  
Furthermore, Chapter 5 discovers that as members of the Eurozone, both Greece 
and Latvia implemented a fixed exchange rate regime which led the fiscal 
consolidation programs in these countries be more costly than those in Pakistan 
and Turkey, which have the freedom to decide their own monetary policy, 
especially an exchange rate regime. In fact, as well as the time it took to 
implement these fiscal consolidation programs, there was a massive depreciation 
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of the local currency in Pakistan and Turkey, something which obviously did not 
happen in Greece or Latvia. Chapter 5 also emphasizes that the political 
economy is an important factor which needs to be considered carefully when the 
process of designing fiscal policy is occurring, this is because the political 
economy has the ability to influence fiscal policy direct or indirectly. 
There are two other chapters in this thesis: Chapter 2 reviews a wide range of 
literature about the relationship between fiscal policy and economic activities. 
This chapter will also discuss the effectiveness of fiscal policy in relation to 
Keynesian theory, neo-classical theory, Ricardian Equivalence theorem and New 
Keynesian theory, whilst also reviewing empirical studies about fiscal policy, 
public debt, external debt and economic growth. Although a wide range of 
literature about fiscal policy is discussed in chapter 2, each research chapter also 
has its own literature review which covers relevant literature on its particular 
research topic. 
Chapter 6 concludes this thesis by summarising the key findings of the three 
research chapters and makes suggestions for any future research relating to the 
research compiled in this thesis.    
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Chapter 2. Fiscal Policy: A Review of the Literature 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter examines literature that is relevant to fiscal policy. This chapter 
consists of five sections: section 2.2 reviews theoretical aspects about the 
relationship between fiscal policy and economic growth. Section 2.2 discusses 
the Keynesian view, the neoclassical view, the Ricardian equivalence and the 
New Keynesian view, in relation to the analysis of the impact of fiscal policy on 
output, whilst also reviewing the theoretical aspects of fiscal sustainability. 
Section 2.3 reviews the results of the empirical research regarding the 
effectiveness of fiscal policy, whilst also discussing the results of fiscal 
adjustments in OECD countries so as to understand more about the differences 
between implementing fiscal adjustments by cuts in government spending and 
incorporating fiscal adjustments by increasing taxes. This section also surveys 
empirical research relating to the sudden stop and the optimal policy implemented 
under a sudden stop, which is also the main focus of Chapter 3 of this thesis in 
section 2.4. Finally, section 2.5 summarises the main aspects discussed in this 
chapter.    
2.2. The effectiveness of fiscal policy: a theoretical review 
There has been a long debate about whether fiscal consolidations are 
contractionary or expansionary. A few of the main views which relate to this topic 
include the Keynesian view, neo-classical view, the Ricardian equivalence and 
the New Keynesian theory: all four of these views will be reviewed in this section.  
2.2.1 Keynesian view about the relationship between government spending 
and output    
According to the traditional Keynesian theory, public spending is identified as an 
effective policy tool for policy-makers; the Keynesian model however, only 
explains the relationship between public spending and the level of output in short-
term. 
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The Keynesian model points out that a decrease in government purchases or an 
increase in taxes leads to a reduction in the aggregated demand and income 
directly, which further affects aggregated demand through the negative 
“Keynesian multiplier” effect. The consequences of this are a decline in output 
and an increase in unemployment. The Keynesian multiplier was first developed 
by Kahn (1931), and is defined as an exogenous increase in spending that will 
lead to an increase in total spending by a multiple of that increase. On this view, 
deficits stimulate both consumption and savings, implying that national incomes 
and capital accumulation will increase, which means that appropriately timed 
deficits do have beneficial consequences.  
The value of the Keynesian multiplier is believed to be greater than one. In order 
to illustrate this, it is necessary to review the simple Keynesian model, which is 
also known as the Keynesian Cross, which most commonly appears in 
undergraduate macroeconomics courses. The simple Keynesian model models 
a closed economy in which output is determined by aggregated demand and 
output; this is because this model assumes rigid prices and excess capacity. We 
can write the equilibrium equation of Keynesian Cross: 
𝑌 = 𝐶 + 𝐼 + 𝐺          (2.1) 
where 𝐼 = 𝐼 ̅is exogenous planned investment. 𝐶 = 𝐶(𝑌 − 𝑇) is the consumption 
function. 𝐺 = ?̅? and 𝑇 = ?̅? are government policy variables. mpc represents the 
marginal propensity to consume. It means:  
∆C = ∆Y.mpc     (2.2) 
and mpc is less than 1.  
Therefore, if there is a change in government spending (∆G) then the equilibrium 
condition changes to: 
∆𝑌 = ∆𝐶 + ∆𝐺 
           We have ∆I = 0 because I is assumed as an exogenous variable. 
           Substitute (2.2) into (2.1), ∆Y = ∆Y.mpc + ∆G  
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Thus,                                          
 ∆𝑌 = ∆𝐺.
1
1 − 𝑚𝑝𝑐
 
 𝑘 =
1
1 − 𝑚𝑝𝑐
 
            k is the multiplier for government spending.  
Similarly, by assuming I and G are exogenous, this model points out that the tax 
multiplier is –mpc/(1-mpc). Since mpc is less than 1, it is easy to see that the 
government purchase multiplier is greater than 1 and larger than the tax 
multiplier. If income tax appeared in the model, the Keynesian multiplier would 
become: 
 𝑘 =
1
1 − 𝑚𝑝𝑐(1 − 𝑡)
 
where t is the income tax rate. In this case, the Keynesian multiplier is less than 
those with no income taxes, but still greater than unity. 
Extending the simple Keynesian model for open economy, the equilibrium 
equation (2.1) becomes:  
𝑌 = 𝐶 + 𝐼 + 𝐺 + 𝑁𝑋       (2.3) 
where NX stands for net export, which is equal to imports minus exports. Similarly 
used for a closed economy, the model also points out the new Keynesian 
multiplier for open economy:  
𝑘 =
1
1 − 𝑚𝑝𝑐(1 − 𝑡) + 𝑐
 
where c signifies the marginal propensity to import. It is clear that the Keynesian 
multiplier in an open economy is less than the Keynesian multiplier in a closed 
economy.   
According to the IMF research department (2009), “the fiscal multiplier is the ratio 
of a change in output to an exogenous change in the fiscal deficit with respect to 
their respective baseline” and its size depends on country, time and 
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circumstance. Based on the time frame considered, there are many different 
multipliers: 
The impact multiplier = ∆Yt / ∆Gt 
The multiplier at a given time N = ∆Yt+N / ∆Gt 
The cumulative multiplier, which is defined as the cumulative change in output 
over the cumulative change in fiscal expenditure at given time N, =
∑ ∆𝑌𝑡+𝑖
𝑁
𝑖=0
∑ ∆𝐺𝑡+𝑖
𝑁
𝑖=0
 
In a more complete Keynesian model, the appearance of crowding-out effects 
through induced changes in interest rate and exchange rate alters the size of 
fiscal multiplier. Therefore, the Keynesian multiplier effects are partially offset 
during the adjustment process; some of these offsets are illustrated in the 
following figure: 
Figure 2.1 IS-LM model 
  
                 In the IS-LM model for a closed economy at equilibrium point,  
          Y = C(Y) + I(r) + G                 (2.4) 
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where r is the interest rate. As a result of Keynesian Cross, a fiscal expansion 
(i.e. government spending) ∆G will lead to an increase in output from Y1 to Y2 as 
can be seen in figure 2.1, with the multiplier being equal to (Y2 – Y1)/ ∆G. 
However, fiscal expansion by issuing debt that leads to higher interest rates 
(interest rate increases from r1 to r2) may reduce private investment. Therefore, 
the IS curve shifts right to ISꞌ and the private investment reduces and the output 
will reduce from Y2 to Y3. It is easy to see that the crowding out effect through 
interest rates will reduce the size of the fiscal multiplier from (Y2 – Y1)/ ∆G to (Y3 
– Y1)/ ∆G.  
In addition, there can also be crowding out through the exchange rate in the open 
economy IS-LM model. This is because higher interest rates will attract capital 
inflows which will increase the exchange rate; therefore, there is a decrease in 
the external current account that offsets the increase in domestic demand, which 
is the result of a fiscal expansion. It is easy to see that the crowding out effect 
through the exchange rate is larger if the degree of capital mobility is higher: 
therefore, if a country has a higher level of financial openness, the multiplier will 
most likely be smaller. 
Hemming et al (2002) review the literature about crowding out effects and 
summarise that the crowding out through interest rates and the exchange rates 
can be affected by several features of the IS-LM framework. To begin with, the 
crowding out effect is affected by the determinants of private investment, it can 
be determined that the crowding out effect will be larger if the investment is more 
sensitive to interest rates. Secondly, the crowding out effect through interest rates 
is based upon the assumption that one’s demand for money is linked to interest 
rates and income: the less sensitive demands for money are to interest rates, the 
more sensitive they are to income, which causes a larger crowding out effect. 
Whilst, openness and the exchange rate regime also has an influence over the 
crowding out effect. In an economy with a flexible exchange rate, capital inflows 
attracted by higher interest rates will increase the exchange rate; so, if capital 
mobility is perfect then there is a complete crowding out effect making the fiscal 
policy ineffective. In contrast, in an economy with a fixed exchange rate, a fiscal 
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expansion will create a smaller increase in interest rates than it would in a closed 
economy, this means that if the capital mobility is perfect then the fiscal policy is 
very effective, because the money supply will increase to ensure that domestic 
interest rates do not rise. 
According to the Keynesian view, fiscal policy only affects the output through the 
demand side. In a Keynesian economy, a fiscal expansion will shift the 
aggregated demand curve right, while the aggregated supply curve remains 
stable. The diagram below of the AD-AS model illustrates the impact of fiscal 
policy on the output in a Keynesian economy. 
 
Evidently, it is difficult to obtain an agreement regarding the size of the fiscal 
multiplier, which can lead to a debate about the size of the fiscal multiplier and 
the factors that affect its size. This particular debate is important to economies 
that are in a fiscal consolidation mode; the fiscal multiplier is simply considered 
as a measure of how changes in fiscal policy (government expenditure and 
taxation) impact the wider economy; the smaller the multipliers, the lower the cost 
for fiscal consolidation, the greater the multiplier, the more effective the stimulus 
package. 
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2.2.2 Ricardian equivalence theorem 
In the 1970s, Robert J. Barro set up what is now called the Ricardian equivalence 
theorem. Whilst the Keynesian approach is based on an assumption that 
consumption is related to current income, the Ricardian equivalence is based 
upon two main assumptions. The first is that the government faces an inter-
temporal budget constraint similar to that faced by a consumer. Similar to a 
consumer’s lifetime budget constraint (ignoring interest rates), we can derive a 
similar budget constraint for the government: 
∑ 𝛾𝑡 = ∑ 𝜏𝑡
∞
0
∞
0
 
where γt and τt are used for government expenditures and government revenues 
respectively, rather than G and T which only refer to government purchases (of 
goods and services) and tax revenues respectively. Due to this budget constraint, 
it is easy to see that the government cannot run a primary deficit, i.e. a level of 
expenditure on goods and services G, which is greater than taxation and other 
revenue T, forever. This signifies either an increase in expenditure or a tax cut, 
which means that spending is greater than revenues and will ultimately have to 
be financed through a tax increase or a cut in spending in the future to make the 
revenue greater than spending. 
The second key assumption is that consumers are forward-looking and are fully 
known of the government’s inter-temporal budget constraint. Therefore, 
consumers will anticipate, based upon the governments financial strategies on 
whether they issue new debt instead of raising taxes, that consumers will most 
likely need to pay higher taxes in the future. Permanent income is consequently 
unaffected, and in the absence of liquidity constraints and with perfect capital 
markets, consumption will not alter (Barro, 1974). It can be conjectured that there 
is Ricardian equivalence between taxation and debt: perfect Ricardian 
equivalence considers a decrease in government saving resulting from tax cuts 
which can be fully offset by higher private saving. Therefore, aggregated demand 
is unaffected, meaning that the fiscal multiplier is equal to zero. 
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According to Ricardian equivalence, fiscal policy has no impact on the economy. 
If the government decides to lower tax, consumers will normally consume more; 
however, within an economy using assumptions of Ricardian equivalence, 
consumers will simply consider the government’s decision as a trade-off, whereby 
it may be lower tax today but it will most likely be higher tax in the future, which 
means consumers are unlikely to increase consumption. Secondly, if the 
government decides to increase government spending, consumers in a Ricardian 
world will know that they will face a higher tax in the future, and as a result of this, 
will reduce their consumption. This decrease will offset any increase in 
government spending. 
Due to a few unrealistic assumptions in the Ricardian equivalence, including 
perfect capital markets, individuals living forever or caring for progeny as much 
as caring for themselves, there are numerous arguments against the Ricardian 
equivalence hypothesis comprising of consumer myopia, borrowing constraints 
and future generations. 
2.2.3 Neoclassical Theory on the relationship between public spending and 
output growth 
Neoclassical economics has developed other theories relating the impact of fiscal 
policy on economic growth, such as the Ricardian equivalence theorem as well 
as rational expectations to explain the relationship between fiscal consolidations 
and economic growth. Neoclassical models consider other transmission 
mechanisms by which reductions in government budget deficits can affect the 
economy; it can especially affect wealth and people’s expectations, which may 
outweigh the negative impacts on demand and economies activities. According 
to neoclassical theory, fiscal policy has an impact on output growth due to its 
effect on aggregated demand and labour supply. In order to understand these 
elements in greater detail, we must first look at how fiscal policies affect economic 
growth through demand side and supply side. 
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2.2.3.1 The demand side 
First of all, how wealth effects on consumption will be considered: as highlighted 
in Keynesian economy, private consumption solely depends on disposable 
income, this means that when government spending decreases, private 
consumption will also decrease. However, a cut in government spending should 
be a signal to consumers that a reduction in the future tax burden is imminent, 
which should generate a positive wealth effect. Not only cuts in government 
spending, but an increase in taxation can also have expansionary effects on 
consumption, because as Blanchard (1990b) argues, if a tax increase today 
generates the expectation of less dramatic tax increases tomorrow, it could have 
expansionary impacts on economic growth.  
Bertola and Drazen (1993) construct a model in which national income is 
assumed to be constant, while government spending, in their opinion, follows a 
random walk with a positive drift. When there are low levels of government 
spending, any increase in government spending will lead to a less than one-to-
one reduction in private consumption. This means that the multiplier is still be 
positive.  
Bertola and Drazen (1993) ascertain that even a small cut in government 
spending could have powerful positive effects on private consumption when there 
are high levels of government spending. 
Bertola and Drazen state that “a policy innovation that would be contractionary in 
a static model may be expansionary if it induces sufficiently strong expectations 
of future policy changes in the opposite direction”. 
Giavazzi and Pagano (1996) share Bertola and Drazen’s viewpoint; they 
determine that large fiscal adjustments can have positive impacts on output, as 
they generate expectations about a permanent and decisive change in the stance 
of fiscal policy. 
Wealth effect is clearly based upon the assumption that large spending cuts 
signal a permanent change in the stance of fiscal policy. On the other hand, those 
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who take a more pessimistic stance assume that large spending cuts threaten 
the political survival of a government committed to fiscal austerity; therefore, a 
wealth effect may not be as large as expected.  
Alesina and Perotti (1997) consider the effects of fiscal consolidation in relation 
to the output through the demand side and find that a tightening fiscal policy may 
have positive impacts on the output via the credibility effect. Alesina and Perotti 
(1997) argue that fiscal adjustments, especially in countries with high levels of 
public debt, may have an important credibility effect on interest rates through 
traditional crowding-in mechanisms or by reducing the default risk. Giavazzi and 
Pagano (1996) argue that a fiscal consolidation can reduce the default premium 
on public debt if it can restore government solvency, where former policies were 
deemed unsustainable. Therefore, tightening fiscal policy has the ability to 
decline interest rates, which in turn generates crowding in effects for private 
investment and consumption of durable goods. The credibility effect is a complex 
issue which needs to be looked into in greater detail through empirical research. 
2.2.3.2 The supply side 
Previous research relating to the role of fiscal policy on economic output 
traditionally focuses on the demand-side effects. However to truly understand the 
impact it has on economic growth, the long term issues, such as supply-side 
effects need to be examined, because if the economy is operating at full capacity, 
a fiscal expansion has to be crowded out. Only fiscal policies with supply-side 
effects can affect capacity constraints; however, supply-side effects can make 
short-term demand-side effects through expectations linked to long-term growth. 
For fiscal expansion to have positive effects on the supply side the fiscal multiplier 
should be bigger; although, if a fiscal expansion has negative effects on the 
supply, the fiscal multiplier should be smaller and in some cases negative. 
Numerous economists consider that fiscal policy can affect the supply-side 
through labour supply. As previously discussed, permanent reductions in 
government spending can have positive impacts on the demand side via the 
wealth effect; however, the same wealth effects may reduce labour supply. The 
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reason for this is because wealth effects on the demand side increase private 
consumptions, which means that individuals have the option to participate in more 
leisure activities than work ones, this outcome will most certainly lead to a 
decrease in labour supply. 
It can be determined that fiscal policy has two opposite effects on labour supply: 
a tight fiscal policy with cuts in government spending financed by taxes will reduce 
labour supply through a wealth effect, while the substitution effect will increase 
labour supply because there is a reduction in income tax, which in turn increases 
work effort and therefore, increases labour supply. A loosening of fiscal policy will 
work in vice versa.  
The wealth effect seems to be a permanent aspect of government spending cuts, 
whereas the substitution effect seems to be more prominent when governments 
want to implement temporary spending cuts. Although, according to Alesina and 
Perotti (1997), empirical works suggest that both the wealth effect and the 
substitution effect on individual labour supply are small.  
2.2.4 New Keynesian theory 
According to Cogan et al (2009), “the term ‘New Keynesian’ is used to indicate 
that the models have forward looking or rational expectations by individuals and 
firms, and some form of price rigidity, usually staggered price or wage setting”. 
New Keynesian theory proposes that an increase in government expenditure will 
crowd out private spending and lead to an increase in interest rates. This theory 
is certainly contrary to the old Keynesian viewpoint, which considered an increase 
in government spending had a multiplier effect on output and would therefore lead 
to an increase in consumption expenditure.   
Cogan et al (2009) use the Smets-Wouters (2007) model to estimate the 
multiplier and discover that the multiplier from a permanent increase in federal 
government purchases is significantly less in New Keynesian models than in 
traditional Keynesian models. In the new model the multiplier is less than one 
because an increase in government spending crowds out investment and private 
consumption. Galí et al (2007) also use a New Keynesian model to estimate the 
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multiplier; their estimated multiplier is quite high, however, their model 
incorporates two assumptions that make it more similar to the traditional 
Keynesian model. Galí et al assume that at least 50% of consumers are rule-of-
thumb consumers, who do not own any assets or any liabilities, and simply 
consume their current labour income; which makes the marginal propensity to 
consume much higher. They also assume that employment is demand-
determined; therefore, workers are always ready to work whenever the firm 
requires. 
In the new Keynesian model, the multiplier still has the ability to be large, 
especially in the “Zero Lower Bound”.   
2.2.5 Institutional aspects of fiscal policy 
The previous sections discuss the views of schools of economics such as 
traditional Keynesian theory, neoclassical theory and New Keynesian theory in 
relation to how fiscal policy affects output. While these schools of economics try 
to determine and define channels where fiscal policy affects output, it is easy to 
see that the impact of fiscal policy on economic activity can also depend on 
institutional and political factors, which will be discussed in this section. 
The impact of fiscal policy on economic activity can depend upon the inside and 
outside lags. Long lags will reduce short-term fiscal multipliers; but, the difference 
between inside lags and outside lags should still be distinguished. There are four 
policy lags: the recognition lag, decision lag, implementation lag and impact lag. 
The first three are inside lags while the last one is an outside lag. According to 
Helming et al (2002), “Inside lags reflect the time it takes to recognize that fiscal 
policy should be change and then to put appropriate fiscal measures in place” 
while “outside lags reflects the time it takes for fiscal measures to feed through to 
aggregate demand”. The impact of fiscal policy depends on outside lags, whereas 
inside lags tend to reduce the effectiveness of fiscal policy.  
What is more, the effectiveness of fiscal policy can also be affected by political 
economy considerations; according to Alesina and Perotti (1995), large and 
persistent deficits may be a result of several political economy factors. For 
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instance, current voters and policy-makers prefer to delegate fiscal 
consolidations to future generations rather than dealing with it themselves. Also, 
fiscal adjustments may be carried out too late due to conflicts regarding sharing 
costs between various groups: this is because fiscal adjustments are not free; 
they even cost more in terms of output. Whilst, policy makers and voters may not 
be fully aware or fully understand the fiscal status; which can cause them to have 
fiscal illusions which can lead to incorrect fiscal policies. Finally, current 
governments may issue more debt in order to limit the fiscal maneuvering 
capabilities of future governments, who may have different priorities when it 
comes to consumption. If this is the case, debt accumulation is a strategic 
instrument which can be used to sort out any differences between the current 
government and future governments. It is clear that these political economy 
factors may lead to persistent deficits which can have a negative impact on the 
economy: this negative impact can offset any positive impact of fiscal 
adjustments. 
The level of development also affects the impact of fiscal policy on economic 
activity. There is limited research about the fiscal multiplier in developing 
countries; it seems that the Keynesian impact of change in government spending 
and government tax may not be affected a great deal in developing countries. 
According to Agenor et al (1999), it is less effective to use fiscal policy for demand 
management because in developing countries, economic activities seem to be 
greatly affected by supply shocks. However, there are some features of 
developing countries which can affect the impact of fiscal policy (the size of fiscal 
multiplier). For example, fiscal policy seems to be harder to implement in 
developing countries because these countries usually have relatively poor tax 
administrations and expenditure management.   
The amount of impact deficit reduction will have on demand and output, and how 
long it will take before the long run effects (if any) materialize cannot be answered 
by theory alone; empirical research needs to be carried out in order to answer 
these questions. Findings of some previous empirical studies will be discussed in 
section 2.3. 
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2.2.6 Fiscal sustainability 
Fiscal sustainability assessment has become an important focus for 
macroeconomic analysis at the World Bank and IMF. There is, however, no exact 
definition of fiscal sustainability. There are two popular approaches to assessing 
fiscal sustainability, including the accounting approach and the present value 
borrowing constrain approach.  
2.2.6.1 The accounting approach 
The simpler method to assess fiscal sustainability is the accounting approach, 
which uses several indicators, such as the debt to income ratio to measures how 
a sustainable fiscal policy is. This approach presumes that a primary deficit is 
sustainable if it creates a constant debt to income ratio. A primary deficit is also 
defined as excess spending, excluding interest payments on existing debt over 
revenue including seigniorage. Blanchard et al (1990) consider that a sustainable 
fiscal policy has to make the debt ratio converge to its initial level. While Pasinetti 
(1998) defines public debt as being sustainable, if the ratio of public debt to GDP 
declines or at least remains constant.  
                               (
𝐷
𝑌
)
𝑡
≤ (
𝐷
𝑌
)
0
      
Goldstein (2003) agrees with Pasinetti (1998) that a sustainable fiscal policy 
needs to keep the debt ratio stable or shrinking. It is easy to see that the 
accounting approach solely focuses on the debt ratio to evaluate the sustainability 
of a fiscal policy. Therefore, a sustainable fiscal policy is a policy which keeps the 
debt ratio stable or decreasing.  
2.2.6.2 The present value borrowing constraint approach 
The present value borrowing constraint approach provides a fuller consideration 
about the sustainability of fiscal policy. In this approach, a fiscal policy is 
sustainable if the present value of future primary surpluses, plus the present value 
of inflation-related revenues is equal to the initial real value of the government’s 
debt. Fiscal policy is sustainable when it can hold the intertemporal budget 
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constraint without leading the government into insolvency. To begin analysing 
fiscal sustainability the intertemporal budget constraint should be incorporated, 
an analysis which is expressed by Burnside et al (2005) as the following: 
  𝑏?̇? = 𝑟𝑏𝑡 − (𝜏𝑡 − 𝑔𝑡 − 𝑣𝑡) −
𝑀𝑡̇
𝑃𝑡
   
where bt is the dollar value of the stock of government’s debt of foreign reserves, 
and r is the constant real interest rate when the government lends or borrows 
from the international capital market. 𝜏𝑡 is the real tax revenue, gt is the real 
government spending and vt is the real transfer.  
Thus, 𝜏𝑡 − 𝑔𝑡 − 𝑣𝑡 is the real government surplus, while Mt is the level of money 
supply and Pt is the price level. 
In the above equation, ?̇? is the derivative of x with respect to time or ?̇? = 𝑑𝑥/𝑑𝑡 
2.3 The effectiveness of fiscal policy: empirical evidence 
2.3.1 Fiscal multiplier: empirical studies 
The size of the fiscal multiplier is important for policy-makers to issue a fiscal 
policy and yet makes it impossible to calculate it theoretically. Even though, there 
is extensive literature related to this, there is still no consensus regarding the size 
of fiscal multipliers, even within the IMF. 
In March 2009, an IMF staff note prepared for the G-20 Ministerial Meeting used 
a range of multiplier values which included 0.3 to 0.6 on revenue, 0.5 to 1.8 on 
capital spending and 0.3 to 1 on other spending. 
Previous research relating to IMF staff suggests that, on average, fiscal 
multipliers were about 0.5 in advanced economies during the three decades 
before 2009. This, of course, lead to an optimistic view about fiscal consolidation. 
However, during the current crisis, and after undertaking fiscal consolidation, the 
question arose of whether negative short-term effects of fiscal consolidation were 
larger than expected because fiscal multipliers had been underestimated? In 
order to answer this question, Blanchard and Leigh (2012) used data from 28 
economies including advanced economies in the G20 and member countries of 
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the EU. They discovered that the actual multipliers, since the beginning of the 
Great Recession, were much higher than originally forecast. According to their 
findings, the actual multipliers ranged from 0.9 to 1.7; in stark contrast to the 0.5 
initially determined by the IMF. This, of course, is welcomed by Keynesian 
economists, because this backs up their previous warning about the dangers of 
austerity. Significant changes are required in fiscal policy, especially by policy 
makers who want to escape the current crisis by an austerity plan aimed at 
reducing the structural deficit. The IMF (2012) suggests that Britain should relax 
its fiscal consolidation strategy until the economy improves. Blanchard (2013) 
also states that Britain should rethink their economic plan; however, the 
recommendation from the IMF (2012) was later on withdrawn (2013). This 
confusion adds to the debate on whether austerity policy is an obstruction to 
recovery and economic growth. 
One of the most recent surveys about the size of fiscal multipliers is Ramey’s 
study. Ramey (2011) takes into consideration earlier research and concludes that 
“…despite significant differences in methodology, the range of plausible 
estimates for the multiplier in the case of a temporary increase in government 
spending that is deficit financed is probably 0.8 to 1.5.” This paper will divide 
empirical research regarding the size of fiscal multipliers which are based upon 
the model to estimate the fiscal multipliers and review results. One debate which 
centres on the size of the fiscal multipliers has been contested regarding which 
method should be used to estimate the fiscal multipliers. This contentious debate 
emanates from the two directions relationship between government consumption 
and output, as government consumption has the capability to affect output, while 
output also has the ability to affect government consumption. In order to estimate 
fiscal multipliers, the model which is used should distinguish these directions of 
the relationship between government consumption and output. 
There are several methods used to estimate the multipliers. Firstly, countless 
studies use macroeconomic models to estimate fiscal multipliers. There are two 
main types of macroeconomic models used to estimate fiscal multipliers, 
including large macroeconomic models which estimate empirically, such as the 
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IMF MULTIMOD model, and then there are the smaller dynamic general 
equilibrium models which are calibrated and solved numerically. The limitation of 
these models is that they cannot obtain a single or definitive fiscal multiplier 
because the results will depend upon other factors. The estimated results 
obtained from these models are normally a wide range of fiscal multipliers; this in 
itself can lead to difficulties in obtaining a clear conclusion from the empirical 
evidence. 
Secondly, there are a plethora of studies which use a vector auto-regression 
model to estimate the fiscal multipliers, especially after Blanchard and Perotti 
(2002).  
The results obtained from these studies and the methods used will be reviewed 
in the following sections. 
2.3.1.1 Estimate fiscal multiplier by using macroeconomic models 
Table 2.1 highlights that most research finds short-term multipliers as a positive 
aspect and the range of the estimated short-term multipliers is wide, but most 
expenditure multipliers range from 0.5 to 1.7, whereas most tax multipliers range 
from 0.3 to 0.8. In short-term spending multipliers there are a greater number of 
tax multipliers. These findings are consistent with previous studies. This result is 
also a standard result from a simple macroeconomic model in which a tax cut 
may lead to additional savings as well as more consumption. While the IMF 
(1996) found a short-term tax multiplier for the United States at 0.7 while the 
short-term spending multiplier was 1.1. Dalsgaard, Andre and Richardson (2001) 
use the OECD INTERLINK model and discovered that spending multipliers for 
the United States, Japan and Germany were significantly greater than tax 
multipliers.  
Most research determined that long-term multipliers were generally smaller than 
short-term multipliers. The long-term multipliers were negative in many cases but 
small in term of absolute value, except for a case involving the IMF (1996) which 
found a long-term multiplier at -0.6 in the United States. Dalsgaard et al (2001) 
discovered a negative long-term multiplier in Germany (-0.2) while Hunt and 
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Laxton (2002) who used the IMF MULTIMOD model to obtain their results found 
long-term multipliers negative in Germany, France and Italy. There is no evidence 
for negative short-term multipliers.  
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Author, time and 
model 
Monetary policy 
assumption 
Canada France Germany Italy Japan UK US 
S L S L S L S L S L S L S L 
Richardson (1988) 
OECD INTERLINK 
Unchanged short-
term interest rates 
and exchange rates 
0.8 0.5 0.6 1.6 1.0 0.6 0.9 0.8 1.2 1.5 1.0 0.7 1.3 1.3 
Dalsgaard et al 
(2001) 
OECD INTERLINK 
Unchanged real 
interest rates and 
nominal exchange 
rates 
0.5 
 
-0.2 
 
0.6 
 
0.2 1.1 
-0.5 
-0.2 
-0.3 
0.9 0.0 1.7 
-0.4 
0.5 
-0.4 
0.2 -0.1 1.0 
-0.6 
0.1 
-0.3 
Roger et al (2002) + No interest rate 
response 
+ Price level 
targeting 
       N/A 0.87 
 
0.77 
-0.06 
 
-0.05 
0.86 
 
0.69 
-0.04 
 
-0.04 
0.85 
 
0.73 
-0.04 
 
-0.03 
       N/A 0.95 
 
0.51 
-0.04 
 
-0.03 
     N/A 
Hunt et al (2003) Unchanged nominal 
exchange rate in 1 
year then inflation 
targeting 
N/A 1.33 -0.16 1.26 -0.19 1.32 -0.18 N/A N/A N/A 
Table 2.1 Fiscal multiplier – Estimating by Macro-model simulation 
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In table 2.1, S stands for short-term multiplier while L stands for long-term 
multiplier. Numbers which are written in italic, if any, are tax multiplier. 
Alternatively, there are many studies which use dynamic general equilibrium 
models to analyse the impact effects of fiscal policy on a range of macroeconomic 
variables including output. A number of previous studies used a neo-classical 
growth model while more recent studies use New-Keynesian models. 
There are different factors that affect the multipliers obtained with DSGE models. 
In general, a fiscal shock will lead to a negative wealth effect on households, this 
event reduces consumption and increases labour supply. It can also reduce real 
wages and consumption. This means that there is a decline in private demand 
which can offset most of the increase in public demand. As a result of this offset, 
output will increase less than the increase in government consumption. In other 
words, the wealth effect makes fiscal policy less effective. The size of the 
multiplier depends on factors such as the inter-temporal elasticity of labour supply 
and the persistence of the shock to government spending.  
Baxter and King (1993) discover that permanent changes in government 
spending lead to larger output effects than temporary changes. These findings 
match those of Aiyagari et al (1992) and Devereux, Head and Lapham (1996); 
who all determined that a large (permanent) stimulus would increase the steady-
state capital stock and cause a greater increase in investment in both the short-
run and long-run. 
Studies which revolved around the multiplier using the DSGE models found 
government spending multipliers to be higher than tax multipliers. This is 
supported by Roeger et al (2010), who determine that the government purchase 
multiplier is 0.5, while the tax multiplier is below 0.4, an aspect which is supported 
by Coenen et al (2012). 
2.3.1.2 Estimate fiscal multiplier by VAR model 
The first application of a structural VAR to investigate fiscal policy, i.e. the 
relationship between government spending, taxation and output is approached 
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by Blanchard and Perotti (2002), who consider the structural VAR approach to be 
more suitable for the study of fiscal policy than for monetary policy. Blanchard 
and Perotti (2002) use a basic VAR specification:  
      Yt = A(L,q)Yt-1 + Ut 
where Yt is a three-dimensional vector in the logarithms of quarterly taxes, 
spending and GDP, all in real per capita terms.  
Data from the US from 1947q1 to 1997q4 is used, where the short-term fiscal 
multiplier is around 0.5 and the medium-term fiscal multiplier is also around 0.5. 
Here, “short-term” can be defined as a time gap ranging from the present to one 
year after the fiscal shock, while “medium-term” is considered a time gap ranging 
from 1 year to 3 years since fiscal shock.    
Countless studies have followed Blanchard and Perotti (2002) and have used 
VAR or SVAR models to estimate the size of fiscal multipliers. Table 2.2 briefly 
summarizes the empirical researches regarding fiscal multipliers, by using VAR 
or SVAR models.              
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Table 2.2 Fiscal multiplier – Estimating by VAR model 
Author and time Data Impact fiscal 
multiplier 
Variables 
Blanchard and Perotti (2002) US (1947q1-1997q4) 0.5 GDP, tax and government spending 
Perotti (2004) Germany(1960q1-1974q4) 
Germany(1975q1-1989q4) 
UK(1963q1-1979q4) 
UK(1980q1-2001q2) 
US (1960q1-1979q4) 
US (1980q1-2001q4) 
0.36 
NA 
0.48 
-0.27 
1.29 
0.36 
Government spending per capita, taxes revenue 
per capita, real GDP per capita, the GDP deflator 
inflation and the 10-year nominal interest rate 
De Castro (2006) Spain (1980q1-2001q2) 1.14-1.54 
(medium-term 
multiplier) 
Public expenditure, net taxes, real GDP, GDP 
deflator and the three-month interest rate 
Gali et al (2007) US (1954q1-2003q4) 0.74 Small VAR: Government spending, output, 
consumption and the deficit 
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De Castro et al (2008) Spain (1981q1-2004q4) 1.3  
Burriel et al (2010) Euro Area (1981q1-2007q4) 0.75 Public expenditure, net taxes, GDP, GDP deflator 
and the ten-year interest rate of government 
bonds 
Ramey (2011) US (1939q1-2008q4) 0.9 to 1.8 Total government spending, GDP, total hours 
worked, nondurable services consumption, 
private fixed investment, the Barro-Redlick (2010) 
tax rate and nominal compensation in private 
business divide by the deflator in private business 
Baum and Koester (2011) Germany (1971q-2004q4) 0.7 The growth rate in government revenue, growth 
rate in government spending and growth rate in 
GDP 
Ilzetzki, Mendoza and Vegh 
(2013) 
44 countries (24 developing 
countries) 
0.37 high income 
countries, -0.21 
developing 
countries. 
GDP and government consumption 
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Table 2.2 summaries the main features of some of the studies which used the 
VAR model to estimate the multiplier. Although all of the papers use similar 
methodology, there are still some papers which have interesting features. First of 
all, Galí et al (2007) use both large VAR and small VAR data for the US over the 
period 1954q1 to 2003q4, to estimate the government spending multiplier. What 
is interesting about this paper is that it estimates the multipliers by two different 
VAR models, both the large VAR model and the small VAR model. By using two 
different VAR models, the results obtained by Galí et al (2007) may guide other 
economists, who also plan to use the VAR model to study fiscal policy, on how to 
choose variables to construct a VAR model. According to Galí et al (2007), the 
large VAR model has 8 variables: government spending, GDP, hours worked, 
consumption of non-durable goods and services, private non-residential 
investment, the real wage, the budget deficit and personal disposable income; 
whereas the small VAR model includes 4 variables: government spending, 
output, consumption and the deficit. The results highlight that the government 
spending multiplier estimated by the small VAR is larger than the multiplier 
estimated by the large VAR in the short-term (0.74 and 0.68) and in medium-term 
(0.75 and 0.70 at 4th quarter after government spending shock). However, 
government spending estimated by the large VAR is larger than that estimated 
by the small VAR in the long-term (1.74 and 1.22 at 8th quarter after government 
spending shock). 
The model most similar to the one I would use to estimate is the one used by 
Ilzetzki, Mendoza and Vegh (2013). They estimate a SVAR model using a large 
international data set:  
 A𝑌𝑛,𝑡 = ∑ 𝐶𝑘𝑌𝑛,𝑡−𝑘 + 𝐵𝑢𝑛,𝑡
𝐾
𝑘=1
 
where Yn,t is a vector of variables comprising government expenditure, GDP and 
other endogenous variables such as the real exchange rate and the policy 
interest rate set by the central bank. Furthermore, in order to distinguish the 
differences between fiscal multipliers in different groups of countries, they only 
estimate a benchmark model for two variables: government consumption and 
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GDP. The impact multiplier for high-income countries is 0.37, whereas in 
developing countries, this number is -0.21. Ilzetzki, Mendoza and Vegh (2013) 
also discover that there is a significant difference between a multiplier within 
predetermined exchange rate regimes (0.09 for impact multiplier and 1.5 for long-
run multiplier) and a multiplier within flexible exchange rate regimes (the impact 
multiplier is statistically negative and the long-run multiplier is statistically 
indistinguishable from zero).  
Furthermore, Ilzetzki, Mendoza and Vegh (2013) also base the ratio of total trade 
to GDP so as to classify countries into groups of open countries and groups of 
closed countries. For open countries the impact multiplier is 0.11 and the long-
run multiplier is 1.4, while in closed countries the impact multiplier is negative and 
the long-run multiplier is also negative. Ilzetzki, Mendoza and Vegh (2013) also 
point out that the impact fiscal multiplier may give misleading information, 
because fiscal shocks such as fiscal stimulus packages are carried out over time 
and this can lead to lags in the economy’s response. Therefore, the cumulative 
multipliers should be also considered. One of the most important contributions to 
the literature of Ilzetzki, Mendza and Vegh (2013) is that their paper is the first 
known attempt of cataloguing available quarterly data on government 
consumption in a broad set of countries. They use data from 44 countries from 
1960q1 to 2007q4, of which 24 are developing countries, classified as such, and 
based on the World Bank income classifications.   
One limitation of the VAR model is known as “fiscal foresight problem”. The 
reason for this problem is that any changes in government spending and taxes 
can be anticipated due to legislative and implementation lags, therefore, the fiscal 
shock may appear in the economy the moment agents anticipate the government 
decisions. Thus, the VAR models may fail to estimate fiscal shocks correctly if 
agents are assumed to be forward looking. In light of this problem, Ramey (2011) 
compares the results between standard VAR methods and the narrative 
approach for identifying shocks to government spending. Ramey illustrates that 
the main difference is that the narrative approach shocks appear to capture the 
timing of the news about future increases in government spending much better 
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than the standard VAR which captures the shocks too late, meaning, it may not 
capture the initial decline in consumption and real wages that could appear at the 
moment the agents are aware of the news. 
2.3.2 Fiscal consolidation and output 
There are numerous empirical studies carried out in order to distinguish the 
relationship between fiscal consolidations and output. Most research focuses on 
the question of how fiscal adjustments affect economic growth. Giavazzi and 
Pagano (1990) used data from some European countries in the 1980s to shed 
light on two contending views about the effects of a fiscal contraction: the 
Keynesian view and the “expectation” view or “German view”. In order to do this, 
Giavazzi and Pagano (1990) ran regressions for 10 countries; they ran a 
regression for each country and each regression used 170 observations. In each 
regression, the dependent variable is the ratio of private consumption to potential 
GDP. There are three independent variables included in the ratio of government 
consumption to potential GDP, the ratio of real money to potential GDP and the 
ratio of cyclically-corrected taxes net of transfers and subsidies to the output. The 
results indicate that there is a negative relationship between government 
spending and private consumption in some countries.  
The Irish government attempted the first fiscal adjustment in 1982 and the result 
turned out as expected in the Keynesian model. This adjustment began in 1982, 
however, by the end of 1984, while the full-employment deficit had been 
decreased by more than 7 percentage points of the GDP, of which 5.5 percentage 
points were due to an increase in discretionary taxes. In contrast to the fiscal 
adjustment in Denmark, this fiscal adjustment led to an increase in the ratio of 
public debt to GDP as well as a decrease by 7.1% of real private consumption: 
making this fiscal adjustment unsuccessful. In spite of this early failure, the new 
Irish government elected in February 1987 attempted another fiscal adjustment 
which was successful. The term “successful” is pointed out by the figures relating 
to the 1987-1989 period in Ireland. Within 2 years, the full-employment primary 
deficit decreased by 7 percentage points of GDP, while real growth resumed and 
the ratio of public debt to GDP started to decline. The findings of Giavazzi and 
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Pagano (1990) encouraged the appearance of other empirical research with 
similar results. The table below summarises the results of some empirical 
research which show evidence of expansionary fiscal contractions. 
In more recent work, Giavazzi and Pagano (1996) use yearly data from 19 OECD 
countries from the early 1970s to 1992 on the variables: income, private 
consumption, business investment, taxes, transfers, public debt and government 
consumption, to investigate, under what conditions, a fiscal consolidation can 
lead to an increase in private demand and vice versa, and whether a loosening 
of fiscal policy can lead to a fall in private demand. Some of the results obtained 
by Giavazzi and Pagano (1996) are: (i) Fiscal policy changes can indeed have 
non-Keynesian effects if they are large and protracted enough. (ii) Non-
Keynesian effects are not only obtained through changes in public consumption, 
but can also be achieved through changes in taxes and transfers. The second 
finding parallels that of Alesina and Perotti (1995), who reported that budget cuts 
implemented by slashing transfer or public sector wages were more likely to be 
“successful” at stabilizing the debt-GDP ratio than those obtained without 
reducing transfer and wages.
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Table 2.3 Evidence of Expansionary Fiscal Contractions 
Author Data Definition of contraction Evidence of expansionary fiscal contraction  
McDermott and 
Wescott (1996) 
20 industrial 
countries from 
1970 to 1995 
An increase in primary structural balance 
by at least 1.5 percentage points of GDP 
over 2 years and not decrease in either 
of the 2 years. 
For successful consolidation, GDP growth is -
0.18% (before), 0.1% (during) and 0.65% 
(after). If gross debt decreases 5% in relation 
to GDP three years after the fiscal 
consolidation, this consolidation is defined as 
a successful fiscal consolidation. 
Giavazzi and 
Pagano (1996) 
19 OECD 
countries from 
1970 to 1992 
Fiscal policy “episode” is defined as a 
period in which the structural component 
of the primary fiscal balance changed in 
the same direction without interruptions. 
A cumulative 5 percentage points of 
GDP change was marked as a large 
consolidation. 
Estimation results point to large 
consolidations, an increase by $1 in taxes (cut 
in transfer) will lead to an increase in private 
consumption by 15-20 cents in the long run. 
Alesina and Perotti 
(1997) 
20 OECD 
countries for the 
period from 1960 
to 1994 
Increase in primary structural balance by 
at least 1.5 percentage points of GDP in 
one year or 1.25 percentage points in 
two consecutive years. 
Real GDP growth rate is -0.2% before, 1.1% 
during and 0.3% after period of successful 
fiscal consolidations. 
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McDermott and Wescott (1996) support the “German view” by examining the 
relationship between fiscal adjustment and economic performance. They used 
data of the fiscal expansion and consolidation in 20 industrial countries over the 
period 1970 to 1995. The key finding of their empirical work is that fiscal 
consolidation does not trigger an economic slowdown, especially in a medium 
term. McDermott and Wescott (1996) also discover that a tight fiscal policy does 
not cause a recession.  
This section has only discussed some early empirical research which points out 
the existence of expansionary fiscal consolidations, meaning that it is not likely 
that any fiscal consolidation will trigger a decline in output.  
Besides trying to answer the question of whether the fiscal consolidation is 
expansionary or contractionary, a key finding of these academic studies is that 
fiscal adjustments by enforcing cuts in spending tend to be more successful than 
raising taxes, particularly if they focus on cutting transfers, entitlement spending, 
and public wages (Alesina and Perotti 1995; Broadbent and Daly 2010). Some 
studies point out that cuts in government spending are not only successful in 
reducing fiscal deficits, but in some cases affect economic growth. In theory, “a 
small reduction in current government purchases could signal large future 
reductions, and therefore cause consumption to rise by more than the fall in 
government purchases” (David Romer, 2000, p. 546-7).  
David Henderson (2009) researched the Canadian experience of cutting 
spending in the 1990s and found that Canada reduced its debt from around 70% 
of GDP to 29% of GDP without giving up economic growth. Furthermore, 
Harvard’s Alberto Alesina and Silvia Ardagna (2010) updated the analysis of 
Alesina and Perotti (1995, 1997) and obtained similar results: “Not all fiscal 
adjustments cause recessions. Countries that have made spending adjustments 
to reduce their deficits have made large, credible, and decisive cuts. Even in the 
very short run, many reductions of budget deficits, even sharp ones, have been 
followed immediately by sustained growth rather than recessions”. In addition, it 
seems that a study which was carried out by Goldman Sachs economists Ben 
Broadbent and Kevin Daly (2010) which used a wider range of dataset had more 
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impressive results. In this study, authors reviewed every major fiscal correction 
in OECD countries since 1975 and found that policies for budgetary adjustments 
which focused on cutting government spending were successful in their main 
mission – correcting fiscal imbalances. Furthermore, instead of obstructing 
economic growth, they stimulated growth. Ben Broadbent and Kevin Daly explain 
these findings through several channels; first of all, according to the Ricardian 
equivalence theorem, cuts in government spending have the ability to reduce the 
fear of raising future taxes, thus, encouraging private spending by means of an 
expectation-driven “income effect”. Secondly, cuts in government expenditure 
mean a decrease in the public sector’s demand for workers; this will increase the 
competitive ability of private investors which in turn stimulates economic growth. 
In addition, Ben Broadbent and Kevin Daly (2010), highlight that tax-driven fiscal 
adjustments are, in fact, contradictory to the aim of cutting spending fiscal 
adjustments. Correcting fiscal imbalances by tax-adjustments are never 
successful and damage growth.  
Although various empirical studies determine that a fiscal consolidation by cuts 
in spending seems to be better for fiscal adjustment by increasing taxes, some 
still oppose this viewpoint. According to Christina D. Romer (2011), the economic 
evidence does not support the anti-tax view; Romer considers that both spending 
cuts and tax increases have the ability to obstruct the recovery in the near future. 
However, it does seem that spending cuts can obstruct the recovery more than 
tax increases, because raising taxes for the wealthy would be least likely to 
decrease overall demand and would undoubtedly raise unemployment in the 
short-term. 
Romer and Romer (2007) discovered that in the United States, an increase in 
taxation by 1% of GDP reduced output over the next 3 years by a maximum of 
about 3%, with the effect being smaller when the only changes in taxation 
considered were those taken to reduce past budget deficits. Based on this study, 
many people consider tax increases to have a bigger short-term effect on the 
economy than spending cuts. However, Christina D. Romer (2011) determined 
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that this idea was a mistake and she believed that spending cuts could have a 
greater effect. 
In order to discover more about this, it is necessary to evaluate the IMF 
procedures regarding the situation of some countries. For example in Japan, 
according to the IMF country report (2011), raising taxes was a better option than 
reducing spending. There are two reasons behind this decision: firstly, the 
Japanese government needed to spend more money for reconstruction after the 
terrible earthquake which happened in 2011. As predicted, the fiscal costs of the 
earthquake ranged somewhere between 2-4% of the GDP over the next several 
years. Therefore, it was too difficult for the Japanese government to reduce their 
spending. Secondly, there was ample opportunity for Japan to increase additional 
tax revenue, especially consumption tax (VAT). Japan’s overall tax revenue was 
one of the lowest amongst the OECD countries with 17% of GDP. Furthermore, 
Japan had one of the lowest VAT rates in the world; Japan’s consumption tax 
which was equivalent to VAT in other countries in the world could increase to 
10% by 2015 from the present 5%. “10%” is still a low level if compared with the 
European average rate of 20%: all of these factors highlight the public debt crisis 
in Japan. 
Amongst a large number of empirical researches, regarding the relationship 
between fiscal contraction and output, there is an interesting study conducted by 
Vincent Hogan (2004) which examines the ability of the expansionary fiscal 
contraction hypothesis which discovered that fiscal contraction may have non-
Keynesian effects but will not, literally, be expansionary. In order to test the 
Expansionary Fiscal Contraction hypothesis, Vincent Hogan (2004) estimates 
consumption functions for 18 OECD countries using data from the OECD 
Economic Outlook (1970 – 1999). Vincent Hogan’s (2004) results could be 
determined as neutral in relation to the impact fiscal contraction has on output. 
2.3.3 Fiscal consolidation and the ratio of public debt to GDP  
Although there is renewed interest in the effects of fiscal policy, there are not 
many studies which focus on the impact of fiscal consolidation on the public debt 
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ratio, even though this topic is becoming more prominent, especially because the 
debt reduction is currently one of the most important targets of fiscal policy in a 
large number of countries. While there are underestimations of fiscal multipliers, 
policy-makers who design austerity programs believe that austerity programs will 
obviously reduce the public debt ratio. However, many empirical studies indicate 
that austerity programs are ineffective. De Grauwe (2014) argues that “on 
average for every one percent increase in austerity output decline by 1.4%.” It 
can be determined that instead of reducing debt ratio; austerity programs 
increase the debt ratio, especially in the Eurozone.  
These empirical results elevate the debate about the impact of fiscal 
consolidation on debt ratio: a few studies related to this topic are reviewed in this 
section.    
Forni et al (2009) set up a DSGE model to study the response of macroeconomic 
variables to a fiscal shock within the Euro area. This study reveals that an 
increase by 1% in government consumption leads to an initial decrease by 1% in 
debt ratio. However, the debt ratio will begin to increase in the fourth quarter after 
the fiscal shock. The response in this study can be deemed symmetric; therefore, 
a decrease of 1% in government consumption will make the debt ratio increase 
by about 1% in the first three quarters after the fiscal shock before it decreases 
in the fourth quarter.  
Gros (2011) uses a simple formal analysis to determine that a fiscal adjustment 
reduces the debt ratio so long as the debt ratio multiples the fiscal multiplier by 
less than 1. Gross (2011) takes into consideration that the austerity plans may 
increase the debt ratio in the short-term and have the ability to be self-defeated.  
The European Commission (2012) also takes into consideration the austerity 
programs that are planned by member states does not ensure that the debt ratio 
will reduce in the short-term. The European Commission (2012) predicts that the 
debt ratio in some countries, such as Spain, United Kingdom and Portugal will 
increase between 2011 and 2015.  
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Eyraud and Weber (2013) consider a simple simulation model, and discover that 
in countries with high multipliers, fiscal consolidation will initially increase the debt 
ratio and then reduce the debt ratio after 2 or 3 years. Eyraud and Weber suggest 
that fiscal gains due to a contractionary fiscal policy are partly offset by the decline 
in output. However, this effect does not last for long; also the debt ratio will most 
likely decline once the fiscal is tightened. These findings are consistent with Forni 
et al (2009). Furthermore, Eyraud and Weber determine that the movement of 
debt ratio after a fiscal consolidation also depends upon the initial debt ratio of 
the country. Fiscal consolidation in countries with a higher debt ratio will increase 
a greater amount of debt ratio in initial time periods. The debt ratio in these 
countries will also need longer to decrease than those countries with a smaller 
initial debt ratio. 
2.4 Fiscal policy under a sudden stop 
2.4.1 Sudden stop and determination 
An episode characterized by a sudden drop in capital inflows to developing 
countries and a corresponding reversal from a large current account deficit to a 
smaller current account deficit, or a small current account surplus, is labeled a 
sudden stop of capital flows into a developing country by Calvo (1998). Calvo’s 
analytical framework is considered to be the first framework which is focused on 
sudden stops, even though it was first introduced by Dornbusch, Goldfajn and 
Valdes (1995). Since then, there have been numerous theoretical works about 
sudden stops. 
Calvo and Reinhart’s (1999) research about the banking crisis and currency crisis 
in the context of sudden stops, takes into consideration policy options including 
capital controls, exchange rate flexibility and dollarization under a sudden stop. 
According to their research, dollarization is the best response to sudden stop, 
although in their study, they do not provide a clear determination of the term 
sudden stop. 
Calvo et al (2004) focus on the cause of sudden stops by using a panel regression 
for 32 countries including 15 emerging economies and 17 developed economies 
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from 1900 to 2001. They discover that sudden stops are normally induced by the 
degree of domestic liability dollarization and the sensitivity of the real exchange 
rate to capital flow reversals. They also determined that there was a higher 
probability of sudden stops in economies with a less open trade sector and higher 
dollarization. One of the most important contributions of Calvo et al (2004) 
findings was the definition about sudden stops; they defined sudden stops as 
periods which met all three of these following conditions:  
 A significant decrease in capital inflows which were revealed in terms of a 
figure which was at least 2 standard deviations declining below the 
country-specific mean of sample. 
 A sudden stop will end when the annual change in capital flows is greater 
than 1 standard deviation below its sample mean. 
 A sudden stop will start once the there is a fall by one standard deviation 
below the mean in the annual change in capital flows. 
Hutchison and Noy (2006) perceive that a sudden stop happens when a country 
faces a currency crisis and a change by more than 3% of GDP in current account 
simultaneously. The definition of a sudden stop episode by Jeanne and Ranciere 
(2006) seems to be simpler; they define that a sudden stop happens when the 
capital account changes by an amount which is larger than 5% of GDP. 
Hutchison et al (2010) considers the definition of Hutchison and Noy (2006) and 
Jeanne and Ranciere (2006) to use more arbitrary thresholds; therefore, 
Hutchison et al (2010) follows Honig (2008) to define a sudden stop crisis “as a 
year in which the financial account decreases by at least 2 standard deviations, 
while the current account surplus increases (at years t or t+1 by any amount)”.  
2.4.2 Sudden stop and policies 
A sudden stop is normally followed by an economic recession. Therefore, policy-
makers need to find an optimal policy in order to reduce the negative effects of 
sudden stops in the emerging markets. However, there is debate regarding 
policies that should be used in countries facing a sudden stop, there are two main 
arguments about this debate in fact.  
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Stanley Fischer (1998) contemplates whether after a sudden stop; policy makers 
should tighten monetary and fiscal policy. According to Stanley Fischer, the 
interest rate should increas in order to make the country more attractive to foreign 
investors, then, when the confidence issue is restored, the interest rate could be 
reduced to normal levels. In terms of fiscal policy, Stanley Fischer believes that 
countries need to define their fiscal fundamentals in order to finance financial 
restructuring and reduce the current account deficit. Stanley Fischer also argues 
that tighter monetary and fiscal policies should be used during a sudden stop; a 
viewpoint which was supported by the IMF in case an Asian crisis occurred in the 
1990s: the IMF forced countries in East Asia to increase their interest rates when 
Asia was in the midst of a crisis. 
On the other hand, many people consider that a sudden stop will lead to a 
recession; therefore, expansionary fiscal and monetary policies should be 
implemented. One of the most famous economists who supported this view was 
the Nobel Prize winner Joseph Stiglitz: he believed that tighter monetary and 
fiscal policies would worsen the recession in countries facing sudden stop. Stiglitz 
(2002) states that: “For more than seventy years there has been a standard 
recipe for a country facing a severe economic downturn. The government must 
stimulate aggregate demand, either by monetary or fiscal policy”. According to 
Stiglitz (2002), the Asian crisis in the 1990s forced some Asian countries into a 
major downturn period, and with this in mind, the stimulation is necessary. 
Braggion et al (2005) constructed a model to examine both viewpoints and 
discovered that an initial tightening of policies followed by a loosening is optimal 
policy during sudden stops. Ortiz et al (2009) studied the fiscal and monetary 
policies of 18 external financial crisis episodes and found that during sudden 
stops, countries with tightened fiscal and monetary policies experienced a larger 
output decline than countries with looser policies. Cúrdia (2009) uses a DSGE 
model and found that a combination of domestic depreciation in exchange rate 
and rising interest rates were optimal monetary policies for countries facing 
sudden stops. Hutchison et al (2010) used data from 83 sudden stops in 60 
countries and discovered that countries with tight fiscal and monetary policies at 
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the time of a sudden stop were more inclined to a larger output decline. They also 
determined that contractionary macroeconomic policies seemed to be better in 
terms of stabilizing current accounts; however, this action is more associated with 
larger output losses. 
Besides these studies regarding policies that reduce output loss under a sudden 
stop, there is an array of studies which concentrate on optimal fiscal policy under 
sudden stops, which focus on other targets besides output.  
Calvo et al (2004) use a simple simulation model to estimate the required primary 
surplus for a country using sudden stops to maintain fiscal sustainability. This 
mechanism highlights when a sudden stop happens; in theory the local currency 
should depreciate in order to reduce the current account deficits, however, this 
depreciation can lead to debt accumulation. Calvo et al (2004) considers 
maintaining fiscal sustainability by keeping the ratio of public debt to GDP 
constant or lower than the initial ratio. To define this, simulations are created 
which determine how much local currency needs to depreciate and how much 
public debt needs to accumulate to counteract this depreciation; at the same time 
the primary surplus for the country to keep fiscal sustainability is also defined. 
Although the model used by Calvo et al (2004) seems to be too simple and 
specific, this is actually the first paper study about fiscal sustainability under a 
sudden stop I have encountered. 
Benigno et al (2008) uses a model for a small open economy with endogenous 
sudden stops which is induced by the appearance of a credit constraint. This 
model includes both tradable and non-tradable goods. Since the focus of this 
model is to study optimal stabilization policies, it is determined that the optimal 
tax rate for non-tradable goods equals zero if the constraint is not binding, 
although this rate will be negative under a sudden stop. These findings imply that 
when the economy is under a sudden stop, the government should subsidize 
non-tradable consumption as this will lead to an increase in the supply and 
demand of non-tradable goods. To achieve this, the credit constraint is relaxed 
as it is in fact a ratio of the output. 
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Different to other studies involving sudden stops in relation to inflow capital, 
Ozkan and Unsal (2010) developed a two-country DSGE model in order to 
differentiate between sudden stops induced by foreign factors and sudden stops 
induced by domestic origins. Ozkan and Unsal (2010) discovered that sudden 
stops arose from financial distress in the global economy, which affected the 
economy for longer than sudden stops originating from domestic origins. In this 
study, Ozkan and Unsal highlight that the sudden stop happens when changes 
are required for investor’s interest rates. This opinion is completely different to 
Benigno et al (2008) who determine that sudden stops are induced by the 
presence of an occasionally binding credit constraint. 
2.4.3 Theoretical models of sudden stop 
Chapter 3 considers a theoretical model which shares common features with 
models related to the literature of sudden stops; therefore it is worth reviewing 
some previous studies about theoretical models of sudden stop.  
This section summarizes the main features of several theoretical studies about 
sudden stops in the table below.  
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Table 2.4 Models of Sudden Stop 
Author and time Household Firms Government Sudden stop Findings 
Auernheimer 
and Garcia-
Saltos (2000) 
There are an infinite number of identical agents in a 
perfect foresight and continuous time model. Each 
agent has a fixed and equal amount of labour. Each 
agent uses labour and domestic capital (total domestic 
capital is assumed to be fixed) as input to produce a 
constant returns to scale production function. Each 
agent uses it productions and borrows from 
international markets to finance capital, consumption 
and pay for debt service. Foreign debt equals the value 
of an individual’s existing capital minus an individual’s 
wealth (collateral constraint). 
The interest on foreign debt individual’s face depends 
upon the world interest rate, the level of debt and the 
value of an individual’s capital (or collateral). 
Individuals maximize their utility function by choosing 
a level of consumption, level of foreign debt and 
domestic capital. 
No 
governmental 
sector. 
If there is a 
positive shock to 
the world interest 
rate, individuals 
tend to sell their 
capital and 
reduce 
consumption in 
order to reduce 
debt. The price of 
domestic capital 
will reduce and 
the output will 
also reduce, due 
to the decrease 
in input capital.  
By introducing 
collateral constraint, 
the model can explain 
a sudden stop. If there 
is no collateral 
constraint, the 
individuals will take 
any given world 
interest rate. 
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Mendoza (2002) Consumed tradable goods, 
non-tradable goods and 
supply labour to firms. They 
access the international 
single-period bond market. 
Individuals face a borrowing 
constraint that limits their 
debt as a share of current 
income. They maximize their 
utility function subject to a 
standard budget constraint. 
Owned by individuals: 
hire labour to price non-
tradable goods 
following a Cobb-
Douglas function. 
They also produce a 
stochastic endowment 
of tradable goods. 
Firms maximize their 
profit by choosing 
labour demand. 
The 
government 
runs a simple 
budget 
constraint. 
They finance 
their 
spending by 
obtaining tax 
from 
individuals. 
This model can 
study sudden 
stops which are 
caused by 
shocks in tax 
rate, productivity, 
in the world 
interest rates, or 
mixture of all 
three. 
This study determines 
that the social costs of 
sudden stops are 
huge. This study also 
suggests that policy 
intervention should be 
considered. However, 
in order to have an 
effective policy, the 
policy-maker needs to 
choose carefully. 
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Mendoza (2006) Choose sequences of 
consumption, labour supply, 
investments in domestic 
capital and foreign 
borrowing, or lending in one-
period bond international 
market to maximize the utility 
function which follows 
Epstein’s (1983) Stationary 
Cardinal Utility function. The 
world international credit 
market is incomplete and the 
foreign lenders require 
households to guarantee 
their debt by a share of the 
market value of their capital. 
Owned by households, 
producing tradable 
goods and selling them 
at world-determined 
price. Firms maximize 
their assets by 
choosing labour 
demands, investment, 
imported inputs and the 
rate of capacity 
utilization which is 
equal to the capital 
depreciation rate. 
Lenders require the 
market value of assets, 
which is used as 
collateral, to be enough 
to cover interest and 
principal on working 
capital loans. 
No 
governmental 
sector. 
The collateral in 
the model 
introduces three 
credit channel 
effects. Two of 
them are in the 
form of 
endogenous 
external 
financing premia. 
The other is the 
debt-deflation 
mechanism. 
Through these 
channels, a 
shock may lead 
to a fall in 
physical 
investment and 
equity price. 
These falls 
The simulation results 
of a sudden stop in an 
equilibrium business 
cycle model with 
collateral constraints 
are consistent with 
the main features of a 
real sudden stop. 
This study also 
suggests that a higher 
level of financial 
institutional 
development can 
reduce the probability 
of a sudden stop, and 
also prevent negative 
effects of contractual 
frictions behind the 
collateral constraints. 
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tighten collateral 
further, which 
leads to a 
reduction in 
credit, asset 
price and 
investment.  
Any emerging 
economy may face 
sudden stops induced 
by increases in the 
world interest rate or 
the price of imported 
inputs caused by 
development in the 
world. 
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Benigno et al 
(2008) 
Uses non-tradable and 
tradable goods, borrows 
money from international 
financial markets limited by a 
fraction of current total 
income. Individuals are firm 
share-holders and work for 
their own firms. 
Produce non-tradable 
goods and pay wage 
rate for individuals.  
The economy is 
endowed with a 
stochastic stream of 
tradable goods (follow 
a random Markov 
disturbance). 
The 
government 
runs a simple 
balanced 
budget in 
each period 
by getting tax 
from 
individuals 
and pay for 
their 
consumption 
of tradable 
and non-
tradable 
goods. 
The endogenous 
“sudden stops” 
are induced 
when there is an 
occasionally 
binding credit 
constraint. 
This study determines 
that when there is an 
endogenous sudden 
stop, the government 
subsidizes non-
tradable consumption 
(negative tax rate) to 
increase both the 
demand and supply of 
non-tradable goods, 
in order to relax the 
financial constraint by 
increasing the value 
of the collateral 
increases. 
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 Ozkan and 
Unsal (2010) 
Use domestic goods and 
foreign goods, whilst 
accessing two types of non-
contingent one-period debt 
(domestic and foreign 
currency). Individuals own all 
home production and 
importing firms, therefore, 
they acquire firm profit, plus, 
they also work for their firms. 
Production firms 
produce domestic 
goods. Importing firms 
buy foreign goods and 
sell to the domestic 
market. Unfinished 
capital producing firms 
combine investment 
and rented capital to 
produce unfinished 
capital goods. 
Entrepreneurs are key 
players in the model. 
They transform 
unfinished capital 
goods to sell to 
production firms. They 
finance investment by 
borrowing from foreign 
lenders. 
The monetary 
policy; the 
interest rate 
rule is the 
following: 
1 + 𝑖𝑡 = (1 +
𝑖)(𝜋𝑡)
𝜀𝜋  
Where i is the 
steady state 
level of 
nominal 
interest rate 
and πt is CPI 
inflation rate. 
The endogenous 
sudden stop: an 
unanticipated 
shock to the 
investors’ 
perception of the 
entrepreneurs’ 
productivity leads 
to a reversal of 
capital flows 
going out of the 
economy. 
The exogenous 
sudden stop: 
global financial 
crisis leads to 
sudden stop. 
The sudden stop 
arising from a global 
financial crisis lasts 
longer than sudden 
stop episodes of 
domestic origins.  
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2.5 Conclusions 
This chapter has reviewed the literature on the macroeconomics of fiscal policy and 
fiscal adjustment. This chapter reviews the view of Keynesian theory, Ricardian 
equivalence theorem, Neoclassical theory and New Keynesian theory about the 
effectiveness of fiscal policy as well as a range of empirical research. 
One of the most prominent aspects of the literature relevant to this thesis is the 
effectiveness of fiscal policy (the size of fiscal multiplier). Reviewing this literature 
suggests that there is no consensus about the size of the multiplier in either theory or 
from empirical estimation. This chapter reviews empirical works about the size of fiscal 
multiplier, especially studies which use VAR approach to estimate fiscal multiplier. 
These suggests a gap in literature in that there are a limited number of empirical works 
which study factors affect the size of fiscal multiplier.  
Therefore, Chapter 4 of this thesis will use a SVAR model to estimate the fiscal 
multiplier for a group of 30 countries, in order to find out whether or not financial 
openness, financial development, the level of external debt, the level of trade 
openness and exchange rate regime affect the size of the government consumption 
multiplier. 
Furthermore, this chapter also reviewed literature about sudden stops in the flow of 
capital to small open economies. Most of the theoretical works study how 
unanticipated shocks in productivity, world interest rate, fiscal expenditure or even a 
combination of all of these shocks lead to a sudden stop. They also study the 
consequences of a sudden stop. Reviewing these models suggests how to model a 
sudden stop by using financial constraints. However, there is still a gap in literature 
about theoretical models of sudden stop that in most models, shocks are immediate 
and unanticipated. This means that borrowers do not have any opportunity to choose 
an optimal path of response to do any adjustment to avoid sudden stop or at least to 
minimise the damage.  
In order to fill this gap, Chapter 3 builds a dynamic deterministic general equilibrium 
model to study external debt. In this model, borrowers from a small open economy 
face a reduction in the sustainable level of external debt which may lead to sudden 
stop. However, in this model, there is the option for the small open economy to 
negotiate with foreign lenders (for example a multilateral body such as the IMF), 
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allowing them to choose their optimal path to adjust to reduced access to foreign 
borrowing. This, thus, can help the small open economy to avoid sudden stop and/or 
risk of default due to a reduced ability to access international debt markets. 
This chapter has also reviewed literature regarding the effectiveness of fiscal policy 
and determinants of fiscal policy choice. This is motivated by the fact that during and 
after the global financial and economic crisis 2007-09, the results of the fiscal stimulus 
package and/or fiscal consolidation program vary across countries and time. However, 
it seems that there is a gap in literature regarding factors which determinants the 
effectiveness of fiscal policy and/or fiscal policy choice. In order to address this gap, 
Chapter 5 of this thesis will analyse case studies from 4 different countries including 
Greece, Latvia, Pakistan and Turkey, in order to study the determinants of a countries 
fiscal policy choice.  
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Chapter 3. External debt reduction: shock therapy versus 
gradualism 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter models the reduction in borrowing by a small open economy, following 
from a reduction of debt capacity. An occurrence like this could be triggered, for 
example, by a change in a lenders perception regarding the sustainable ratio of foreign 
debt to GDP level, perhaps following a slowdown in growth. The purpose of this model 
is to address the issue of speed adjustment: the length of time it will take the small 
open economy to reduce the overall external debt ratio to a sustainable level as 
required by foreign lenders. The core model presented here uses standard modelling 
assumptions within a perfect foresight setting to investigate this question, and 
discovers – under a variety of assumptions – that it is in the best interest of an indebted 
country to delay the speed of adjustment for as long as possible. This deferral is 
motivated by impatience, relatively high discount rates of households and/or the 
government in the indebted country.  
In reality, when governments are faced with a reduction of debt capacity their reaction 
should be associated with ‘shock therapy’ (i.e. reducing their deficits rapidly) rather 
than a ‘gradualism’ approach (a delay in adjustment as predicted by this model). This 
chapter will therefore also consider other reasons, outside of the modelling framework, 
why a fiscal adjustment should perhaps be undertaken rapidly and not gradually. 
There are numerous reasons which may force the economy to reduce its existing fiscal 
debt and deficit. One of them is a sudden stop which is usually characterized by a 
sudden drop in inflow of international capital and a corresponding reversal from a large 
current account deficit to a smaller current account deficit or a current account surplus 
(Calvo, 1998). This sudden stop is usually followed by a depreciation in local currency, 
an increase in trade surplus and an economic recession. 
A sudden stop may be the result of a change in lenders perceptions. Reviewing the 
literature on sudden stops suggests a main gap. In most models, a sudden stop occurs 
after an unanticipated shock which leaves the debtor with no opportunity to create an 
optimal plan. Most models instead focus on the economic impact of a sudden stop and 
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the cause of it, for example, how shocks to productivity, the world interest rate, as well 
as fiscal expenditure or a mixture of all three elements can lead to a sudden stop. 
To address this gap in previous literature, this chapter will study the external debt 
reduction process following a change in lenders perceptions relating to the sustainable 
ratio level of foreign debt to GDP: the cause of this reduction is not modelled. It is 
presumed that the small open economy in this chapter can negotiate with lenders (for 
instance multilateral agencies) allowing them time to bring their foreign debt ratio or 
deficits to a sustainable level.  
The model developed in this chapter is a dynamic deterministic general equilibrium 
(DDGE) model for a small open economy with two types of goods: tradable and non-
tradable. In this model, households with foreign debt constraints want to maximize 
their utility function by choosing the level of labour supply, consumption and foreign 
debt, while firms want to maximize their profits by choosing labour demand. To begin 
with, governments will only run a simple budget constraint, and this model illustrates 
this type of response with a significant fall in foreign debt capacity. However, one 
important assumption in this model is that the small open economy is still able to 
negotiate with current lenders as well as new lenders who allow the economy to 
essentially roll over their existing debt before bringing the debt ratio to a safe level in 
the future. The new debt ratio level gives foreign lenders piece of mind regarding the 
possible risk of debt default. This assumption means a sudden stop episode has the 
ability to become a limited debt capacity episode.  
This chapter does not however, highlight the reasoning behind the foreign lenders 
change of perception; there are several possible reasons for this change in perception, 
from financial turmoil to an economic crisis. This chapter also extends the baseline 
model to study about debt default and find that even the small open economy can 
choose an optimal plan to do adjustment, they may still want to default external debt 
if they benefit enough from defaulting. 
The rest of chapter 3 is structured as follows: section 3.2 will discuss the speed of 
external debt reduction and also review the theories in relation to sudden stops, some 
of which make similar modelling assumptions to the present chapter. Section 3.3 
describes in depth the model used in this chapter, while section 3.4 explores the 
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parameterization of the model. The simulation results will be analysed in section 3.5, 
whilst section 3.6 summarizes the findings of chapter 3. 
3.2 Literature review 
This section discusses two main literatures which are most directly relevant to this 
chapter: the first piece of literature that will be looked at concerns the speed of external 
debt reduction and will be reviewed in section 3.2.1 (together with the literature about 
the speed of economic transition from a command to a market economy, because this 
addresses a similar question about the appropriate speed of adjustment). While, 
section 3.2.2 investigates literature which focuses on the theoretical models of sudden 
stops which share similar features with the model used in this chapter.  
3.2.1 The speed of external debt reduction: arguments within the literature about 
the speed of economic transition 
Key issues that arise during an external debt reduction episode will be addressed in 
this chapter, including how fast external borrowing should be reduced and what 
particular adjustment path government and household deficits should choose to 
achieve this goal? In other words, it is a choice between shock therapy (rapid 
adjustment) and gradualism (slow adjustment)? When a decision is being made, trade-
offs between the cost of external debt reduction (for example, decrease in 
consumption, investment and output) and the cost of high levels of external debt (for 
example, the risk of a funding crisis and additional cost of debt service because of risk 
of default) should be taken into account. 
While there are a substantial number of political and economic commentaries on the 
cost of rapid fiscal consolidation and the associate problems of ‘austerity’, there 
appears to be a gap in the research literature relating to the speed of external debt 
reduction, following a reduction in external debt capacity. Once again, this is a choice 
between “shock therapy” and “gradualism”. The term “shock therapy” originated in 
debates in the 1990s about the speed of economic transition from a centrally 
administered system to a system based on market relations. “Shock therapy” is, to a 
certain extent, significant when it comes to adjusting the lower external debt capacity, 
as this may also require structural adjustment; for example, the re-allocation of 
resources from non-tradable to tradable output. This sub-section reviews this debate 
on “shock therapy” versus “gradualism” in relation to transition economies and 
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assesses its relevance to the challenge of emerging market countries adjusting to a 
lower debt capacity.  
A succinct statement of shock therapy is quoted by Sachs (1990): “you don’t try to 
cross a chasm in two jumps”. Sachs believed that a rapid economic transition can 
avoid painful and costly periods of adjustment. Parker, Tritt and Woo (1997) compare 
transitions in Asia and Eastern Europe; they consider the speed of transition to have 
a negative relationship with the continuance of output decline and a positive 
relationship with the intensity of output recovery. Whereas, Bruno et al (1988) analyses 
case studies of Latin American experiences with macroeconomic stabilisation in the 
1980s and discovers that a comprehensive and radical program is the best option for 
transition.  
A comprehensive and radical program was devised by John Williamson (1990), the 
“Washington Consensus”; this program was based upon neo-classical mainstream 
economic theory. Many economists have had similar ideas about the necessity of a 
radical program for economic reform, including Blanchard et al (1991), Fischer and 
Gelb (1991), Aslund (1992) and the World Bank (1996). According to the Washington 
Consensus, numerous interdependence, mutually supportive and interactive features 
of economic relationships, should be introduced into the economy. However, the 
protagonists of shock therapy consider separate changes to not be as successful 
unless they are introduced simultaneously: there are several reasons for this view. 
Firstly, Kornai (1990), Boycko (1991) and Winiecki (1991) believe that a command 
economy could be theoretically superior to a new economy which is not cohesive and 
consistent. This viewpoint is shared by Balcerowicz (1995), who reviewed failed and 
reversed reforms, concluding that the reason for these failed reforms was because 
they were not radical enough to allow the economy to reach a level which would 
perform better than the previous command economy. 
Secondly, protagonists of “shock therapy” believe that the imperfection of a new 
market may be the reason why societies maintain the old system which is less reliable. 
Gomulka (1989) argues that in order to break the hold of the old system, it is necessary 
to deliver a “shock” reform.      
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There is an agreement amongst standard economic theories which state that it is 
necessary to stabilize macroeconomics quickly in order to break the inflationary 
expectations (Aslund, 1994).  
Whilst, Sachs and Woo (1994) consider that while a transition can have negative 
impacts on the economy, it is unnecessary to extend output decline by doing a gradual 
adjustment. Whereas, Sachs and Lipton (1990) argue that a transition should carry 
the recession because a long-run growth was guaranteed. This argument parallels the 
notion of external debt reduction as the debt reduction process which often triggers a 
recession and a decrease in living standards. Similar to an economic transition, better 
conditions are also guaranteed after an external debt reduction process has taken 
place, including a reduction in debt burden and a reduction in the risk of a debt crisis 
and the potential of a sudden stop.  
Gradualists, however, consider China and Vietnam as the ideal success stories of the 
step by step transitions process. Gradualists consider a nonexistent recession and a 
high growth rate in these countries resulting from a low speed transition. Aslund (2007) 
believes that the fundamental difference between gradualists and radical reformers 
was their view regarding the viability of the command economy. Gradualists claim that 
a radical reform will lead to a greater fall in output and will be more costly than a 
gradual reform. Even protagonists of radical reform such as Fischer and Gelb (1991) 
understand that various changes could not be undertaken instantly, realizing that it 
can take at least a decade for this transition to work. For example, the privatization of 
large enterprises would most likely take years to finalize, due to the complex reform 
procedures. Stiglitz (2002) and Goldman (2003) also support the notion of gradualism: 
Stiglitz criticized the IMF policy on Russia arguing that the Washington Consensus did 
not work in Russia, he determined that Russia should have followed China’s example. 
While the cases involving successful gradual reforms are explained in terms of political 
factors and initial conditions, there are also numerous logical arguments for the 
gradual adjustment of external debt. Firstly, there is a broad consensus in theoretical 
and empirical studies regarding the positive relationship between the speed of debt 
reduction and the reduction in living standards. In order to repay the external debt, the 
domestic economy needs to reduce its consumption. Also, in order to repay the 
external debt, the domestic economy needs to increase its net exports and relinquish 
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consumption, although these may be limited by the individuals’ preferences. Greece 
is a primary example.  
3.2.2 Theoretical models of sudden stops 
The model used in this chapter shares some common features with the models used 
in sudden stop literature, although the issue of optimal speed of adjustment is not 
considered, something which is the main focus point of this chapter. Therefore, it is 
worth while discussing the theoretical models of sudden stops before divulging into 
how the model is employed and has developed in this chapter. 
There are various ways a sudden stop can be simulated in theoretical models. There 
are in fact two distinct categories: a group of models where sudden stop happens due 
to the ability to repay debt, and a group of models where sudden stop occurs because 
of the economy’s willingness to pay the debt. 
This review focuses on the first category: models with sudden stops induced by the 
debtor’s ability to repay the debt. One of the most widely known models which 
incorporates’ the ability to pay is Calvo’s (1998) model. Calvo (1998) explains sudden 
stops by setting up a perfect foresight small open economy model and three periods 
(period 0, 1 and 2) with unlimited liability firms owned by households. There is an 
endowment of tradable goods in period 2 (future output); firms borrow so they are able 
to import tradable goods at period 0 and produce non-tradable goods which are to be 
sold at period 1. At period 1, both tradable and non-tradable goods are consumed and 
the debt is due, which means firms borrow more to import tradable goods for 
consumption. At period 2, tradable goods are consumed and the debt is paid.  
If there is a temporary shock which affects a country’s ability to access the capital 
market in period 1 when non-tradable goods productions are implemented, as is the 
plan at period 0, this means that firms are unable to repay the debt (bankruptcy). This 
bankruptcy, which is assumed to entail fixed bankruptcy costs, increases the real debt 
service at period 2, lowering the permanent income of the small open economy. 
Bankruptcy will lead to a decrease in consumption of tradable goods, which will mean 
the price of non-tradable goods will reduce as a consequence of a fall in the marginal 
rate of substitution between tradable and non-tradable goods, which ultimately leads 
to the bankruptcy of the firm. One important assumption in this model is that 
bankruptcy comes at a cost. If bankruptcy did not come with any consequences, then 
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households would simply borrow more (unlimited liability firms) to fulfil the firms’ 
obligation and the equilibrium would prevail. However, bankruptcy does come at a 
cost. This particular model is very simple compared to the model in this chapter and 
ones in other studies (i.e. it is only a three-period model. It does not have a labour and 
government sector). Although, Calvo (1998) does introduce a clear mechanism to 
explain sudden stop in a theoretical model.  
Another way to model a sudden stop, something which is widely used in the literature, 
is to introduce an upper bound for external debt. For instance, the economy is only 
allowed to borrow internationally a fraction of its income, the reasoning for this is in 
case there is a negative shock to income, resulting in a sudden stop, if the debt is 
greater than its new upper bound. Mendoza (2002) and Begnino et al (2008) use a 
financial constraint to limit foreign borrowing of households as a share of total current 
income. Mendoza’s (2002) model is used to study sudden stops caused by shocks in 
tax rate, productivity and in world interest rates, or a mixture of all three. In order to do 
this, Mendoza (2002) introduces an occasionally binding financial constraint into his 
model. The presence of the occasionally binding constraint explains how a shock in 
productivity, in world interest rates, tax rates or a mixture of all three may cause a 
sudden stop. For example, if there is a negative shock in productivity, this will lead to 
a drop in the current income of households, which means that the upper bound of 
external debt decreases and could potentially lead to a sudden stop.    
There are other forms of foreign debt constraints; Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) use a 
collateral constraint which limits the upper bound of debt by the liquidation value of the 
capital stock one period into the future. Izquierdo (2000) and Edison, Luangaram and 
Miller (2000) also use this type of constraint in the context of modelling constraints in 
relation to international borrowing. 
Besides these limits on debt to income, and the collateral constraint form of Kiyotaki 
and Moore, several other forms of financial constraint are used in other models of 
sudden stops. Auernheimer and Garcia-Saltos (2000) use a different form of debt 
constraint which limits the upper bound of foreign debt at the same level as the market 
value of the capital stock. While, Christiano, Guts and Roldos (2001) and Mendoza 
and Smith (2001) study models in which the current liquidation value of assets is used 
as collateral.  
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In sharp contrast to other studies, Mendoza (2006) introduces debt constraints into 
both the demand side and the supply side of the model (debt constraints for both firms 
and households). Mendoza (2006) reveals that this type of model with financial 
constraints can reproduce quantitatively well during sudden stop episodes in emerging 
economies. Mendoza also argues that it is a challenge for a large class of DSGE 
models to simulate the sudden stop, because these models assume there is a perfect 
world credit market. This means that when there is a drop in output, individuals will try 
to maintain their consumption by borrowing more from foreign lenders, while data on 
most episodes of output declines determines the opposite outcome, with a drop in 
borrowing following a fall of output.  
In the models in the second group, the debtor will not fulfil their obligation when the 
lifetime payoff of default exceeds the lifetime payoff of continuing with credit contracts. 
As a result of this, sudden stops may happen, especially as foreign lenders will not 
want to take any risks in the future. These types of models were extremely popular 
after the developing country debt crisis of the 1980s. One of the first studies involving 
sovereign debt default is that of Eaton and Gersovitz (1981); they set up a global 
financial market which was fully informed. This market included a sovereign debtor 
who would be excluded from the market permanently if they defaulted. In this model, 
there is a maximum lending ceiling, where lenders are only willing to lend at a default 
risk premium which is at least as high as the market interest rate. In the model of Eaton 
and Gersovitz, the default risk premium is an endogenous outcome that reflects the 
probability that debtors consider whether it is optimal to default because the 
participation constraints have failed. Atkeson (1991) also considers a model where 
sovereign debtors are unable to participate in the international capital market if they 
end up defaulting. Therefore, for models with this assumption, the penalty for 
sovereign debt default is financial autarky.  
There are other studies which take into consideration models where a default debtor 
may have access to financial contracts with certain conditions and restrictions. Bulow 
and Rogoff (1989) consider a model in which default debtors may have direct trade 
sanctions by lenders imposed, whilst Kletzer and Wright (2000) study an environment 
which limits the set amount of financial contracts the default sovereign debtors can 
access, that is if they default. In this environment, both lenders and borrowers lack any 
sort of commitment.  
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3.3 The model 
This section introduces a model for a small open economy with two types of goods: 
tradable and non-tradable goods. In this small open economy, households consume 
tradable and non-tradable goods; their consumption is financed by the outcome of 
their own firms’ profits, their wage from working for any non-tradable goods production 
sector and borrowing overseas. Households have access to an incomplete asset 
market with a occasionally binding financial constraint.  
In this small open economy, firms are owned by households. Firms are expected to 
produce a fixed amount of tradable goods, and they also hire necessary labour to 
produce non-tradable goods using a Cobb-Douglas function.  
In the baseline version of this model, the government runs a balanced budget in each 
period. 
This model is similar, in a number of respects, to the model originally proposed by 
Mendoza (2002). One similarity is the presence of a constraint on the level of external 
debt; this constraint assumes that only a fraction of current household income can be 
claimed if there is a default, which means that lenders are more unwilling to allow 
households to borrow more than their limit. In the Mendoza model, the constraint is 
occasionally binding because the presence of unanticipated shocks in all time periods 
reduces output or government revenue or increases the world interest rate. If these 
shocks are large enough then the external debt constrain will bind. In the model used 
in this chapter, shocks only occur at a single period. The specific shock analysed 
involves an alteration in foreign lenders’ perceptions regarding sustainable external 
debt ratio (not shocks of productivity, world interest rate and tax receipts as analysed 
by Mendoza).  
The main aspect of this model assumes that borrowers from a small open economy 
can obtain temporary access to external credit (for example from a multinational lender 
such as the IMF) in order to gradually adjust the external debt so as to balance the 
foreign lenders’ new required external debt ratio. This allows a small open economy 
to manage a sudden stop: the key issue addressed here is the timing and speed of 
the required reduction of debt. 
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From a technical perspective this simply highlights the vast difference between this 
model and the Mendoza (2002) model. The shock of foreign lenders’ perception 
regarding sustainable external debt of a small open economy in this model is 
perceived as an anticipated shock, whereas shocks in the Mendoza (2002) model are 
unanticipated.  
Another important assumption is that households are impatient: this is a reasonable 
assumption because if households are in fact patient, they accumulate assets and the 
financial constraint is not binding, which means that a change in a foreign lenders’ 
perception may not affect the small open economy.  
3.3.1 Households 
A representative household is infinitely-lived and seeks to maximize: 
                                      𝐸0 ∑ 𝛽
𝑡∞
𝑡=0 (𝑙𝑛𝐶 −
𝐻𝑡
1+𝜑
1+𝜑
)                                                                 (3.1) 
where Ct denotes the individual consumption basket and Ht the individual supply of 
labour at time t. β is the discount factor and φ>0 is the inverse elasticity of labour 
supply. 
The consumption basket C is a composite of traded and non-traded goods: 
                                          𝐶𝑡 = [𝜔
1
𝜂𝐶𝑇,𝑡
𝜂−1
𝜂 + (1 − 𝜔)
1
𝜂𝐶𝑁,𝑡
𝜂−1
𝜂 ]
𝜂
𝜂−1
                                      (3.2) 
where the parameter η is the elasticity of intra-temporal substitutions between 
consumption of traded and non-traded goods while ω is a weighting factor. 
The corresponding aggregated price index is given by: 
𝑃𝑡 = [𝜔 + (1 − 𝜔)𝑃𝑁,𝑡
1−𝜂]
1
1−𝜂                                                     (3.3) 
The price of tradable goods is normalised to 1. 
Households can maximize their utility, subject to the following period budget 
constraint:  
𝐶𝑇,𝑡 + 𝐶𝑁,𝑡𝑃𝑁,𝑡(1 + 𝜏𝑁,𝑡) + 𝐷𝑡−1(1 + 𝑖 ∗) = 𝜋𝑡 + 𝑊𝑡𝐻𝑡 + 𝐷𝑡 − 𝑇𝑇,𝑡 − 𝑇𝑁,𝑡𝑃𝑁,𝑡                  (3.4) 
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where Wt is the wage rate. πt denotes the firm profits, while WtHt represents the 
household labor income. 𝜏𝑁,𝑡 is a distortionary taxation on non-tradable goods 
consumption. 𝑇𝑇 and 𝑇𝑁 are lump sum taxes in units of tradable and non-tradable 
goods. Dt is the amount of foreign borrowing denominated in local currency from the 
international financial market with the world interest rate i*. This assumption is a 
reasonable one if one of the countries’ is a member of a monetary union. That being 
said it does not take into account the possibility of a higher “peso premium” being paid 
if there is a future risk of depreciation. 
If that is the case, there is a financial constraint for the external debt of households 
who have a share of the total output of tradable goods of the economy: 
                                                           𝐷𝑡 ≤ 𝜃𝑌𝑇,𝑡                                            (3.5) 
Households maximize (3.1), subject to (3.4) and (3.5) by choosing CT,t, CN,t, Dt, and 
Ht. The first order conditions for this problem are as follows: 
𝐶𝑇,𝑡
𝐶𝑁,𝑡
=
𝜔
1−𝜔
𝑃𝑁,𝑡
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𝜂
                                       (3.6)                                                                                          
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                                                              (3.7) 
                                          𝜇𝑡 − 𝜆𝑡 = 𝛽𝐸[(1 + 𝑖 ∗)(𝜇𝑡+1)]                     (3.8) 
                                                               𝐻𝜑 = 𝑊 ∗ 𝜇𝑡                                                            (3.9) 
𝜆t is multiplier on the financial constraint while μt is multiplier on the budget constraint. 
Equation (3.6) determines the optimal allocation of tradable and non-tradable goods 
while equation (3.7) determines the multiplier μt. Equation (3.8) is obtained from the 
optimal external debt of the households. Finally, equation (3.9) determines the labour 
supply for non-tradable production as a function of wage rate.  
3.3.2 Firms 
The small open economy produces a constant output of tradable goods YT for each 
period.  
Firms also produce non-tradable goods YN,t expressed in a Cobb-Douglas function: 
                                                           𝑌𝑁,𝑡 = 𝐴𝐾
𝛼𝐻𝑡
1−𝛼                                                        (3.10) 
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where H is the amount of labour used in the non-tradable sector. 𝐴𝐾𝛼 is the production 
factor. α is the labour share in production in the non-tradable sector.  
Firms find it difficult to choose Ht to maximize profit in the current period: 
                                                  𝜋𝑡 = 𝑌𝑇 + 𝑃𝑁,𝑡𝐴𝐾
𝛼𝐻𝑡
1−𝛼 − 𝑊𝑡𝐻𝑡                                     (3.11) 
Equation (3.11) implies that the profit of firms is equal to total revenue minus the cost 
of labour of non-tradable goods production.  
The first order condition for labour demand is:  
                                                       𝑊𝑡 = (1 − 𝛼)𝑃𝑁,𝑡𝐴𝐾
𝛼𝐻𝑡
−𝛼                                         (3.12)  
Equation (3.12) determines the labour demand for non-tradable production as a 
function of wage rate and price of non-tradable good.  
3.3.3 Government 
The consolidated government budget constraint is:            
 𝐺𝑇,𝑡 + 𝐺𝑁,𝑡𝑃𝑁,𝑡 = 𝜏𝑁,𝑡𝑃𝑁,𝑡𝐶𝑁,𝑡 + 𝑇𝑇,𝑡 + 𝑇𝑁,𝑡𝑃𝑁,𝑡                                  (3.13) 
Equation (3.13) implies that in each time period, the government spends both tradable 
goods and non-tradable goods. The government consumption is financed by collecting 
tax from households. In this model, we follow Benigno et al (2008) by assuming that 
government spending of non-tradable goods is financed by a constant lump-sum tax. 
For simplicity, we assume that 𝐺𝑁,𝑡 = 𝑇𝑁,𝑡 . This means that changes in the distortionary 
tax rate on individual consumption for non-tradable goods are financed by a 
combination of endogenous changes in relative price (𝑃𝑁) and lump-sum transfer on 
tradable goods (𝑇𝑇).  
3.3.4 Aggregation and equilibrium 
Combining the household budget constraint and a firm’s profit equation, the 
aggregated constraint for the small open economy can be rewritten as: 
                             𝐶𝑇,𝑡 + 𝐷𝑡(1 + 𝑖 ∗) + 𝐺𝑇,𝑡 = 𝑌𝑇 + 𝐷𝑡+1                                                      (3.14) 
The equilibrium for non-tradable goods sector is:                                
                                                𝑌𝑁,𝑡 = 𝐶𝑁,𝑡 + 𝐺𝑁,𝑡                                                                    (3.15) 
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There is a financial constraint for the total external debt of the economy expressed by 
the following equation: 
                                                               𝐷𝑡 ≤ 𝜃𝑌𝑇                                                                (3.16) 
This financial constraint implies that the amount that a country as a whole can borrow 
is constrained by a fraction of the value of its total output of tradable goods.  
3.3.5 Steady state (result in Appendix 2) 
As presented in appendix 1 and 2, the steady state of the model can be solved through 
several steps. To begin with, I have rewritten the first condition equations for 
households’ utility maximization problem in appendix 1.  
Secondly, I incorporate the equilibrium condition of the labour market (equation 3.28) 
and the equilibrium condition of the non-tradable goods market (equation 3.30).  
Finally, I substitute the values of parameters, which are discussed in the following 
section, into these two equations and solve using Matlab.  
For simplicity, the price of a tradable good is normalized to 1. Furthermore, the output 
of tradable goods is also normalized to 1. 
The steady state value of main variables are shown in table 3.2 in appendix 2. 
3.3.6 Calibration  
The calibration of the model is shown in the following table. This chapter set the 
quarterly world interest rate (i*) as being equal to 0.0147, which yields an annual world 
interest rate of 6 percent. The quarterly discount factor (β) is equal to 0.9832. The 
product of (1+i*) x β is less than 1, enhancing the assumption that the individual is 
impatient. The inverse elasticity of labour supply (φ) is set at 2 since it is assumed that 
half of the time is spent working. 
This chapter shadows Ostry and Reinhart (1992) in setting the elasticity of intra-
temporal substitution between tradable and non-tradable goods (η) at 0.76. Ostry and 
Reinhart estimated this value for developing countries. 
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Table 3.1 Value and description of parameters 
Parameter: Description Value 
β Discount factor 0.9832 
i* World real interest rate 0.0147 
φ The inverse elasticity of labour supply 2 
ω Relative weight of tradable and non-tradable goods 0.344 
η Elasticity of substitution between tradable and non-tradable goods 0.76 
α The labour share of production in the non-tradable goods sector 0.636 
AKα Production factor 1.723 
θ Ratio of Household external debt to total output of tradable goods 0.70 
𝜌𝑁 Fraction of non-tradable output consumed by government 0.141 
𝜌𝑇 Fraction of tradable output consumed by government 0.017 
𝜏𝑁 Distortionary tax rate imposed on households with non-tradable 
consumption 
0.0793 
 
This chapter then follows Benigno et al (2008) who constructed the most similar model 
to the one used in this chapter, in setting the labour share of production in the non-
tradable goods sector (α) equal to 0.636, with the production factor (AKα ) being equal 
to 1.723, whilst the relative weight of tradable and non-tradable goods (ω) equal to 
0.344. Aspects of Benigno et al (2008) are used to set government spending at 14.1% 
of non-tradable goods output and 1.7% of tradable goods output.  In this model, the 
ratio of foreign debt to GDP is set at 70%. 
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3.4 Simulation results  
3.4.1 Simulation from old steady state to new steady state 
The baseline mode is simulated with the assumption that there is a change in foreign 
lenders’ perceptions about the sustainable external debt ratio going from 70% to 65% 
of the total output of tradable goods. However, there is an agreement between foreign 
lenders and the economy, that there will be 16 quarters (4 years) for small open 
economy to undertake any adjustments.  
As can be seen from the simulation results, borrowers do not do anything in the first 9 
quarters. The model presents a perfect foresight and highlights that households are 
impatient, with this attitude; borrowers try to delay adjustments for as long as possible. 
When borrowers realize they are unable to delay anymore, without undertaking an 
undesirably rapid reduction in consumption, they begin making adjustments.  
Individuals reduce their tradable goods consumption in order to reduce the external 
debt; this can be seen in figure 3.1, where within 7 quarters, the tradable goods 
consumed by households reduced from 0.9727 to 0.9601, which means that tradable 
goods consumed by households decreased 1.26% within 7 quarters. At the end of this 
period, there is a jump to the new steady state level: this is higher than the old steady 
state level, as the debt service on the new lower level of debt is also reduced.  
Figure 3.1 Tradable goods consumed by Households 
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Figure 3.2 Non-tradable goods consumed by Households 
 
During the time period, figure 3.2 reveals that non-tradable goods consumed by 
households remain almost stable. Within the 7 quarters from the 10th quarter to the 
17th quarter, non-tradable goods consumed by households diminish from 1.261586 to 
1.261389, which is equivalent to a decrease of 0.016%.  
Figure 3.3 Total consumption basket 
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Since it outlines a weighted average of tradable goods consumption and non-tradable 
goods consumption, total consumption also gradually decreased during the 
adjustment path. Figure 3.3 highlights that the total consumption reduced from 2.1844 
to 2.1752 within 7 quarters, which means the total consumption of households reduced 
0.42% within 7 quarters, then jumping to the new steady state level which is higher 
than its old steady state level. 
Another interesting simulation result is that, during the adjustment path, the real 
exchange rate depreciates. This is evident from figure 3.4, where the relative price of 
non-tradable goods (as the price per unit of tradable goods normalizes to equal 1) 
decreased from 1.5386 to 1.5128 within 7 quarters, which meant that the price of non-
tradable goods reduced 1.68% within 2 years. This reduction is similar to Calvo (1998) 
in that during the adjustment path the decline in tradable goods consumption (because 
a bigger fraction of output of tradable goods is used to repay debt) induced a fall in the 
marginal rate of substitution between tradable and non-tradable goods, thus affecting 
the relative price of non-tradable goods.           
Figure 3.4 Price of non-tradable goods (real exchange rate) 
 
The reduction in the relative price of non-tradable goods, led to a decrease in the wage 
rate of the non-tradable goods production sector (as in figure 3.5) because during the 
same time period the output of non-tradable goods remained almost stable.                 
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Figure 3.5 Wage rate in non-tradable goods production sector 
 
           
Figure 3.6 Total external debt 
 
Figure 3.6 shows that during the adjustment path, the total external debt of the small 
open economy diminished from 0.7 to 0.65. Figure 3.6 also reveals that households 
attempted to bind the financial constraint as long as possible, even though during the 
adjustment path the financial constraint is not binding.  
Figure 3.7 summarises the baseline simulation, presenting the dynamics of the main 
variables during the adjustment path as being a percent of the initial steady state level.  
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Figure 3.7 Compare percentage change in main variables 
 
3.4.2 Simulation from out of steady state to a new steady state 
In reality, the adjustment of external borrowing, an external debt crisis or a sudden 
stop in inflow capital, as portrayed in Chapter 5 of this thesis, do not usually occur 
when the economy is in an initial steady state and the ratio of external debt to GDP is 
stable. Instead these factors occur when the economy is not in a steady state and the 
ratio of external debt to GDP is rising rapidly - Latvia and Greece are examples of this. 
As members of the European Union, both of these countries were able to borrow at 
low interest rates, and even before the global financial and economic crisis of 2007-
2009, positive outlooks of economic growth (especially regarding Latvia which has had 
one of highest growth rates in Europe since 2000) made it easier for these countries 
to borrow money from overseas, hence, their external debt levels kept rising until the 
crisis happened.  
Therefore, in this section, the model used is simulated for when a reduction of debt 
capacity occurs, when the economy is in an out-of-steady state position and the 
external debt ratio continues to rise. The problem is whether this affects the speed of 
adjustment.  
In economic terms, the economy is initially in a steady state with the maximum ratio of 
total external debt to total output of tradable goods being 65%, but then there are two 
further developments: first there is an increase in the maximum external debt ratio to 
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70% in period 0 (a positive shock), followed subsequently by a decrease in the 
maximum external debt ratio (a negative shock). It is then presumed that foreign 
lenders permit an increase in the maximum level of total external debt ratio from 65% 
to 70% after 2 quarters (although the reason for the alteration in the lenders’ perception 
is not modelled, a possible reason for this change may be a more comprehensive view 
about growth potential). At some point in the future, during the adjustment path of the 
small open economy (when the economy is no longer in a steady state), foreign 
lenders alter their perception regarding sustainable ratio of total external debt of the 
small open economy again, reducing it from 70% to 68% at any given time. Once this 
has happened the country is able to arrange interim borrowing from multilateral 
lenders such as the IMF in order to ease the transition to a lower maximum debt ratio.  
Technically, the model is simulated with two perfect foresight shocks in the theta (the 
maximum level of external debt ratio). However, the two shocks will be announced at 
two different times; the first is announced when the ratio of total external debt to total 
output of tradable goods is at -2, increasing from 65% to 70% after 2 quarters. The 
second shock is announced at a point later than time 0 that the external debt ratio 
reduces from 70% to 68% at any given time in the future. With this in mind two cases 
are considered: the second shock is announced at the end of the 1st quarter and at 
the end of the 5th quarter. The choice of debt ratios of 65%, 70% and 68% are 
somewhat arbitrary, and may appear rather trivial compared to the actual decline in 
debt capacity in countries such as Greece and Latvia. It must not be forgotten that the 
main purpose is to investigate qualitatively the difference in behavior debt capacity 
reductions that occur in an out-of-steady state; therefore the exact ratios are not vital.   
When the second shock is announced at the end of the 5th quarter, three sub-cases 
are considered in the second announcement, this is the time frame foreign lenders will 
give the small open economy, 3, 5 or 7 quarters, before they reduce the maximum 
level of total external debt ratio to 68%. The results of this behaviour are shown in 
figure 3.8. The simulation from the 5th quarter, when the second shock is announced, 
is our key focus in this section (simulation from out of steady state). As it can be 
determined from figure 3.8, at the 5th quarter, the financial constraints are not binding; 
this means that households can borrow more because the current ratio of total external 
debt to total output of tradable goods is 69.5%. 
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Figure 3.8 Dynamics of ratio of total external debt for out of steady state shocks 
 
However, the behaviour of households depends on the amount of time they have 
before the maximum level of total external debt to ratio reduces to 68%. If they have 
only 3 quarters, as in sub-case 1, households will reduce their external debt 
immediately. If households have 5 quarters, as in sub-case 2, then they will increase 
their external debt to 69.7% and then start reducing. If households have enough time 
(7 quarters as in sub-case 3 or longer), they will continue to increase their external 
debt to bind the constraint and reach a steady state with the ratio of total external debt 
at 70%, staying there as long as possible before implementing a new adjustment 
system to meet the new requirements of the foreign lenders.  
Figure 3.9 Dynamic of ratio of total external debt 
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Figure 3.9 demonstrates the dynamic of ratio of total external debt to total output of 
tradable goods, when the second shock is announced at the end of the 1st quarter 
rather than at the end of the 5th quarter. There are again three sub-cases 4, 5 and 6, 
in which households have 3, 6 and 11 quarters respectively, to make adjustments in 
order to meet these new requirements of foreign lenders. The behaviour of these 
households in these sub-cases is similar to their behaviour in sub-case 1, 2 or 3.  
The reason behind the simulation of two different case studies is to accommodate 
when the level of the total external debt ratio of the second shock is announced. In 
case the second shock is announced at the 5th quarter, the external debt ratio is 
already higher than the new requirement, whereas if the second shock is announced 
at the 1st quarter, the external debt ratio is lower than the new requirement. This 
variation leads to differences in the movement of total external debt between sub-case 
3 (reducing to the new steady state level begins immediately) and sub-case 4 
(increasing to the new steady state level begins right away). 
3.4.3 Model with default 
In this section, the model is extended even further to study the possibility of a debt 
default.  
In order for this to happen, the model is based upon the economic story that: at time 
t=0, the maximum level of total external debt of the small open economy is 70% of the 
total output of tradable goods (normalize to 1). At t=5 (out of steady state), there is 
another announcement that the maximum level of total external debt is 68% of the 
total output of tradable goods. However, there is an agreement between the small 
open economy and some foreign lenders, such as the IMF and ECB, which permit the 
small open economy to borrow up to 70% of the total output of tradable goods until 
t=12. This means that from t=13, the maximum level of total external debt will be 68% 
of the total output of tradable goods. One important assumption is that from period t=5 
to t=12, the country may default on additional debt from the IMF or ECB if it is better 
for them (in term of total utility).  
It is assumed that if one default’s, households will face a higher interest rate due to 
the reduction of credibility; the interest rate will increase in each case study by (i) 0.1% 
(ii) 0.2% (iii) 0.3%, 1 period after default. 
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Simulation results are shown in table 3.2, where households are most likely to default 
if the total expected utility is larger if they did default than if they did not default. As can 
be seen from the table; if the interest rate increases by 0.3 percentage points after 
default, and after this households decide to default, they will always acquire less utility 
than if they had not have defaulted. If interest rates increase by 0.2 percentage points 
after default, households may decide to default at period 8, 9 or 10, because the total 
expected utility will be greater than in if there was no default. Similarly, if interest rates 
increase by 0.1 percentage points after default, households may decide to default at 
period 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11 or 12.  
In order to analyse the optimal borrowing decision, it is necessary, at each period t, to 
consider one’s options between defaulting at period t or defaulting one period later at 
period t+1. A default will only occur at period t if the total expected utility from defaulting 
at t is greater than the total expected utility from defaulting one period later at t+1. 
Table 3.2 Total expected utility in case of default and no default 
Period No 
default 
Interest rate increase 
0.1% after default 
Interest rate increase 
0.2% after default 
Interest rate increase 
0.3% after default 
    default 
at t 
default 
at t+1 
default 
at t 
default at 
t+1 
 default 
at t 
default at 
t+1 
5 41.16065 41.160429 41.162185 41.157196 41.1590064 41.153963 41.155828 
6 41.15886 41.160429 41.161569 41.157196 41.1583903 41.153963 41.155212 
7 41.15768 41.160429 41.160953 41.157196 41.1577745 41.153963 41.154596 
8 41.1571 41.160429 41.160388 41.157196 41.15718 41.153963 41.15403 
9 41.15708 41.160429 41.160335 41.157196 41.15715 41.153963 41.153978 
10 41.15712 41.160429 41.159719 41.157196 41.15654 41.153963 41.153361 
11 41.15779 41.160429 41.159102 41.157196 41.1559233 41.153963 41.152745 
12 41.15909 41.160429 41.158485 41.157196 41.1553063 41.153963 41.152128 
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Households will decide to default at the first period t when the total expected utility 
exceeds the total expected utility in case of no default (the first column of table 3.2) 
and when it exceeds the total expected utility if the default is at period t+1 (a second 
comparison made in the second and third, fourth and fifth, sixth and seventh columns 
of table 3.2). There are two cases where default is preferred: it is preferred when the 
interest rate increases by 0.1 percentage points after default and when the interest 
rate increases by 0.2 percentage points after default. In both scenarios, households 
decide to default at period 8; however, when the interest rate costs of default are 
higher, with an increase of 0.3 percentage points after default, then it is never ideal to 
default.  
Figure 3.10 Dynamic of ratio of total external debt - default versus no default 
 
The previous findings are illustrated clearly in figure 3.10, where as soon as the total 
external debt reaches its maximum level, households will then decide to default 
additional debt from foreign lenders such as the IMF and ECB if the total expected 
utility from defaulting is greater than if there is no default.  
3.5 Sensitivity analysis 
In this section, key parameters of the model are altered, whereby it is now the 
simulations duty to explore the robustness of the model.  
The first alteration implemented is the actual parameters, parameter ω – relative 
weight of tradable and non-tradable goods and parameter η – elasticity of substitution 
between tradable good and non-tradable goods: these aspects do not greatly affect 
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the main results in these simulations. This is completely different to a modified version 
of the model, which is discussed in appendix 3, in which the total external debt of the 
economy is constrained by a fraction of nominal GDP instead of the total output of 
tradable goods as in the baseline model. This will be discussed in greater detail in 
appendix 3 and 4 of this chapter. 
Alterations to i* - the world interest rate and β - the discount factor affect the speed of 
adjustment. The smaller the value of β(1+i*) the faster the adjustment path and vice 
versa (suppose that β(1+i*) less than 1 assumes that households are impatient). This 
is a reasonable assumption in mathematical terms: mathematically, the tradable goods 
consumed by households will adjust so as to follow the Euler equation 3.8. During the 
adjustment path, the financial constrain is not binding; this means that the Lagrange 
multiplier of the financial constraint is equal to 0 (𝜆 = 0), therefore, the equation 3.8 
will convert to: 
𝜇𝑡 = 𝛽(1 + 𝑖 ∗)𝜇𝑡+1  
Hence, the smaller the β(1+i*), the bigger the change in 𝜇 (or tradable goods 
consumed by households) is. The bigger the change in tradable goods consumed by 
households in each period also means that the adjustment path is shorter (or the 
speed of adjustment is faster).  
In economic terms, the smaller the value of β (1+i*) the more impatient households 
are likely to be. The more impatient households will try to delay the adjustment for 
longer; however, households need to reduce their total external debt to meet the new 
requirements of the foreign lenders which may come into action any time in the near 
future. Therefore, when households delay the adjustment for longer, they will need to 
do adjustment quicker to meet the requirements. This means that their adjustment 
path will be shorter.  
3.6 Summary and Conclusions       
This chapter builds a deterministic dynamic model in which an exogenous sudden stop 
can happen when there is a change in foreign lenders’ perceptions regarding the 
sustainable level of total external debt. One assumption of the model is that there is 
an agreement between the foreign lenders (such as IMF and ECB) and the domestic 
borrowers about the adjustment path, which will reduce the current level of total 
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external debt to a new sustainable level at any given time in the near future. This will 
prevent a sudden stop and, therefore, reduce the risk of a default, which is a costly 
consequence for both lenders and borrowers. 
The simulation results of the model reveal that borrowers will try to delay the 
adjustment for as long as possible before reducing consumption of tradable goods in 
order to repay part of the debt. During the adjustment procedure, the real exchange 
rate depreciates (the relative price of non-tradable goods to tradable goods keeps 
decreasing during the adjustment path). However, during the adjustment path 
consumption of the non-tradable goods by households almost remains stable. Another 
important finding of this section is that during the adjustment path the financial 
constraints are not binding.  
This particular model is also simulated from an initial out-of-steady state position (in 
which debt can still increase during the transition). This raises the possibility of debt 
repudiation. Lenders providing temporary additional finance must consider whether 
the borrowers may choose to default on borrowing if the benefit of reducing debt 
outweigh the resulting costs. These simulation results help understand circumstance 
when households will default on part of their external debt and suggests that limits on 
borrowing during the transition period may be required to prevent default.        
Furthermore, this chapter also examines an extended version of the baseline model 
(in appendix 3 and 4). The findings from the simulation results of the extended model 
confirm the findings of the simulation results from the baseline model. The extended 
model looks at in greater detail the transfer between the tradable goods production 
sector and the non-tradable goods production sector during a period when foreign debt 
capacity is depleting. 
The model used in this chapter can be extended in number of ways to study about 
post-crisis fiscal policy. Firstly, the assumption about fixed output of tradable goods 
can be relaxed in order to study about source transfer between tradable sector and 
non-tradable sector during the time of limited external debt capacity. Secondly, the 
government’s debt should be introduced to study about fiscal policy.  
This model can be used to predict the behavior of a small open economy if they can 
have an agreement with multilateral lenders such as IMF and/or ECB when external 
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debt capacity is reducing. Furthermore, the model can be also used by both lenders 
and borrowers as a guideline when negotiate credit contracts (terms and time) to 
obtain an optimal agreement which help the borrowers to avoid sudden stop or debt 
default due to borrowers’ inability to repay and also help the lenders to avoid debt 
default due to borrowers’ unwillingness to repay.   
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Appendix 1. First condition equations in steady state 
In order to determine the steady state equilibrium, the following set of equations will 
be used. To begin with, the conditions for the household maximization problem have 
been ordered: 
                               
 𝐶𝑇
𝐶𝑁
=
𝜔
1−𝜔
𝑃𝑁
𝜂(1 + 𝜏𝑁)
𝜂                                                     (3.17)                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            
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𝑃𝑁
𝜂−1(1+𝜏𝑁)
𝜂−1)
                                         (3.18) 
                                                     𝜆 = 𝜇[1 − 𝛽(1 + 𝑖∗)]                                                     (3.19) 
                                                                 𝐻𝜑 = 𝑊𝜇                                                             (3.20) 
The equilibrium conditions for the non-tradable sector: 
                                               𝑌𝑁 = 𝐴𝐾
𝛼𝐻1−𝛼                                                       (3.21) 
                                                𝑊 = 𝑃𝑁(1 − 𝛼)𝐴𝐾
𝛼𝐻−𝛼 =
𝑌𝑁𝑃𝑁
𝐻
(1 − 𝛼)                (3.22) 
                                                𝑌𝑁 = 𝐶𝑁 + 𝐺𝑁                                                        (3.23) 
Additional equilibrium conditions are prearranged by the liquidity constraint and the 
equilibrium condition in the tradable sector:  
                                        𝑌𝑇 = 𝐶𝑇 + 𝐺𝑇 + 𝐷𝑖
∗                                                       (3.24) 
In a steady state, it is assumed that the ratio of total external debt to GDP is θ: 
                                                            𝐷 = 𝜃𝑌𝑇                                                       (3.25) 
Appendix 2. Equilibrium in steady state 
The labour market: 
From equation (3.20) the labour supply for the non-tradable sector is: 
                                                               𝑊 =
𝐻𝜑
𝜇
                                                                   (3.26) 
While the labour demand for the non-tradable sector is expressed in equation (3.22): 
Therefore, the equilibrium condition for the labour market is as follows: 
                                                          𝐻𝜑+1 = (1 − 𝛼)𝑌𝑁𝑃𝑁𝜇                                            (3.27) 
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Or  
                                         𝐻𝜑+1 =
(1−𝛼)
(1−𝜌𝑁)(1+𝜏𝑁)[1+
𝜔
1−𝜔
𝑃𝑁
𝜂−1(1+𝜏𝑁)
𝜂−1]
                               (3.28) 
The non-tradable goods market: 
The non-tradable goods supply is expressed by the equation (3.21): 
                                                          𝑌𝑁 = 𝐴𝐾
𝛼𝐻1−𝛼 
While the non-tradable goods demand can be derived from the equation (3.17), (3.23), 
(3.24) and (3.25): 
                                            𝑌𝑁 =
(𝑌𝑇−𝜃𝑖
∗𝑌𝑇−𝜌𝑇𝑌𝑇)(1−𝜔)
𝜔𝑃𝑁
𝜂
(1+𝜏𝑁)
𝜂(1−𝜌𝑁)
=
(1−𝜃𝑖∗−𝜌𝑇)(1−𝜔)
𝜔𝑃𝑁
𝜂
(1+𝜏𝑁)
𝜂(1−𝜌𝑁)
                   (3.29) 
For simplicity, we normalize YT equal to 1. 
Subsequently, the equilibrium condition for the non-tradable good market is: 
                                     𝐻𝛼−1 =
𝐴𝐾𝛼𝜔(1+𝜏𝑁)
𝜂(1−𝜌𝑁)
(1−𝜃𝑖∗−𝜌𝑇)(1−𝜔)
𝑃𝑁
𝜂
                       (3.30) 
According to (3.28), (3.30), the parameters and exogenous variables, the steady sate 
of the model as shown in table 3.3 can be solved. 
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Table 3.3 Value of main variables in steady state 
Variable Description  
H Individual labour supply to the non-tradable goods sector 0.6448 
PN Price of non-tradable goods 1.5386 
YN Output of non-tradable goods 1.4687 
CN Per capita non-tradable consumption 1.2616 
YT Output of tradable goods 1 
PT Price of tradable goods 1 
CT Per capita tradable consumption 0.9727 
C Per capita consumption 2.1844 
W Wage rates in the non-tradable goods sector 1.2756 
P Aggregated price of the economy 1.3333 
D Foreign debt of private households 0.7 
GN Non-tradable goods consumed by Government 0.2071 
GT Tradable goods consumed by Government 0.017 
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Appendix 3. Model in which the total external debt is constrained by a fraction 
of nominal GDP 
In the baseline model, the total external debt of households is constrained by a fraction 
of the total output of tradable goods, as highlighted in equation 3.5.  
In the modified model, there is a different form of the financial constraint implemented 
in which the total external debt of the economy is constrained by a fraction of nominal 
GDP.  
This means that equation 3.5 will become:  
                                                                           𝐷𝑡 ≤ 𝜃𝑡(𝑊𝑡𝐻𝑡 + 𝜋𝑡) 
Therefore, the total external debt of households will be constrained by a fraction of their 
income. Thus, equation 3.16 will turn into: 
        𝐷𝑡 ≤ 𝜃𝑡(𝑌𝑁,𝑡𝑃𝑁,𝑡 + 𝑌𝑇,𝑡) 
These alterations mean that the total external debt of the economy will become 
constrained by a fraction of nominal GDP. 
To make things simple, Yt will be normalized to 1, just like it is in the baseline model.  
This modified model will then be simulated using the same assumptions that were used 
in the baseline model, whereby the lender requires the domestic borrower to reduce 
the ratio of external debt to the nominal GDP from 70% to 65% after 16 quarters. During 
that time, the domestic borrower is able to borrow money to roll their debt, but the ratio 
of external debt to the total output of tradable goods cannot exceed 70%.    
Figure 3.11 Dynamic of the ratio of total external debt to nominal GDP 
 
0 5 10 15 20 25
0.64
0.65
0.66
0.67
0.68
0.69
0.7
 83 
 
Figure 3.11 highlights an interesting aspect of the modified model: the financial 
constraint is always binding during the adjustment path; something which can be 
explained by the effects of changes in the relative price. 
Figure 3.12 Dynamic of main variables (index) 
 
As can be seen in figure 3.12, apart from financial constraint, the behaviour of the 
economy in the modified model is quite similar to the baseline model. One obvious 
difference between the modified model and the baseline model is the movement of 
non-tradable goods consumed by households; in the modified model, there is a change 
in non-tradable goods consumed by households by 0.7% and -0.6% at the 15th and 
16th quarter. These alterations are justified by the obvious adjustments in relative price 
and tradable goods consumed by households: equation 3.6 and the figure above 
clearly illustrate this.  
Another difference between the baseline and modified model was first of all mentioned 
in section 3.5, which related to the sensitivity of parameters. Unlike the baseline model, 
the modified model, incorporated changes in parameter ω – the relative weight of 
tradable and non-tradable goods as well as parameter η – elasticity of substitution 
between tradable and non-tradable goods; changes in other parameters, including the 
interest rate and the discount factor did not affect the main results. Evident from the 
simulation results in appendix 4, changes in parameter η – elasticity of substitution 
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between tradable and non-tradable goods led to a change in the speed of adjustment. 
Even with a change in the speed of adjustment individuals still attempted to delay these 
adjustments for as long as possible. The less elasticity of substitution between tradable 
and non-tradable goods, the longer the adjustment process: for example, if the value 
of η was reduced so it was now equal to 0.5, the adjustment process would last till the 
16th quarter, meaning this adjustment only lasts for 10 quarters with the value of η 
being equal to 0.76. On the other hand, if the parameter η was altered, so it was now 
equal to 0.1, then the adjustment process would last for 160 quarters (40 years), with 
the adjustment process only lasting for 5 quarters when the parameter η increases to 
0.99. 
Although modifications in the elasticity of substitution between tradable and non-
tradable goods can lead to changes in the time of adjustment, these alterations do not 
affect the way that a small open economy reacts to meet lenders’ requirements. A 
small open economy can still attempt to delay the adjustment, so long as it has enough 
time to actually adjust. These findings can be perceived as reasonable because when 
the elasticity of substitution between tradable and non-tradable goods is high, it is a lot 
easier for individuals to spend more on non-tradable goods, less on tradable goods 
and be able to repay the external debt quickly and vice versa. Furthermore, even when 
the elasticity of substitution between the tradable and non-tradable goods parameter 
is modified, the financial constraint is permanently binding along the adjustment path; 
these findings are consistent with the assumption that the households are impatient, 
which means they will constantly borrow as much as they can in order to consume as 
much as possible. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 85 
 
Appendix 4. Simulation results for modified model with alternative parameter η 
- Elasticity of substitution between tradable and non-tradable goods 
η=0.99  
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η=0.01 
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Chapter 4. The impact of changes in government consumption on 
economic output  
4.1 Introduction and summary 
After the global crisis of 2007-2009, many Eurozone countries have been facing a fiscal 
crisis due to the increasing fiscal deficit and public debts, and even though the 
effectiveness of tight fiscal policy and its ability to reduce fiscal deficit and public debts 
is still debatable, numerous countries have implemented fiscal consolidation programs 
in order to reduce their deficits and public debts to sustainable levels. Due to the 
implementation of fiscal consolidation programs, the main contention regarding fiscal 
policy and its effectiveness, which has been receiving a great deal of attention since 
the global crisis, shifted from a fiscal stimulus to a fiscal austerity. The debate regarding 
fiscal consolidation programs has become popular in recent times, due to the fact that 
the results from fiscal adjustments vary across countries. Due to the failure of fiscal 
consolidation programs in reducing fiscal deficit and public debts in some advanced 
countries, such as Greece, many economists (for example, Blanchard and Leigh, 
2013) consider fiscal multipliers to have been severely underestimated. This means 
that fiscal consolidation programs are more costly than expected; therefore, in terms 
of size, how large are fiscal multipliers? Which factors affect the size of a fiscal 
multiplier? This chapter attempts to address these two questions, whilst focusing on 
government consumption.  
This chapter uses a panel structural vector auto-regression (or SVAR) model to 
estimate the government consumption multiplier for 30 countries (26 European 
countries and 4 others: the United States, Canada, Australia and Japan). The data 
used in this chapter spans from as early as 1980q1 to as late as 2013q4, and is 
collected at quarterly intervals. This study estimates government consumption 
multipliers for groups of countries based on a varied set of criteria: 
(i) countries with high levels of financial openness versus countries with low level of 
financial openness  
(ii) countries with high levels of external debt versus countries with low levels of 
external debt 
(iii) countries that have a high degree of financial development versus countries with 
a low degree of financial development  
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(iv) open trade economies versus closed trade economies  
(v) countries with flexible exchange rate regimes versus countries with fixed exchange 
rate regimes.  
This chapter divides the whole sample into sub-samples based on criteria such as the 
level of financial openness, the level of external debt, the level of financial 
development, the level of trade openness and the exchange rate regime. It is worth to 
explain briefly why this chapter focus on these criteria. As discussed in Chapter 2 of 
this thesis, an expansionary fiscal policy may lead to crowding out effects induced by 
changes in interest rates and/or exchange rate. Therefore, the effectiveness of an 
expansionary fiscal policy (size of fiscal multipliers) may depends on the size of 
crowding out effects. Since this discussion, we believe that some factors which affects 
the size of crowding out effects (through changes in interest rates and/or exchange 
rate) may affect the size of fiscal multiplier. That’s why we try to examine the 
relationship between the size of government consumption multiplier and the level of 
financial openness, the level of external debt, the level of financial development, the 
level of trade openness and the exchange rate regime.     
The main findings of this chapter can be summarised as follows: first of all, the most 
likely response to an output of shock in government consumption in a country which 
has a higher degree of financial openness will be bigger than that of a country with a 
lower degree of financial openness, with the cumulative multiplier in both countries 
being positive (95% confidence level). Justifying these results regarding the 
relationship between the level of financial openness and the size of a fiscal multiplier, 
this chapter will divide the samples being used into two observation groups: one group 
will have observations of a high level of financial openness and the other will have 
observations of a low level of financial openness. It is assumed from the initial 
estimations that the higher the level of financial openness the bigger the government 
consumption multiplier.  
What is more, the government consumption multiplier is greater in countries where 
there is a high level of external debt. This implies that in a number of countries, due to 
the rapid accumulation of the debt burden in recent years, the government 
consumption multiplier has rose, an aspect which is consistent with the findings of 
Blanchard and Leigh (2013) who determine that since 2009 the fiscal multipliers in 
advanced countries have increased in size, much more so than was expected. 
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Whilst from this chapter is can be explained that the higher the level of financial 
development, the smaller the government consumption multiplier.  
Furthermore, it will be highlighted that the government consumption multiplier in “open” 
economies is not significantly different to the government consumption multiplier in 
“closed” economies, results which are not consistent with Ilzetzki et al (2013). 
Finally, this chapter divides the whole sample into groups of countries with flexible 
exchange rate regimes and those with fixed exchange rate regimes. The government 
consumption multiplier for the group of countries with flexible exchange rate regimes 
is not only less than the fixed exchange rate regime, but it also performs in an entirely 
different way. While the cumulative multiplier in countries with fixed exchange rate 
regimes increases over time reaching its peak after 4 quarters and staying at that level; 
the cumulative multiplier in countries with flexible exchange rate regimes reaches its 
peak after just one quarter then drops sharply after two quarters. What's more, the 
cumulative multiplier in flexible exchange rates is not statistically different from zero 
after the second quarter. 
The rest of this chapter is structured as follows: section 4.2 reviews the literature which 
discusses the fiscal multiplier and the factors which affect the size of the fiscal 
multiplier. Section 4.3 sets out the empirical methodology used in this chapter, while 
section 4.4 describes the data used in this chapter. The empirical results and the 
interpretation of these results are reported in section 4.5, whilst this section also 
highlights the results of the robust tests which were carried out. Finally, section 4.6 
reiterates the findings and discusses the interpretations of these findings.  
4.2 Literature review 
A more comprehensive review of the literature relating to fiscal policy and the fiscal 
multiplier is presented in Chapter 2. This particular section reviews the empirical 
studies that estimate the size of the fiscal multiplier and examine the factors which can 
alter the size of a fiscal multiplier. 
After the financial crisis of 2007 and the global economic crisis of 2009, interest in the 
effectiveness of fiscal policy increased, resulting in many studies focusing on the fiscal 
multiplier. The academic paper which is most similar to this chapter is Ilzetzki, Mendoza 
and Vegh (2013); who use the panel VAR approach to analyse data from 44 countries, 
including 20 high-income countries and 24 developing countries, to study the size of 
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the government consumption multiplier. Ilzetzki, Mendoza and Vegh (2013) determine 
that government consumption multipliers in industrial countries are greater than those 
in developing countries. The government consumption multiplier is also lower in open 
economies than in closed economies. Countries with a fixed exchange rate regime 
have a superior government consumption multiplier than countries that have flexible 
exchange rates. Finally, Ilzetzki, Mendoza and Vegh (2013) discover that the 
government consumption multiplier is lower when the level of public debt is high. 
Ilzetzki et al (2013) replicate Blanchard and Perotti (2002) by using SVAR to estimate 
the fiscal multiplier. Blanchard and Perotti (2002) is one of the first to use a SVAR 
approach to research the effects of fiscal policy. SVAR is used to study the effects of 
changes in government spending and taxation on output in the United States during 
the post-war period. Their results revealed that positive changes in government 
spending led to positive changes in output, while positive changes in taxation led to 
negative changes in output. However, they discovered that both positive changes in 
government spending and taxation led to strong negative changes in investment 
spending.  
Another paper which uses similar methods to this chapter is Corsetti et al (2012); 
Corsetti et al (2012) use a two-step approach which identifies government spending 
shocks and trace the effects of government spending in different economic 
environments to determine how the exchange rate regime, public indebtedness and 
the state of the financial system affect the size of the fiscal multiplier. They discover 
that the government spending multiplier is higher in a fixed exchange rate regime than 
in an economy which has a flexible exchange rate regime, and determine that a weak 
public finance reduces the effectiveness of the fiscal policy. Finally, according to their 
results, the government spending multiplier seems to be larger when there is a financial 
crisis. 
While Ilzetzki et al (2013) and Corsetti et al (2012) research the variations in the effects 
of fiscal policies in different economic environments; Auerbach and Gorodnichenko 
(2012) and Baum et al (2012) study the relationship between the state of the economy 
and the effectiveness of fiscal policy. Baum et al (2012) investigates fiscal multipliers 
on a country-by-country basis for G7 economies (excluding Italy) concluding that the 
multiplier varies amongst countries. Furthermore, they all determine that, on average, 
the fiscal multiplier is greater when there is a downturn (periods with negative output 
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gap) than when there is an expansion (periods with positive output gap). Auerbach and 
Gorodnichenko use a SVAR approach and data from a large number of OECD 
countries (34 countries), to estimate the government purchase multiplier and discover 
that the government consumption multiplier is larger in a recession. The SVAR model 
is extended by the use of direct projections that are able to economise the degree of 
freedom, and relax the assumptions of the impulse response function which are used 
by the SVAR approach to estimate the multiplier. This alternative model yields the 
same results as the standard SVAR model; with the government consumption 
multiplier being lower in recessions. 
Hall (2009) uses several models to estimate government consumption multipliers using 
US data. Hall (2009) uses a direct regression model which uses government spending 
for the military for total purchases, treating the change in non-military government 
purchases as one of the sources of the noise. Hall assumes that the change in military 
spending is uncorrelated to any other components, such as output and private 
consumption. The estimated multiplier for his model is about 0.5; he also uses a vector 
auto-regressions model, discovering that the multiplier is between 0.5 and 1. Hall 
determines that the neo-classical model predicts a small positive fiscal multiplier and 
a fairly large crowding out in consumption after an expansionary fiscal policy. He also 
considers a reduced form of the New Keynesian model based upon a negative 
elasticity of the markup ratio in respect to output. Hall’s model predicts that the 
multiplier has the potential to rise to 1.7 when the monetary policy is passive because 
the interest rate has fallen to the lower bound of zero, but just under 1 when the 
monetary policy is normal. In this model it can be concluded that the New Keynesian 
model predictions are better than a neo-classical model, this is because the predicted 
multiplier in the New Keynesian model complements the observed multiplier.1  
Kara and Sin (2012) use a different New Keynesian model to Hall, which takes into 
account credit constraints. Kara and Sin discover that the presence of credit constraints 
increases the fiscal multiplier, which are consistent with Hall (2009).  
The present chapter reexamines some of the questions that have already been 
addressed in previous research; analysing the impact of trade openness and exchange 
                                            
1 Another interesting discovery by Hall is that the effectiveness of an expansionary fiscal policy depends on two 
features of the economy: a negative response of mark-up price over cost and an elastic labour supply. Both of these 
features relate to the traditional Keynesian viewpoint of price stickiness and wage stickiness. 
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rate regimes in relation to the size of the government consumption multiplier. This 
section also investigates the impact of three other factors which have not been 
addressed in any previous research – financial development, financial openness and 
the level of external debt’s impact on the government consumption multiplier.     
4.3 Methodology 
4.3.1 Identification of the fiscal multiplier 
A difficult task in studies of the fiscal multiplier is identification. This is because the 
relationship between government spending and output goes in two directions. Firstly, 
government spending can affect output. Secondly, output can affect government 
spending. The first channel needs to be captured in order for the fiscal multiplier to be 
estimated. In order to explore this problem, some authors focus on military expenditure, 
the reasoning for this is because military expenditure is exogenous to current and 
recent changes in the GDP (as Hall (2009) determined above). This approach relies 
on the basis that changes in government spending for the military sector does not affect 
the structure of the business cycle. Therefore, military build-ups have the ability to be 
used as exogenous fiscal shocks. However, there are limitations to this approach. 
Shocks in government spending, because of military reasons, are most likely to occur 
before or during wars that have an independent and strong economic impact. This 
makes it much more difficult to identify changes in economic activities which are purely 
caused by fiscal shocks. Also, there are not many identifiable alterations in which the 
change in military expenditure is clearly exogenous. Hall (2009) argues that there are 
only two observations in which the US economy are to estimate fiscal multipliers using 
this approach: military build-ups in World War II and the Korean War. Therefore, 
variations in government spending of military expenses for the Vietnam War and the 
two Iraq Wars were not large enough to provide a reliable estimate of the fiscal 
multiplier. 
Another way of analysing the identification problem is by using a structural vector 
autoregressive model (SVAR). An important assumption of this SVAR model is that 
the level of government consumption in each quarter will only affect the output level of 
future quarters, it will not affect the current quarter. How this assumption can be 
practically tested is discussed in greater detail in the following sections. One of the 
advantages of using a SVAR model is that it can explain both of the potential directions 
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of the relationship between government spending and output, whilst, only a limited 
amount of data is required to estimate fiscal multiplier by SVAR. 
The SVAR model of the government consumption multiplier estimated in this chapter 
uses panel data i.e. it is a panel-SVAR. The advantages and disadvantages of using a 
panel-SVAR model are discussed in the following sections. 
4.3.2 SVAR for a single country 
Sims (1980) and Asteriou et al (2007) consider that all of the variables should be 
treated as endogenous variables if they are determined together simultaneously. This 
method is different to most econometric models which normally include a dependent 
variable which is treated as an endogenous variable and several independent or 
explanatory variables which are treated as exogenous variables. After the publication 
of Sims (1980) seminal paper, the vector autoregressive approach became one of the 
most popular methods used to study the effects of monetary policy.  
Following Blanchard and Perotti (2002), the objective of this study is to estimate the 
following system of equations (in matrix form): 
                AYt = ∑ CkYt−k + ut
K
k=1         (4.1) 
where Yt is a mx1 vector of variables comprising of government expenditure variables, 
GDP and some endogenous variables for a given quarter t. A is the square matrix 
containing the structural contemporaneous parameters of the variables. Ck is an mxm 
matrix of the cross-effects of the kth lag of the variables in their current observations 
and ut is a mx1 vector or an m (exogenous) shocks (this model has m variables). 
One issue with this equation is that we can only estimate the reduced-form VAR of the 
model in the equation (4.1): 
Yt = ∑ 𝐴
−1CkYt−k + 𝐴
−1ut
K
k=1
 
In order to estimate the multiplier, we need to estimate the matrices A, Ck and ut. 
However, the OLS or GMM only provide the estimates of A-1Ck and A-1ut. In order to 
calculate the estimates for A, Ck and ut, this chapter uses the lower triangular Cholesky 
decomposition as an identification scheme. Meaning that the changes in the first 
variable of this model are able to affect others contemporaneously, while fluctuations 
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in variables occurring later in the model need at least the length of one period to affect 
the first variable.  
When reckoning the government consumption multiplier (the first variable in the model 
is government consumption, while the second variable is the output), using the 
Cholesky decomposition as an identification scheme is the most reliable and popular 
method; a method which is also used by Blanchard and Perotti (2002) and Ilzetzki et 
al (2013). While a shock in government consumption can affect output immediately, 
any changes in output need at least a quarter to affect the government consumption. 
This assumption can be described in the form of the lower triangular matrix A: 
 𝐴 = (
1 0
𝑎21 1
) 
4.3.3 Panel-SVAR 
This chapter estimates a structural VAR using panel data; therefore, the model can be 
rewritten as follows: 
               AYi,t = ∑ CkYi,t−k + 𝑓𝑖 + Bui,t
K
k=1              (4.2) 
in this equation the index i refers to the i-th observation cross section. B stands for a 
diagonal mxm matrix, where the vector ut contains orthogonal independents, identically 
distributed shocks to the endogenous variable, with the expectation of this vector being 
zero (E[ui,t]=0) and E[ui,t ui,t’] in the identity matrix. In accordance with Holtz-Eakin et al 
(1988), it is possible to treat lagged values of Y as instrumental variables. 
One of the advantages of using Panel-SVAR instead of SVAR is that with Panel-SVAR 
there are a greater number of observations. A hindrance of Panel-SVAR is being forced 
to impose certain homogeneity restrictions; this concern is lessened if the different 
units of the cross-section are economically similar. However, the underlying structure 
requirement is the same for each cross-sectional unit, not to mention it is still a strong 
assumption; therefore, this chapter includes the fixed effects denoted by fi in equation 
(4.2). The use of these fixed effects will allow the model to capture some degrees of 
“individual heterogeneity”. Holz-Eakin et al (1988) argue that including individual 
effects in the model means that the time series relationship between the dependent 
variables and its lag values are not considered identical.  
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However, introducing fixed effects into the model, including lags of variable leads, fixed 
effects can be correlated with regressions. Hence, the mean-differencing 
transformation, which is normally used to eliminate fixed effects, will create biased 
coefficients. To solve this problem, this chapter incorporates aspects of Love and 
Ziccino (2006) study by using forward-mean differencing (Helmert procedure, see 
appendix 2). Arellano and Bover (1995) consider that by using this transformation it 
will keep homogeneity of variance (homoscedasticity) and will not induce serial 
correlation.  
Furthermore, using the Helmert procedure enables this study to use lagged 
regressions as instruments and do coefficient estimations by using the system general 
method of moments. Therefore, this paper uses a STATA Panel VAR code developed 
by World Bank staff member, Inessa Love, to estimate the Panel VAR model using 
forward-mean differencing. This code generates 95% confidence intervals for the 
impulse response functions with Monte Carlo simulations.  
4.3.4 Lag structure 
One important task when using the SVAR approach is to choose the optimal lag length 
- K in the model (equation 4.2). This chapter uses a model with one lag to estimate all 
sub-samples as well as the whole sample. This decision is justified by using the HQIC 
and SBIC information criteria, both of which suggest one period lag for all sub-samples. 
In SVAR analyses, the results can often change significantly depending upon the 
number of lags chosen in the SVAR. In econometrics, there are some popular 
specification tests used to help decide the optimal number of lags for the model such 
as AIC, HQIC and SBIC. In this paper, the Panel SVAR is estimated instead of SVAR. 
Therefore, this chapter calculates AIC, HQIC and SBIC for each cross section and then 
uses the modal value of the optimal lag length as the optimal lag length for the Panel 
SVAR model: the optimal number of lags will be chosen between 1 and 12.  
Ivanov and Kilian (2001) suggest that in order to select the most appropriate optimal 
lags for the SVAR model, AIC works better in accordance with monthly data. For 
quarterly data, HQIC seems to be more accurate, especially if the number of 
observations is greater than 120, while SBIC is the best criteria to use for samples 
which have less than 120 observations. Furthermore, Lutkepohl (2005) considers that 
while SBIC and HQIC provide consistent estimations of the true lag order, AIC tends 
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to overestimate the true lag order with positive probability even when an infinite sample 
size is being used. Taking this into consideration, this chapter uses the optimal lag 
length chosen by HQIC and SBIC.  
4.3.5 Calculating multipliers 
In order to estimate government consumption multipliers, the model is estimated using 
logarithms of real GDP and real government consumption.  
This paper will focus on the impact multiplier, cumulative multiplier and the long-run 
multiplier. These are defined as follows:  
The impact multiplier is expressed in the formula as: 
𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑡 𝑚𝑢𝑙𝑡𝑖𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑒𝑟 =
∆𝑌0
∆𝐺0
 
where the change in output ΔY used in this formula is caused by a change in 
government consumption ΔG.      
The cumulative multiplier: 
𝐶𝑢𝑚𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑚𝑢𝑙𝑡𝑖𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑒𝑟(𝑡) =
∑ ∆𝑌𝑖
𝑡
𝑖=0
∑ ∆𝐺𝑖
𝑡
𝑖=0
 
The long-run multiplier is also the cumulative multiplier, as t goes to infinite. In this 
study, the estimation reveals the impact of a shock in government consumption on 
output is always horizontal by 3 years. Therefore, the estimated long run multipliers in 
this chapter are in fact the cumulative multiplier after 12 quarters.  
In order to calculate the multiplier, this chapter highlights that the orthogonalized 
impulse-response functions illustrate the response of a variable to an orthogonal shock 
in one other variable with no disturbance to other variables. This helps to clarify the 
effect of one shock at a time, while keeping other shocks at zero.  
In order to estimate the government consumption multiplier (main focus of this 
chapter), the Panel-VAR for variable real government consumption in the form of 
ΔlogG and real output in the form of ΔlogY require estimating. After analysing the 
impulse response function, it can be determined that if there is a shock in ΔlogG by 1 
unit at time t=0, then ΔlogY at time t will increase by IRFt (ΔlogY) unit and ΔlogG at 
time t will increase by IRFt (ΔlogG). If time t=0, then IRFt (ΔlogG)=1. Therefore: 
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𝐼𝑅𝐹0(∆𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑌)
𝐼𝑅𝐹0(∆𝑙𝑜𝑔𝐺)
= 𝛽 = 𝐼𝑅𝐹0(∆𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑌) =
∆𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑌
∆𝑙𝑜𝑔𝐺
=
∆𝑌
𝑌
.
𝐺
∆𝐺
=
∆𝑌
∆𝐺
.
𝐺
𝑌
 
The impact government consumption multiplier can easily be defined as: 
∆𝑌
∆𝐺
= 𝛽.
𝑌
𝐺
 
It is highly complicated to calculate a cumulative multiplier from the impulse response 
function, an aspect which is expressed in the following formula: 
𝐶𝑢𝑚𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑚𝑢𝑙𝑡𝑖𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑒𝑟(𝑛) =
∑ 𝐼𝑅𝐹𝑡(∆𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑌)
𝑛
𝑡=0
∑ 𝐼𝑅𝐹𝑡(∆𝑙𝑜𝑔𝐺)
𝑛
𝑡=0
.
?̅?
?̅?
 
in this formula 
?̅?
?̅?
 is average in relation to the ratio between government consumption 
and GDP of the sample used to estimate panel VAR. 
4.4 Data 
This chapter uses quarterly data from 30 countries from 1980q1 to 2013q4 
(unbalanced panel data), including 26 European countries and 4 non-European 
countries. These countries are listed in the appendix. Focusing mainly on EU countries 
(23 countries) helps to limit potential heterogeneity especially as EU countries tend to 
have numerous economic similarities. The data used in this chapter excludes 5 EU 
countries including Bulgaria, Croatia, Greece, Luxembourg and Romania; this is solely 
due to the shortage of data on these countries. The data used in this chapter also 
includes 7 non-EU countries including Australia, Canada, Iceland, Japan, Norway, 
Switzerland and United States. The reasons for including these countries in the dataset 
are: the availability of data relating to these countries, and these economies share a 
range of economic similarities with EU countries.    
Quarterly data was chosen for this study simply because it is better suited for 
identification; take for instance Blanchard and Perotti (2002), who determine that the 
impact of change in fiscal policy in relation to output can be identified using the 
assumption that fiscal authorities require at least one period to respond to new 
economic data with discretionary policy. One of the disadvantages of using quarterly 
data is the limited availability of the data.  
Data relating to 26 European countries was collected from Eurostat, the data for United 
States, Canada, Japan and Australia was collected from Oxford Economics.   
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The data used is also required to determine financial openness, financial development 
and openness of the economy. The Chinn and Ito (2006) index of capital account 
openness is used in this study as a measure of financial openness. According to the 
Chinn-Ito website, “The Chinn-Ito index (KAOPEN) is an index measuring a country's 
degree of capital account openness. The index was initially introduced in Chinn and 
Ito (Journal of Development Economics, 2006). KAOPEN is based on the binary 
dummy variables that codify the tabulation of restrictions on cross-border financial 
transactions reported in the IMF's Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and 
Exchange Restrictions (AREAER)”.  
Incorporating the financial development index, this chapter uses the figure of domestic 
credit in relation to the private sector (as % of GDP). There are several indicators of 
financial development, for example the ratio of liquid liabilities to GDP and the ratio of 
market capitalisation to GDP. However, in this study the ratio of domestic credit of the 
private sector in accordance with GDP is used because of the broad consensus that 
this ratio is a good indicator of financial development along with the fact that the data 
of this ratio is quite easy to accumulate. This particular data is taken from the World 
Development Indicators (WDI). 
In order to determine whether an economy is an open or closed one, this chapter uses 
the ratio of total trade to GDP (this data is also taken from World Development 
Indicators). 
The data used to define whether a country implementing a fixed exchange rate regime 
or a flexible exchange rate regime is the same data used by Ilzetzki, Reinhart and 
Rogoff (2011).   
The figures which highlight the external debt as part of the GDP were collected from 
the Oxford Economics; due to the availability, this data was collated from 2003q1 to 
2013q4.  
4.5 Results and interpretation 
4.5.1 Results 
The level of financial openness 
In order to answer the question whether or not the level of financial openness affects 
the size of the fiscal multiplier, the whole sample has been divided into two sub-
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samples. Due to the fact there is no literature about the level of Chinn-Ito capital 
account openness index to be classified as a high level or low level, this chapter uses 
the mean of variable kaopen of the whole sample as criteria.  
The first sub-sample includes observations which have the value of variable kaopen 
(the Chinn-Ito capital account openness index) greater than 1.85 (mean variable of 
kaopen), while the second sub-sample includes observations with the value variable 
of kaopen less than or equal to 1.85.  
Figure 4.1 reveals the cumulative multiplier for both sub-samples: the impact multiplier 
for groups of higher level financial openness observations and groups of lower level 
financial openness observations are 0.63 and 0.28 respectively. Both figures are 
statistically different from zero as well as from each other at a 95% confidence level. 
In Figure 4.1 and other figures in this chapter, the dashed lines show the 95% 
confidence interval; for instance, the 95% confidence interval of the impact multiplier 
in groups of lower financial openness level observations equates to (0.1 - 0.44), while 
the ones in groups which are of a higher financial openness level observation are 
between (0.52 - 0.75). 
Figure 4.1 Government consumption multiplier – High level of Financial 
Openness group versus Low level of Financial Openness group 
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Since fiscal policy can only be implemented over a period of time and the economy will 
most likely take time to respond to these changes, this chapter also takes into 
consideration the cumulative multipliers for both groups at horizons ranging from 0 to 
12 quarters.  
The estimation results show that the cumulative multiplier in the higher level of the 
financial openness group is greater than the cumulative multiplier in the lower level of 
the financial openness group at every time horizon (Figure 4.1). Furthermore, the 
cumulative multiplier in the higher level of the financial openness sub-sample is 
significantly different from zero at every time horizon, while this does not happen for 
the lower level of the financial openness sub sample. As revealed in Figure 4.1, the 
cumulative multiplier of the lower financial openness level only differ from zero at 
quarter 0 and quarter 1, after quarter 2 the level does not dramatically alter. This means 
that the impact of a shock in government spending in relation to the output may be 
offset totally after 2 quarters by crowding out effects in time of low levels of financial 
openness. 
The long-run multiplier (the cumulative multiplier at the quarter 12) in higher levels of 
the financial openness group and lower levels of the financial openness group are 1.19 
and 0.47 respectively (Figure 4.1). 
The sample was also divided into high level financial openness countries and low level 
financial openness countries (which is different to the classification used for Figure 4.1, 
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which allowed individual countries to move between classifications). For simplicity, the 
average capital account openness index for each country is calculated, if this value of 
a country is greater than 1.85, then this country is classified as a high level of financial 
openness country. Other countries are classified as a low level of financial openness 
country: this classification is revealed in Table 4.3. 
Figure 4.2 Government consumption multiplier – High level of Financial 
Openness Countries and Low level of Financial Openness Countries 
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In figure 4.2, it can be determined that the multiplier in countries with high levels of 
financial openness is significantly greater than the multiplier in countries with low levels 
of financial openness at every time horizon. These findings are consistent with the 
results presented in figure 4.1, whereby the higher the level of financial openness, the 
bigger the multiplier. In other words, the higher the levels of financial openness the 
more effective fiscal stimulus packages will be in term of raising output. 
The level of external debt    
In order to examine whether the level of external debt affects the government 
consumption multiplier, this chapter splits the data used into countries with high levels 
of external debt and countries with low levels of external debt, using the ratio of total 
external debt to GDP as a criterion. Countries with a ratio of external debt to GDP 
greater than 100% are classified as high external debts, while others are classified as 
low external debts. One reason for this cut-off level is that although the ratio of external 
debt to GDP varies during this period in many countries, it rarely crosses the cut-off 
level (100%). As a result, there are 20 “high external debt” countries and 10 “low 
external debt” countries: these results are presented in Table 4.7.  
Figure 4.3 Cumulative multiplier – Low external debt countries and High external 
debt countries 
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Figure 4.3 reveals that the cumulative multiplier in countries with low levels of external 
debt is small, it increases from the initial value 0.06 (impact multiplier) to 0.21 (long run 
multiplier). This level is not only small but it is also not statistically significant from zero 
at every time horizon. 
Furthermore, Figure 4.3 also highlights that the effects of a fiscal shock in countries 
with high levels of external debt is quite large; increasing from the initial value of 0.93 
(impact multiplier) to the long run value 1.93. This value is statistically positive and 
greater than the cumulative multiplier in low level external debt countries at every time 
horizon. In other words, in countries with high levels of external debt, the government 
consumption multiplier is larger than in low external debt countries.  
The level of financial development 
To determine how the level of financial development affects the size of the government 
consumption multiplier, the SVAR is re-estimated for two groups of countries, one that 
includes high level of financial development countries and one with countries that have 
a low level of financial development. This classification is based upon the financial 
development index which uses the ratio of domestic credit to private sector to GDP as 
a proxy for the financial development.  
Countries with a ratio of domestic credit to private sector of less than 100% GDP are 
classified as low level financial development countries, countries above this 100% level 
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are considered to be high level of financial development countries. One reason for this 
cut-off level is that although the ratio of domestic credit to private sector varies during 
this period in many countries, it rarely crosses the cut-off level (100%). 
Figure 4.4 Cumulative multiplier – Low level financial development countries and 
High level financial development countries 
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multiplier in groups of high level financial development countries increases from 0.28 
(impact multiplier) to 0.63 (long-run multiplier). Furthermore, the results determine that 
the effects of increases in government consumption in groups of low level financial 
development countries is significantly larger than in groups of high level financial 
development countries.  
The level of trade openness 
To investigate the impact of trade openness, the SVAR is re-estimated for two sub-
samples: open economies and closed economies. The classification is based upon the 
ratio of total trade in services and goods to GDP. The data of total trade to GDP is 
collected from World Development Indicator, and due to data availability, data collected 
for the year 2012 is used for classification.  
Following Ilzetzki et al (2013), countries with a ratio of total trade to GDP greater than 
60% are classified as being open, while other countries are deemed as closed. On this 
basis, there are 25 open countries and 5 closed countries (as listed in Table 4.5).  
 
Figure 4.5 Cumulative multiplier – Open economies and Closed economies 
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As shown in Figure 4.5, the cumulative multiplier in “open” economies increases from 
0.51 (impact multiplier) to 0.93 (long-run multiplier), being positive for every time 
horizon. Whereas the cumulative in “closed” economies increases from 0.63 (impact 
multiplier) to 1.26 (long run multiplier) and is also positive for every time horizon. Figure 
4.5 also reveals that the cumulative multiplier in “open” economies is not significantly 
less than the cumulative multiplier in “closed” economies at each time horizon.  
Flexible exchange rate regime vs Fixed exchange rate regime      
When examining the impact of the exchange rate regime in relation to the size of the 
government consumption multiplier, the SVAR is re-estimated into two sub-samples 
comprising of: fixed exchange rate regime countries and flexible exchange rate regime 
countries. This is based on the de facto classification of Ilzetzki, Reinhart and Rogoff 
(2011), where a country with no separate legal tender, crawling pegs, de facto or pre-
announced bands or crawling bands narrower than or equal to +/-2% is classified as a 
fixed exchange regime country. Other countries are classified as flexible exchange 
regime countries. In case there are countries which change from a fixed exchange rate 
regime to a flexible exchange rate regime or vice versa, for the purpose of this research 
they have been referred to as their dominated regime. In line with this classification, 
there are 12 countries with flexible exchange rate regimes, and 18 countries that have 
a fixed exchange rate regime (as listed in Table 4.6).  
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Figure 4.6 Cumulative multiplier - Flexible Exchange Rate Regime Countries and 
Fixed Exchange Rate Regime Countries 
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statistically positive at every point, in contrast, the cumulative multiplier in countries 
with flexible exchange regimes increases from an initial value of 0.23, peaking at 0.55 
after 1 quarter, and then dropping to 0.39 after 2 quarters. This value fluctuates slightly 
and then stays at 0.43 from the fourth quarter onwards. In flexible exchange rate 
regime countries, the cumulative multiplier is even not statistically different to zero after 
the second quarter.  
4.5.2 Interpretation 
The level of financial openness, external debt and financial development 
As reported in the above section, the government consumption multiplier tends to be 
larger in countries with a high level of financial openness, a high level of external debt 
or a low level of financial development, in comparison to countries with a lower level of 
financial openness, a lower level of external debt or a higher level of financial 
development. All of these results seem to be reasonable in terms of economic theory 
regarding crowding out effects through changes in interest rates following changes in 
fiscal policy. 
The IS-LM model considers that an increase in government spending may be followed 
by an increase in interest rates, which in turn can lead to crowding-out effects on 
investment. These crowding-out effects will partly offset the impacts of an 
expansionary fiscal policy on output; this means that the crowding-out effects will 
reduce the size of the multiplier. The reason behind an increase in interest rates is that 
the government will need to issue more debt to finance the purchasing of more goods 
and services. This effect can lead to an increase in demand in the financial market, 
which can cause an upward pressure on the interest rate. However, a high level of 
financial openness means that the government can easily borrow from overseas at a 
given interest rate, which means that the interest may not increase at all or may just 
increase slightly. Therefore, crowding-out effects will be smaller in high level of 
financial openness countries. 
In addition, a higher level of external debt means that a greater number of economic 
activities in the economy are financed by foreign capital. As predicted by the IS-LM 
model, this will limit the crowding out effects via an increase in domestic interest rates 
following an expansionary fiscal policy. Therefore, the government consumption 
multiplier is bigger in countries with higher levels of external debt than countries with 
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lower levels of external debt. These findings are also consistent with Kara and Sin 
(2012). In theory, without financial constraints, both private investment and 
consumption become crowded out through an increase in the real interest rate, which 
normally follows a fiscal expansion. Moreover, there may be negative wealth effects 
on private consumption because forward-looking households expect taxation to rise in 
the future in order to finance the budget deficits. As a result, the effects of an 
expansionary fiscal policy will be offset partly, which means the government 
consumption multiplier in low external debt countries is smaller. In contrast, countries 
with a high level of external debt or those with credit constraints, have to deal with a 
nominal interest rate is stuck at a fixed level i.e. zero lower bound. In these periods, an 
expansionary fiscal policy leads to an increase in output, which is followed by a rise in 
the inflation rate. An expansionary fiscal policy may lead to a decrease in real interest 
rates which can cause additional increase in outputs further down the line, meaning, 
the government consumption multiplier is larger in high external debt countries.   
This result explains Blanchard and Leigh (2013) study which discovers that the fiscal 
multiplier in advanced countries since 2009 is greater than expected before (about 0.9 
to 1.7 instead of 0.5 calculated by IMF (2009)). The empirical results discussed in this 
chapter certainly correlate to findings of Blanchard and Leigh: the debt burden has 
been accumulating rapidly over the years, and as a result the government consumption 
multiplier becomes much larger, which also reduces the effectiveness of austerity 
programs. 
A higher level of financial development means that more private consumption and 
private investments are financed by domestic credit. A larger proportion of private 
consumption and private investments financed by domestic credit can create stronger 
negative effects in the form of an increase in domestic interest rates on private 
consumption and investments. This larger proportion also means that a higher level of 
financial development, or more private consumption and investment financed by 
domestic credit creates stronger crowding-out effects on private consumption and 
investments and a smaller government consumption multiplier. 
The level of trade openness and exchange rate regimes 
The estimated results highlight that the government consumption multiplier in open 
economies (countries with higher levels of trade openness) is not significantly less than 
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the government consumption multiplier in closed economies (countries with lower 
levels of trade openness).  
These findings are inconsistent with the results of Ilzetzki et al (2013). Furthermore, 
Ilzetzki et al determine that both impact multipliers and long-run multipliers in “open” 
economies are negative, whereas the results from this chapter show that these 
numbers are positive: these differences may be caused by the differences in the 
sample. 
These findings are also inconsistent with the Mundell-Fleming model; in this model, a 
more open economy appears to have a lower fiscal multiplier. There are two main 
reasons for this: firstly, a portion of government consumption is imported from foreign 
producers, which means the increase in government consumption will be partly offset 
by the increase in imports. Also, as already explained by the Mundell-Fleming model, 
increases in government spending may be followed by a depreciation of the local 
currency; this may lead to an increase in imports and a decrease in exports. In other 
words, a depreciation of local currencies will lead to a decrease in net export, which 
will reduce the effectiveness of an expansionary fiscal policy, meaning an 
expansionary fiscal policy in a more open economy will be less effective than one in a 
closed economy. 
However, since this analysis, a possible explanation of why the cumulative multiplier 
in the open economies sample is not significantly less than the cumulative multiplier in 
the closed economies sample as predicted in the Mundell-Fleming model is because 
both fixed exchange rate regime countries and flexible exchange rate regime countries 
have been used in this research.  
As outlined in the above section, this chapter also examines the impact of the 
exchange rate regime on the size of the government consumption multiplier and 
discovers that the government consumption multiplier in fixed exchange rate regimes 
is significantly larger than the government consumption multiplier in flexible exchange 
rate regimes. These results parallel the predictions of the Mundell-Fleming model, and 
also help to explain why the cumulative multiplier in closed trade economies is not 
statistically different to the cumulative multiplier in open trade economies.  
Furthermore, these results determine that although flexible exchange rate regimes 
reduce the effects of an expansionary fiscal policy by crowding-out effects through 
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exchange rates, these effects will be greater if an economy is more open to trade: 
because even most closed economies in the sample implement a flexible exchange 
rate when the multiplier is still high. In other words, the crowding-out effect through 
exchange rates is still small in flexible exchange rate regime countries if this country is 
not open to trade.    
4.5.3 Robustness check 
Sample variation 
A question which needs to be considered is whether the behaviour of a single country 
or a small group of countries can influence these results? In order to complete a 
robustness check for the results of this chapter, the estimated SVAR for single 
countries must be taken into consideration. Based on these single country estimations, 
this chapter excludes four countries including Belgium, Iceland, Ireland and Lithuania, 
all of which have much larger multipliers than any other countries: while the multiplier 
in other countries spans from -0.6 (Slovenia) to 1.8 (Japan), the multipliers in Belgium, 
Iceland, Ireland and Lithuania are 2.68, 2.06, 3.76 and 2.23 respectively. 
After excluding these four countries, the estimated results have become slightly 
different in terms of value (smaller). However, the main results still hold. The 
cumulative government consumption multiplier is still bigger in high level financial 
openness countries, bigger in high external debt countries, bigger in low levels of 
financial development and bigger in fixed exchange rate regime countries.   
The financial openness – The Lane and Milesi-Ferreti (2007) “index of financial 
integration” 
As an alternative to the Chinn-Ito index used as the financial openness index, the 
panel-SVAR is re-estimated using the Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007) “index of 
financial integration” (IFI) instead. The IFI is the ratio of the sum of gross external 
financial assets and liabilities to GDP. Due to there being no literature regarding the 
level of IFI and whether it can be classified as high level or low level, this chapter 
chooses a 500% cut-off level because this will divide the whole sample into two equal 
groups: one which has 15 higher level IFI countries and one with 15 lower level IFI 
countries (as listed in Table 4.8).   
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The government consumption multiplier in countries with a higher level of IFI is not 
significantly different to the government consumption multiplier in countries with lower 
levels of IFI: an aspect which is not consistent with the results delivered in section 
4.5.1, this is due to the differences in classification. For example, the United States, 
Canada and Japan are high level financial openness countries (based on the Chinn-
Ito index); however, their IFIs are much lower than other countries in the sample. 
Net external indebtedness 
As an alternative to gross external debt, the panel-SVAR is re-estimated on two sub-
samples, distinguished using the ratio of net foreign liabilities to GDP. Countries with 
the average ratio of net foreign liabilities to GDP greater than 20% are being classified 
as low net foreign liabilities countries, while others are being classified as having high 
levels of net foreign liabilities. The full classification of this is shown in Table 4.9. The 
results of the panel-VAR estimation (Figure 4.7) indicate that the cumulative 
government consumption multiplier in countries with higher levels of net foreign 
liabilities is significantly greater than the cumulative government consumption multiplier 
in countries with lower levels of net foreign liabilities at every time horizon. These 
findings are consistent with the results which used gross external debt; the government 
consumption multiplier in countries with high levels of net external debt or gross 
external debt is greater than in countries with low levels of net external debt or gross 
external debt. 
Figure 4.7 Cumulative multiplier – Net Foreign Liabilities 
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4.6 Summary and conclusions 
This chapter provides empirical evidence on the magnitude of the government 
consumption multiplier and how this is affected by a number of economic factors: 
financial openness, financial development, level of external debt, trade openness and 
exchange rate regime using panel-SVAR estimation with quarterly data for 26 
European countries and 4 non-European countries. Dividing the whole sample into 
sub-samples allows investigation of how these economic factors affect the government 
consumption multiplier (an approach also adopted by Ilzetzki et al (2013)). These 
classifications are based upon several criteria, such as the level of financial openness, 
the level of external debt, the level of financial development, the level of openness to 
trade and the exchange rate regime.  
This reveals that government consumption multiplier is bigger in countries with higher 
level of financial openness, higher level of external debt, lower level of financial 
development and fixed exchange rate regime. This chapter also examines the 
relationship between trade openness and the size of government consumption 
multiplier. However, the estimation result suggests that the cumulative government 
consumption multiplier in countries with higher level of trade openness is not 
significantly differ to the cumulative government consumption multiplier in countries 
with lower level of trade openness. This is inconsistent with Ilzetzki et al (2013) as well 
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as the prediction of Mundell-Fleming model which considers that trade openness may 
affect the size of government consumption multiplier through crowding out effects 
induce by changes in exchange rate following any change in government consumption.  
However this inconsistency may be explained that when using trade openness level to 
divide the whole sample into sub-samples, each sub-sample include both countries 
with fixed exchange regime and countries with flexible exchange regime.  
Two of these criteria – exchange rate regime and level of financial openness -- are 
motivated by Mundell-Fleming model of fiscal policy in an open economy. According 
to the Mundell-Fleming model if the exchange rate is allowed to float then the 
expansionary impact of fiscal expansion is offset by exchange rate appreciation and 
so the fiscal multiplier is lower with a floating exchange rate. In a financially closed 
economy a fiscal expansion will be ‘crowded out’ by higher domestic interest rates, but 
a greater degree of financial openness will allow more borrowing from overseas and 
reduce this crowding out, hence increasing the fiscal multiplier. The results reported 
here are consistent with both these predictions of the Mundell-Fleming model. 
The methods employed in this chapter could be extended in a number of ways. The 
sample could be increased to cover more countries. The investigation could be 
pursued using a multivariate SVAR model instead of bivariate SVAR model, which 
would make it possible to investigate for example the dynamic response of monetary 
policy to fiscal policy shocks or the role of asset prices in macroeconomic transmission. 
More economic factors could also be considered. A larger sample might allow 
investigation of the interaction of the various economic factors. 
Despite these limitations and simplicity of the model employed, these results reveal 
two major limitations to the Mundell-Fleming model and other related macroeconomic 
models. Mundell-Fleming in common with most macroeconomic models before the 
global financial crisis of 2008 -- takes no account of the financial sector. The measure 
of financial development employed here – the ratio of credit to GDP – is an indicator 
of the extent to which the financial sector provides consumer and corporate credit and 
of the magnitude of such credit expansion in response to fiscal and monetary policy. 
The finding that countries with a higher level of financial development have a lower 
government consumption multiplier indicates that the structure and development of the 
financial sector needs to be taken into account in analyzing fiscal and monetary 
transmission. Further research is merited to obtain a better understanding of how the 
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structure and development of the financial sector affects monetary transmission. One 
possibility is that crowding out effects of higher interest rates are more powerful in 
economies with relatively large ratios of credit to GDP. 
A second limitation of these standard pre-crisis models is the assumption that the 
government and private sector are financially unconstrained and that changes in their 
debt levels do not alter their ability to reallocate spending over time either now or in the 
future i.e. fiscal and monetary transmission should be invariant to debt stocks. This is 
contradicted by the finding here that a higher level of external debt is associated with 
a higher government consumption multiplier. Again further research is merited to 
identify the channels through which debt levels affect fiscal and monetary transmission. 
One possibility is that higher levels of debt limit the ability of the private sector to 
increase corporate investment and household investment and consumption when 
government spending is reduced and domestic interest rates fall. 
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Appendix 1. Data overview 
Table 4.1 Government Consumption (% GDP) and Number of observations for 
samples 
Sample Government Consumption (% 
GDP) 
No of Obs 
Full 19.89 2851 
Lower Financial Openness  20.47 677 
Higher Financial Openness 19.70 2146 
Lower Financial Openness 
(countries) 
20.18 1075 
Higher Financial Openness 
(countries) 
19.71 1776 
Lower Financial Development 20.43 837 
Higher Financial Development 19.45 1682 
Open to Trade 20.07 621 
Closed to Trade 19.25 2230 
Flexible Exchange Rate 19.04 1295 
Fixed Exchange Rate 20.59 1556 
Lower External Debt 17.92 419 
Higher External Debt 19.88 836 
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Table 4.2 List of Countries 
 Country Source Period   Country Source Period 
1 Australia Oxford Economics 1980q1 - 2013q4 16 Japan Oxford Economics 1980q1 - 2013q4 
2 Austria Eurostat 1988q1 - 2013q1 17 Latvia Eurostat 1995q1 - 2013q4 
3 Belgium Eurostat 1980q1 - 2013q4 18 Lithuania Eurostat 1995q1 - 2013q4 
4 Canada Oxford Economics 1980q1 - 2013q4 19 Malta Eurostat 2000q1 - 2013q4 
5 Cyprus Eurostat 1995q1 - 2013q3 20 Netherlands Eurostat 1988q1 - 2013q4 
6 Czech Eurostat 1996q1 - 2013q4 21 Norway Eurostat 1980q1 - 2013q4 
7 Denmark Eurostat 1990q1 - 2013q4 22 Poland Eurostat 1995q1 - 2013q4 
8 Estonia Eurostat 1995q1 - 2013q4 23 Portugal Eurostat 1995q1 - 2013q3 
9 Finland Eurostat 1980q1 - 2013q4 24 Slovakia Eurostat 1997q1 - 2013q4 
10 France Eurostat 1980q1 - 2013q4 25 Slovenia Eurostat 1995q1 - 2013q4 
11 Germany Eurostat 1991q1 - 2013q4 26 Spain Eurostat 1995q1 - 2013q4 
12 Hungary Eurostat 1995q1 - 2013q4 27 Sweden Eurostat 1993q1 - 2013q4 
13 Iceland Eurostat 1997q1 - 2013q3 28 Switzerland Eurostat 1980q1 - 2013q3 
14 Ireland Eurostat 1997q1 - 2013q3 29 United Kingdom Eurostat 1980q1 - 2013q4 
15 Italy Eurostat 1991q1 - 2013q4 30 United States Oxford Economics 1980q1 - 2013q4 
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High level of Financial Openness countries (kaopen) 
 Name Mean  Max  Min  
1 Austria 2.16 2.44 1.12 
2 Canada 2.44 2.44 2.44 
3 Denmark 2.43 2.44 2.18 
4 Estonia 2.39 2.44 1.91 
5 Finland 1.9 2.44 1.12 
6 Germany 2.44 2.44 2.44 
7 Ireland 2.44 2.44 2.44 
8 Italy 2.25 2.44 0.41 
9 Japan 2.35 1.65 2.44 
10 Latvia 2.30 2.44 1.91 
11 Lithuania 2.26 2.44 1.38 
12 Netherland 2.44 2.44 2.44 
13 Portugal 2.44 2.44 1.91 
14 Spain 2.34 2.44 1.64 
15 Sweden 2.30 2.44 1.38 
16 Switzerland 2.44 2.44 2.44 
17 United Kingdom 2.39 2.44 1.65 
18 United States 2.44 2.44 2.44 
Low level of Financial Openness countries (kaopen) 
 Name Mean  Max  Min 
1 Australia 1.42 2.44 -0.11 
2 Belgium 1.71 2.44 0.51 
3 Cyprus 0.49 2.44 -1.16 
4 Czech Republic 1.55 2.44 -0.11 
5 France 1.41 2.44 -1.17 
6 Hungary 1.32 2.44 -1.17 
7 Iceland 0.5 1.12 -1.17 
8 Malta 0.93 2.44 -1.17 
9 Norway 1.24 2.44 -0.11 
10 Poland -0.38 -1.17 0.0644 
11 Slovakia 0.01 1.38 -1.17 
12 Slovenia 1.16 2.44 -1.17 
Table 4.3 High level of financial openness countries and low level of financial openness countries  
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Table 4.4 List of high level of financial development countries and low level of financial development countries 
 Country Private Credit (% GDP) Classification   Country Private Credit (% GDP) Classification 
1 Australia 123 High 16 Japan 177 High 
2 Austria 118 High 17 Latvia 68 Low 
3 Belgium 92  Low 18 Lithuania 51 Low 
4 Canada NA (updated to 2009) NA 19 Malta 128 High 
5 Cyprus 305 High 20 Netherlands 200 High 
6 Czech 57 Low 21 Norway NA (updated to 2006) NA 
7 Denmark 205 High 22 Poland 54 Low 
8 Estonia 77 Low 23 Portugal 184 High 
9 Finland 99 Low 24 Slovakia NA (updated to 2008) NA 
10 France 116 High 25 Slovenia 87 Low 
11 Germany 101 High 26 Spain 193 High 
12 Hungary 57 Low 27 Sweden 139 High 
13 Iceland 97 Low 28 Switzerland 176 High 
14 Ireland 186 High 29 United Kingdom 176 High 
15 Italy 124 High 30 United States 184 High 
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Table 4.5 List of “open” economies and “closed” economies 
 Country Total Trade (% GDP) Classification   Country Total Trade (% GDP) Classification 
1 Australia 42 Closed 16 Japan 31 Closed 
2 Austria 111 Open 17 Latvia 122 (figure of 2011) Open 
3 Belgium 171 Open 18 Lithuania 157 (figure of 2011) Open 
4 Canada 61 Open 19 Malta 186 (figure of 2011) Open 
5 Cyprus 86 (figure of 2010) Open 20 Netherlands 168 Open 
6 Czech 150 Open 21 Norway 68 Open 
7 Denmark 104 Open 22 Poland 92 Open 
8 Estonia 181 Open 23 Portugal 78 Open 
9 Finland 81 Open 24 Slovakia 176 (figure of 2011) Open 
10 France 57 Closed 25 Slovenia 142 (figure of 2011) Open 
11 Germany 98 Open 26 Spain 65 Open 
12 Hungary 181 (figure of 2011) Open 27 Sweden 91 Open 
13 Iceland 113 Open 28 Switzerland 94 Open 
14 Ireland 191 Open 29 United Kingdom 65 Open 
15 Italy 59 Closed 30 United States 30 Closed 
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Table 4.6 List of countries with flexible exchange rate regimes and countries with fixed exchange rate regimes 
 Country Classification  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Country Classification 
1 Australia Flexible 16 Japan Flexible 
2 Austria Fixed 17 Latvia Fixed 
3 Belgium Fixed 18 Lithuania Fixed 
4 Canada Flexible 19 Malta Fixed 
5 Cyprus Fixed 20 Netherlands Fixed 
6 Czech Flexible 21 Norway Flexible 
7 Denmark Fixed 22 Poland Flexible 
8 Estonia Fixed 23 Portugal Fixed 
9 Finland Fixed 24 Slovakia Fixed 
10 France Fixed 25 Slovenia Fixed 
11 Germany Fixed 26 Spain Fixed 
12 Hungary Flexible 27 Sweden Flexible 
13 Iceland Flexible 28 Switzerland Flexible 
14 Ireland Fixed 29 United Kingdom Flexible 
15 Italy Fixed 30 United States Flexible 
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Table 4.7 List of countries with low level of external debt and countries with high level of external debt 
 Country Classification   Country Classification 
1 Australia Low 16 Japan Low 
2 Austria High 17 Latvia High 
3 Belgium High 18 Lithuania Low 
4 Canada Low 19 Malta Low 
5 Cyprus Low 20 Netherlands High 
6 Czech Low 21 Norway High 
7 Denmark High 22 Poland Low 
8 Estonia High 23 Portugal High 
9 Finland High 24 Slovakia Low 
10 France High 25 Slovenia High 
11 Germany High 26 Spain High 
12 Hungary High 27 Sweden High 
13 Iceland High 28 Switzerland High 
14 Ireland High 29 United Kingdom High 
15 Italy High 30 United States Low 
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 Country Classification   Country Classification 
1 Australia Low 16 Japan Low 
2 Austria High 17 Latvia Low 
3 Belgium High 18 Lithuania Low 
4 Canada Low 19 Malta High 
5 Cyprus High 20 Netherlands High 
6 Czech Low 21 Norway Low 
7 Denmark High 22 Poland Low 
8 Estonia Low 23 Portugal Low 
9 Finland High 24 Slovakia Low 
10 France High 25 Slovenia Low 
11 Germany High 26 Spain Low 
12 Hungary High 27 Sweden High 
13 Iceland High 28 Switzerland High 
14 Ireland High 29 United Kingdom High 
15 Italy Low 30 United States Low 
 
Table 4.8 List of countries with high levels of “index of financial integration” (IFI) and countries with low levels of IFI 
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 Country Classification   Country  Classification  
1 Australia High 16 Japan Low 
2 Austria Low 17 Latvia High 
3 Belgium Low 18 Lithuania High 
4 Canada High 19 Malta Low 
5 Cyprus Low 20 Netherlands Low 
6 Czech High 21 Norway Low 
7 Denmark High 22 Poland High 
8 Estonia High 23 Portugal High 
9 Finland High 24 Slovakia High 
10 France Low 25 Slovenia Low 
11 Germany Low 26 Spain High 
12 Hungary High 27 Sweden High 
13 Iceland High 28 Switzerland Low 
14 Ireland High 29 United Kingdom Low 
15 Italy Low 30 United States Low 
Table 4.9 List of countries with low levels of net foreign liabilities and countries with high levels of net foreign liabilities 
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Appendix 2. Forward-mean differencing transformation 
The forward-mean differencing transformation is a transformation in which each 
observation will be removed from the mean of later (future) observations. This 
transformation is otherwise known as orthogonal deviations or the Helmert transformation 
which is described in Arellano and Bover (1995). 
It is worth describing how forward-mean differencing transformation can be achieved. 
For example we have n observation of variable x: x1, x2… xn. xi is observation at the time 
t of variable x. 
yi is forward-mean differencing transformation of xi. We can calculate yi by using the 
following formula: 
      𝑦𝑖 = 𝑥𝑖 −
∑ 𝑥𝑘
𝑛
𝑘=𝑖+1
𝑛−𝑖
  
Since this formula, it is easy to see that this transformation make us lose one observation 
because yn does not exist.      
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Chapter 5. What determines fiscal policy choices? Case studies of 
unsustainable fiscal deficits in Greece, Latvia, Turkey and Pakistan 
5.1 Introduction 
A range of governments have implemented austerity programs in order to achieve fiscal 
sustainability, especially since the global financial and economic crisis of 2007-2009. 
However, individual countries situations vary considerably and it is difficult to determine 
in econometric or simulation models every factor influencing the choice of fiscal and other 
policies as well as their subsequent economic impact. To provide a similar 
complementary approach that was applied to the other chapters of this thesis, this chapter 
analyses four case studies relating to the adjustment of unsustainable fiscal deficits in 
Greece, Latvia, Turkey and Pakistan. This analysis is undertaken in order to address two 
main questions. 
(i) How different were the policy choices in these countries? 
(ii) What defines the differences in their fiscal and other policy choices? 
There are many factors which determine fiscal policy choices. However, this chapter’s 
focus is on three main factors: firstly, this chapter reviews how fiscal policy was influenced 
by economic conditions such as growth, public debt and external debt. 
Also, this chapter discusses fiscal policy choice in a broader context of fiscal policy and 
monetary policy, discussing the exchange rate regime and considering how fiscal policy 
choices interact with other macroeconomic policy decisions. 
Finally, this chapter analyses the relationship between political conditions, including the 
influence of politics on the sovereign debt risk and fiscal policy choice.  
There are several reasons behind choosing these four particular case studies; to begin 
with, all of these countries faced unsustainable fiscal deficits in 2009. The ratio of deficit 
to GDP is 15.2%, 9.1%, 5.9% and 5.5% in Greece, Latvia, Pakistan and Turkey 
respectively. Furthermore, this chapter focuses on the interaction between fiscal policy 
and monetary policy; by choosing two EU countries (less flexible in monetary policy) and 
two non-EU countries (more flexible in monetary policy) it can be deemed as a reasonable 
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choice. Also, these particular countries have different economic conditions which are 
focused upon in this chapter, such as the level of external debt and the level of public 
debt. Finally, the different social and political situations in these four countries, especially 
the uncertainties relating to the political situation in Greece, Pakistan and Turkey, detail 
how political economies can affect fiscal policy.         
The main results can be summarised as follows: 
(i) After the global financial crisis in 2009, all four countries faced unsustainable 
fiscal deficits. Greece, Latvia and Turkey implemented fiscal consolidation 
programs from 2009, while Pakistan undertook fiscal adjustments in 2011. 
However, the outcome of these fiscal consolidation programs was different 
across all countries.  
(ii) Fiscal adjustments seem to be less effective in terms of reducing public debt in 
Greece than in Latvia, Pakistan and Turkey due to several reasons. At the 
beginning of the fiscal adjustments episode, Greece had a much higher level 
of public debt than Latvia, Pakistan and Turkey. Furthermore, at that time, the 
level of total external debt in Greece and Latvia was also much higher than it 
was in Pakistan and Turkey. 
(iii) Fiscal adjustments cost more in Greece and Latvia than in Pakistan and 
Turkey. The most obvious explanation for this is because that Greece and 
Latvia are small economies within the Eurozone, or it is because they fixed their 
exchange rates against the Euro (Latvia before 2014) i.e. they used an identical 
monetary policy with a target of a fixed exchange rate regime. According to the 
predictions presented in the Mundell and Fleming model and several empirical 
studies, fiscal multipliers appear to be bigger in countries with fixed exchange 
rate regimes than in countries with flexible exchange rate regimes. This also 
means that a tight fiscal policy is more costly in countries where there is a fixed 
exchange rate regime in place. 
(iv) Political economy can influence fiscal policy directly by making decisions which 
affect the level of government expenditures and government revenues. 
Furthermore, it also affects fiscal policy indirectly through changes in credibility 
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of sovereign debt which may lead to changes in credibility of the private sector 
and financial credibility of the economy. These changes, in turn, affect fiscal 
choice and the effectiveness of fiscal policy.   
The rest of this chapter is structured as follows: section 5.2 draws on the literature review 
and earlier research chapters to distinguish some of the principal factors which can affect 
fiscal policy choice. Section 5.3 reviews the four case studies, using the main structure of 
analysis developed in section 5.2. Section 5.4 summarises the main contents of this 
chapter, while four appendices provide further detail about economic conditions and fiscal 
policy in the four countries separately. 
5.2 Factors affecting fiscal policy: general discussion 
When a government is faced with an unsustainable fiscal deficit, a tighter fiscal policy is 
always the first choice considered. However, policy choices and economic outcomes 
differ across countries because there are many factors which affect the scale of 
adjustment required as well as the effectiveness of fiscal and other macroeconomic 
policies. This section will discuss these factors, which are possible determinants of fiscal 
policy choice, and will examine them in detail in relation to the four case studies. 
This section will start by discussing the concept of fiscal sustainability and the reasons 
for the emergence of unsustainable fiscal deficits. The way monetary policy has the ability 
to affect fiscal policy choices will then be discussed: fiscal policy and monetary policy are 
two of the most important influential tools in economic activities. With this in mind, a fiscal 
policy should be issued with careful consideration especially regarding the interaction with 
monetary policy and vice versa. Also, this section will consider how economic structures 
affect fiscal adjustment; finally discussing the relationship between political economy, 
sovereign debt and fiscal policy choice.  
5.2.1 Economic shocks and fiscal sustainability 
After the global financial and economic crisis of 2007-2009, many countries faced the 
challenge of reducing unsustainable high fiscal deficits. Before the four case studies are 
examined in this chapter, this subsection first considers what is meant by “fiscal 
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sustainability” and “fiscal unsustainability” and how economic shocks can lead to the 
emergence of unsustainable fiscal deficits.  
Before the determinants of fiscal policy choices are discussed, it is worth considering the 
definition of an unsustainable fiscal deficit. There is no official definition for an 
unsustainable fiscal deficit. In fact, the EU instigated a formal rule which set the overall 
budget deficit threshold at 3% of GDP. However, what makes any particular level of fiscal 
deficit or public debt unsustainable? 
The term “fiscal sustainability” is mentioned numerous times throughout this thesis, and 
it is worth recalling briefly. Depth discussions about fiscal sustainability were presented 
in the literature review (section 2.2.6), which detailed two popular approaches to 
assessing fiscal sustainability: the accounting approach and the present value of 
borrowing constraint approach.  
The accounting approach simply states that a fiscal policy or a fiscal deficit is sustainable 
so long as it keeps the ratio of public debt to GDP stable or decreasing (Blanchard et al, 
1990; Pasinetti, 1998; Goldstein, 2003).  
The present value of borrowing constraint approach determines that a fiscal policy or a 
fiscal deficit is sustainable if the present value of future primary surpluses (and deficits) 
and inflation-related revenues is equal to or greater than the initial current value of a 
government’s debt (Burnside et al, 2005). 
In theory, these two approaches should yield the same outcome, because although the 
ratio of public debt to GDP will either stabilize or decrease so long as the present value 
of surpluses and inflation related revenues exceeds the real value of government debt. In 
reality, these two approaches are complementary. The accounting approach highlights 
the fiscal contraction that is necessary to stabilize the ratio of public debt to GDP, while 
the present value of borrowing constraint approach highlights the short-term impact of 
both current deficits and inflation.  
In both approaches, it is necessary to distinguish between total deficit (budget balance) 
and primary deficit (primary budget balance). The primary budget balance (primary deficit) 
is the government fiscal balance, excluding interest payments. It seems that the primary 
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government deficit is more likely to result from a fiscal policy (a contractionary fiscal policy 
or an expansionary fiscal policy), whereas total deficit involves debt services of the 
accumulation of the net government debt. For example, after the implementation of a 
contractionary fiscal policy, a countries government primary budget balance may reduce 
sharply to a low level deficit or even a surplus, however, the overall government deficit 
will still be high, due to the high cost of debt services (a high interest rate or/and a high 
level of public debt to GDP). Greece is an example of this: while the ratio of the Greek 
government’s primary budget balance to GDP increased from 0.4% in 2014 to 0.7% in 
2015, the Greek government’s overall budget balance reduced from -3.6% of GDP in 
2014 to -7.2% of GDP in 2015.      
Both approaches do suggest that a total deficit is not the only information which can be 
used to assess fiscal sustainability. Fiscal sustainability may depend upon several other 
key parameters, such as the ratio of debt to GDP, the primary budget balance (primary 
deficit or primary surplus), real interest rates and the growth rate. Furthermore, when debt 
comes in the form of foreign currency then the exchange rate is another factor which 
should be considered when assessing fiscal sustainability.  
These examinations also propose how economic shocks such as shocks in productivity, 
shocks in fiscal expenditure as well as financial and exchange rate crisis can lead to the 
emergence of unsustainable fiscal deficits.     
For example, if the real interest rate was high during the same time the growth rate was 
low, a “sustainable fiscal deficit” may become “unsustainable”; in other words, a high real 
interest rate would lead to high costing debt services. This means that a larger proportion 
of the budget would be used to serve debt services rather than repay the debt: the public 
debt may accumulate faster than the economic growth rate. As a result, the ratio of public 
debt to GDP will increase, meaning the government face an unsustainable fiscal deficit 
and fiscal unsustainability.  
According to two popular methods, fiscal sustainability also depends upon the ratio of 
public debt to GDP; however, how can it be determined what level of public debt is 
unsustainable? There is much contention within the academic field regarding public debt, 
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and at what level it is truly unsustainable. In reality, Japan has maintained a high level 
ratio of public debt to GDP since 2000; Japan’s ratio increased dramatically from 100% 
in 2007 to 229.2% in 2015. Whereas, the ratio of public debt to GDP in Greece peaked 
to 180.1% in 2014; obviously the ratio of public debt in Japan was much higher than it 
was in Greece, however, it is hard to say whether the Japanese ratio of public debt to 
GDP was more unsustainable than it was in Greece. Reinhart and Rogoff (2010) study 
the relationship between economic growth, inflation rate and the level of government debt; 
considering whether a government debt of more than 90% of GDP is an unsustainable 
government debt. They determined that when the ratio of government debt to GDP is 
greater than 90%, the median growth rate falls by one percent, while the average growth 
rate falls even further. Reinhart and Rogoff (2010) also discover that when a countries 
government debt exceeds 90% of its GDP, that countries economy tends to contract 
about 0.1% annually. This particular study is criticized by Herndon et al (2013) who 
replicated Reinhart and Rogoff (2010) and found serious errors due to coding errors and 
selective omitted data being available. Herndon et al (2013) concluded that these serious 
errors led to inaccurate findings by Reinhart and Rogoff regarding the relationship 
between public debt and growth amongst 20 advanced countries. Herndon et al (2013) 
also calculated that the growth rate in countries with public debts that exceed 90% of 
GDP is just about a percentage point lower than it is in countries with lower ratios of public 
debt to GDP. This suggests that a high level of public debt may reduce the effectiveness 
of fiscal policy in terms of stimulus economic activities.       
According to the Keynesian viewpoint, an expansionary fiscal policy will stimulate 
economic activities and economic growth; therefore it should be used to help the economy 
escape recession. On the other hand, when the economy faces a high level of public debt 
as well as high levels of budget deficits, a tight fiscal policy is the most suitable option to 
reduce budget deficits and public debt in order to bring public finance back to a 
sustainable path. 
However, the simple Keynesian model appears to only be appropriate when the 
temporary demand shock is being studied; examples of which are evident during the 
economic crisis of the 1970s when the fiscal policy failed to increase economic activities 
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as expected. One of the main reasons behind this failure was that the economies in the 
US, UK as well as in other major countries were hit by supply shocks (an increase in oil 
price) instead of temporary demand shocks.  
To avoid this in the future, policy-makers may design fiscal policies based on the opposite 
viewpoint regarding the effects of fiscal policy. For instance, in 1993 the UK government 
decided to increase taxes; it was explained that a tight fiscal policy would lead to a 
stabilization of public debt which was a precondition for a sustained recovery from 
recession. Also, in the middle of a recession in 1981, the UK government introduced large 
tax increases, whilst Denmark in 1982 and Ireland in 1982 and 1987 also implemented 
similar public debt stabilization programs.  
Public debt stabilization programs are based on the viewpoint that high levels of budget 
deficits and public debt may discourage private sector spending, due to the 
consequences of accumulating public debt. Sutherland (1997) refers to this view as being 
an “anti-keynesian” view. Giavazzi and Pagano (1990) studied in greater detail the case 
of Denmark and Ireland, and found that the Danish case was more of an “anti-keynesian” 
viewpoint while the Irish case was consistent with the traditional Keynesian view. Alesina 
and Perotti (1995) and Giavazzi and Pagano (1996) studied cross sections of OECD 
countries and found empirical evidence for an “anti-keynesian” view. Sutherland (1997) 
constructed a theoretical model and discovered that at a moderate level of public debt 
and an expansionary fiscal policy had traditional Keynesian effects (expansionary), while 
such a fiscal policy can have contractionary effects when public debt reaches an 
extremely high level.  
Beside this “anti-keynesian” view, public debt may affect the effectiveness of fiscal policy 
with regard to the crowding out effects of private consumption and investment through 
interest rates. Therefore, an expansionary fiscal policy may lead to lower or higher 
expensive credit for the private sector, meaning the interest rate may increase; as a 
consequence, the private sector may reduce their investment and consumption.  
There are a limited number of papers which study how the level of external debt can affect 
fiscal policy choices. However, it seems that fiscal policy is far more efficient in terms of 
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stimulating economic growth, so long as an economy can borrow from overseas easily. 
When a country can easily access the international finance market, an expansionary fiscal 
policy may not reduce credit for the private sector, which will not lead to an increase in 
interest rates. Therefore, the crowding out effects in private consumption and investment 
through interest rates will be smaller (a viewpoint which is supported by the empirical 
results of Chapter 4 of this thesis). 
5.2.2 The interaction of fiscal and monetary policy 
Before discussing how monetary policy can affect the effectiveness or in fact the choice 
of fiscal policy, it is worth recalling the brief definitions of monetary policy and fiscal policy.  
Fiscal policy refers to the choices a government makes regarding taxation and 
government spending, whether this choice is to stimulate economic activity or help to 
achieve other government objectives. When fiscal policy is being analysed the several 
key macroeconomic variables which are normally focused on are taxation, expenditure 
levels, government debt and a government’s budget balance. 
Monetary policy refers to the choices of the central bank and its procedures in controlling 
any available money and credit in the economy, in order to achieve several objectives 
related to the economy such as price stability (inflation), exchange rate stability, 
controlling the balance of external payment and promoting economic development. 
Monetary policy is also directly linked to fiscal policy because an increase in state issued 
money, including central bank money, is a source of finance for government spending. 
During the 1990s, alongside the growth of central bank independence, there was a trend 
of separation between government debt management from the central banks; this meant 
that the ministry of finance or the debt management office concentrated on financing the 
fiscal deficit, while the central bank played its part by supporting the money market 
liquidity. This separation is based upon the reducing conflicts of interest; several 
examples for this conflict of interest of whether the central bank is ultimately responsible 
for government debt management are defined as follows: while the central bank needs to 
limit its volatility of yields on government bonds, adjustments to interest rates may be 
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required to boost the economic condition, whilst, the central bank may bring forward the 
government bond issuance if they decide to increase the interest rate.   
However, many economists consider that government debt management cannot be 
separate from monetary policy. According to Tobin’s equivalence, there is an obvious 
logical difficulty in separating monetary policy from public debt management. Tobin (1963) 
argues that the issuance of government short-term debt is similar to a monetary 
expansion especially in relation to a portfolio choice: an opinion which Friedman (1959) 
also shares. Furthermore, Tobin (1963) concludes that the Federal Reserve (US 
monetary policy-maker) needed to know about the decisions made by the Treasury (US 
government debt management office) in order to make its decision and vice versa.  
The global financial and economic crisis of 2007-2009 and its aftermath, has led to some 
radical rethinking about government debt management and central banks. Raising 
traditional debate about the separation of fiscal policies and monetary policies in terms of 
government debt management and economic development: the quality of government 
debt management and a better central bank are the most important factors for economic 
development.  
Although monetary policy and fiscal policy are nowadays often implemented by different 
bodies, they are not independent, because a change in one may affect the effectiveness 
of the other. 
Several views regarding the relationship between fiscal policy and monetary policy are 
discussed in the literature review (Chapter 2); however, it is useful to recall briefly the 
most important points.  
According to the Keynesian viewpoint of aggregated demand, the impact of fiscal policy 
will depend upon how a deficit is financed. If the government finances its spending by 
printing more money, an expansionary fiscal policy (an increased deficit) will lead to an 
expansionary monetary policy, which in turn may increase inflation rates and depreciate 
the exchange rate. If a government chooses a non-monetary financing program by 
borrowing more money through issuing debt, then a fiscal expansion may lead to 
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crowding out effects: meaning there will be too little credit or it will become too expensive 
for the private sector.  
Another way fiscal policy can affect monetary policy directly is if the government increases 
indirect taxes including valued taxes or sales taxes, this will increase price levels, which 
will lead to an increase in the inflation rate.  
A fiscal policy can also affect a monetary policy indirectly; when economic agents expect 
the government to increase taxes in the future in order to finance current spending, 
economic agents will prepare for this eventuality by saving more and consuming less at 
present. This is known as the Ricardian equivalence: where a fiscal policy may lead to 
changes in the financial behaviour of economic agents, with the monetary policy most 
likely requiring change as well. 
Another indirect impact of an expansionary fiscal policy in relation to monetary policy is 
that expectations about the unsustainability of government finance have the potential to 
become a destabilizing factor within the financial market, which can result in the collapse 
of the monetary regime. Externally, if the government borrows too much from overseas, 
this can lead to doubts relating to the stability of exchange rates or can result in financial 
problems regarding the balance of payments. 
Furthermore, fiscal policy can lead to alterations in both interest rates and exchange 
rates. For example, an expansionary fiscal policy usually leads to an increase in 
government debt. However, if the impact of an expansionary fiscal policy to output, is not 
as good as expected, the risk of the government defaulting on their debt increases. As a 
result of this, interest rates will increase. An increase in interest rates normally leads to 
an appreciation in local currency. However, when interest rates and the level of 
indebtedness are both high, the opposite (a depreciation in local currency) may happen. 
This means that an increase in domestic interest rates may make the local currency more 
attractive, due to high expected returns; however, when the level of indebtedness and 
interest rates are high, the available resources for repayment decrease because of the 
increase in the cost of debt service: meaning that the probability of debt default increases. 
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As a consequence, the local currency becomes less attractive, creating a depreciation in 
the local currency.       
As well as fiscal policy affecting monetary policy, monetary policy also affects fiscal policy.  
Monetary policy has the ability to affect the effectiveness of fiscal policy by either 
increasing or reducing the crowding out effects of a fiscal policy. According to Mundell 
(1963) and Fleming (1962), extension of the IS-LM model to the open economy under 
flexible exchange rates, fiscal policy is less effective in terms of stimulating economic 
growth (a smaller fiscal multiplier): a view which is also supported by several empirical 
studies such as Ilzetzki et al (2013) and the results presented in Chapter 4 of this thesis. 
In addition, monetary policy may impact the effectiveness of fiscal policy indirectly through 
wealth effects: higher interest rates caused by an expansionary fiscal policy reduce the 
value of assets held by households, thus dampening private consumption (wealth effect). 
The global financial and economic crisis of 2007-2009 and the Euro-zone fiscal crisis 
which began in 2010 are good examples of a “vicious circle” with a financial crisis, a 
sovereign debt crisis and an economic crisis: an aspect which can be deemed as an 
interaction between fiscal policy and monetary policy.  
Diagram 5.1 Vicious circle of financial crisis, fiscal crisis and economic crisis 
                                                               
As perceived in the diagram, it is evident that in order to support the banking system, the 
government will be forced to bail out domestic banks. This action will lead to an increase 
in government spending and an increase in government debt. A financial crisis like this 
will also lead to higher interest rates. As a consequence, the risk of the government 
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defaulting on its debt also increases. All of this leads to increases in both a sovereign and 
financial credit default swap (CDS), due to the close relationship between them. These 
actions will also increase interest rates further and worsen both the countries financial 
problems and fiscal deficits.   
5.2.3 The interaction between financial market and fiscal policy 
The relationship between monetary policy and fiscal policy depends on the development 
of the financial market. Both monetary policy and fiscal policy makers must consider the 
operations of financial markets. Hilbers (2004) determines that there are four stages of 
transition in financial development; from a simple financial market to a fully developed 
financial market, the central banks and monetary policy will have a strong impact on fiscal 
policy choices. During the un-developed stage of the financial market, fiscal deficits are 
mainly financed by money creation; this is because there is no public debt outside of the 
central bank. In the next stage, although there are marketable securities, there are no 
secondary markets and also no flexibility in interest rates, meaning that fiscal deficits are 
still mainly financed through money creation. Within the transition stage, there is a 
secondary market for government debt instruments; also the interest rate is much more 
flexible. Highly active and independent liquidity managements are conducted by central 
banks; allowing the government greater scope to finance a deficit through bond issue. In 
the final stage of the transition, the financial market has medium-term debt instruments; 
the interest rates are fully flexible and the central banks control liquidity in the financial 
market.  
In both the transition stage and the final stage, good coordination between fiscal policy 
and monetary policy is required. It is evident that a higher level of financial development 
means a more flexible interest rate as well as more economic activities financed by 
domestic credit. These factors may lead to stronger crowding out effects in private 
consumption and investment; therefore, an expansionary will be more effective in terms 
of stimulating economic growth (a view which is also supported by empirical evidence 
found in Chapter 4 of this thesis). 
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5.2.4 Political economy, credibility and fiscal choice 
The political economy can affect the fiscal choices of the government directly and in-
directly: both are discussed in this section.  
The direct impact of political economy on fiscal choice is quite clear. There are three 
literary resources which relate to how political economy determines fiscal choice directly. 
First of all, several policy-makers tend to use expansionary fiscal policy in order to win 
elections; as voters normally underestimate the costs of an expansionary fiscal policy (tax 
burdens, especially if they are postponed), but value government spending (Nordhaus, 
1975; Buchanan and Wagner, 1977). Although the main assumption of this viewpoint – 
voters always make mistakes – is criticized (Alesina and Perotti, 1995; Drazen, 2000), 
research explains why rational voters are still persuaded by expansionary fiscal policy. 
One of the reasons for this is that voters do not have enough information given to them 
about politicians; therefore, they tend to vote for politicians who have more government 
programs which require more government spending (Rogoff and Sibert, 1988; Rogoff 
1990). However, empirical studies do not support this view: Alesina et al (1998) study of 
the behaviour of various macroeconomic indicators, election outcomes and opinion polls 
for 19 OECD countries from 1960 to 1995, found that governments with tight fiscal policies 
were not more likely to be replaced than governments with expansionary fiscal policies.  
An expansionary fiscal policy may be the result of a distribution fiscal decision conflict 
between policy makers and a group of voters. Persson and Svensson (1989) and Alesina 
and Tabellini (1990) consider that when there are differences in fiscal preferences 
between policy makers, the ones who are most likely to be replaced tend to run deficits. 
One argument explains why conflict between groups of voters may lead to an 
expansionary fiscal policy: Weingast et al (1981) contemplate that while the benefits of 
government programs are centralized; the cost of these programs is being concentrated 
or shared through all geographic units. So, if budget decisions are made to accommodate 
geographic units, fiscal deficits are more likely to increase.  
The literature discussed above points out that political motivation may increase fiscal 
deficits (determine fiscal policy choice), and the political economy may reduce fiscal 
deficits by issuing constraints for policy makers who design fiscal policy. These 
 139 
 
constraints have been defined as a set of rules, procedures and practices (Alesina et al, 
1999). There are two types of rules: the first type of rule is in the form of a numeric target. 
There is an agreement amongst 28 member states of the European Union (the Stability 
and Growth Pact) about the upper limit of 3% of GDP for budget deficit and 60% of GDP 
for public debt. The second type of rule is in the form of a three-stage process budget 
decision including drafting, approval and implementation.            
This section also discusses the indirect impact of political risk regarding the fiscal choices 
of authorities through credibility, something which received limited concern in the 
research literature about political economy. It is clear that a country with political instability 
is more of a risk for lenders and investors, an aspect which reduces that countries 
financial credibility. But how can financial credibility affect one’s fiscal policy choice? The 
term “financial credibility” refers to the possibility that borrowers can fulfill their obligations, 
including paying the interest and debt principal repayment on time; therefore, the more 
financial credibility, less of a risk to lenders and vice versa.  
In order to determine the impact of financial credibility on fiscal choice, this chapter 
discusses the impact of credit default swap (CDS) spread on the effectiveness of fiscal 
policy. The CDS spread is considered an indicator of default risk: a tighter (smaller) CDS 
spread indicates a lower risk of debt default, while a looser (bigger) CDS spread indicates 
a higher possibility of debt default. There is a vicious circle between fiscal policy and CDS 
spread. When investors become aware of a risk in relation to the sovereign debt default 
(the sovereign CDS spread is bigger), a higher interest rate is required (default premia), 
as this lowers the price of the government bond. However, a higher interest rate will lead 
to a bigger budget deficit and a higher level of government debt, which increases the risk 
of government debt default. Furthermore, as the price of government bonds decrease, 
the value of assets held by financial intermediaries, such as commercial banks, will 
reduce. This, forces the financial intermediaries to increase interest rates and credit 
spread their loans to the private sector. As a consequence, private investment will 
diminish. On the other hand, higher interest rates force governments to cut their spending; 
this together with reductions in private investments can lead to the beginning of an 
economic recession.   
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The presence of the vicious circle is supported by the empirical investigation of Cottarelli 
and Jaramillo (2012); that ran a simple OLS regression to examine the determinants of 
the CDS spread. The regression results reveal that fiscal fundamentals such as public 
debt and primary balance have a significant impact on the CDS spread in advanced 
countries. An increase in the ratio of public debt to GDP leads to an increase in the CDS 
spread, while a decrease in the ratio of primary deficit to GDP reduces the CDS spread. 
Cottarelli and Jaramillo also discover that a decrease in the growth rate increases the 
CDS spread. These results, predict an interesting outcome of fiscal adjustment, whereby 
a tight fiscal policy could increase the CDS spread so long as the fiscal multiplier was 
high enough: this would indeed create a problem regarding fiscal policy choice. As a tight 
fiscal policy, which increases the CDS spread, may lead to an increase in the overall 
deficit due to a higher financing cost, whilst, such a painful fiscal adjustment may force 
the government to give up their consolidation program. 
5.3 Review of case studies 
This section analyses four case studies that focus on Greece, Latvia, Pakistan and Turkey 
from 2004 to 2015, which discover the differences between fiscal policies in these four 
countries (scale of adjustments and results) and what determines these countries fiscal 
policy choice and results? 
This section first of all reviews the fiscal situation in these four countries (section 5.3.1); 
the rest of this section including section 5.3.2, 5.3.3, 5.3.4 and 5.3.5 discusses how the 
decision and outcomes of fiscal choice in these countries were affected by economic 
conditions, monetary policy, the financial market and political economy respectively. 
Detailed information of each country during the period 2004 to 2015 is described in 
separate appendices.  
5.3.1 Fiscal situation 
As can be seen from Figure 5.1, except for Pakistan, the Government budget balance in 
the other three countries reduced dramatically from 2007 to 2009. In 2009, the ratios of 
overall fiscal deficit to GDP are 15.2%, 9.1%, 5.9% and 5.5% in Greece, Latvia, Pakistan 
and Turkey respectively. In Pakistan the fiscal deficit deteriorates fairly steadily between 
2005 and 2011, whereby their fiscal problems appear to be less closely associated with 
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the global financial crisis. All countries faced unsustainable fiscal deficits in 2009, in fact, 
the Greek public sector deficit was already unsustainable before the global financial and 
economic crisis of 2007-2009 (from 2004 as can be seen in figure 5.1).  
Figure 5.1 Government general budget balance from 2004 to 2015 
 
       Source: IMF and Eurostats 
In response to their deteriorating fiscal situation since 2009, Greece, Latvia and Turkey 
all implemented fiscal consolidation programs. As shown in figure 5.2, the primary deficits 
in these three countries decreased sharply over the next three years. The primary balance 
in Turkey was even restored to a surplus in 2011 (2% of GDP, there was previously also 
a surplus of more than 4% of GDP during the years 2004-2006), while the primary balance 
in Latvia reached surplus in 2012 (0.8%). The primary deficit in Greece reduced 
dramatically from around 10% of GDP in 2009 to only 3% of GDP in 2011. In Pakistan, 
fiscal adjustments had been implemented since 2011; this reduced the ratio of primary 
fiscal deficit to GDP in Pakistan from 4.2% in 2011 to 0.5% and 0.1% in 2014 and 2015. 
From this figure (5.2) and the previous one (5.1), it can be portrayed that all four countries 
achieved a fairly substantial adjustment in relation to their fiscal position from the 
unsustainable deficit in 2009.  
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There are two possible reasons for the reduction of government deficits in Greece, Latvia 
and Turkey in 2010 and 2011 and Pakistan in 2012 and 2013. The first being the active 
fiscal consolidation programs implemented for cutting government spending and/or 
increasing tax rates, and the second being the recovery of tax revenues as economic 
output recovers after the global financial and economic crisis of 2007-2009. As can be 
seen in Figure 5.4, this growth recovered in Turkey (in 2010) and Latvia (in 2011): further 
discussions about this are presented in the following section. 
Figure 5.2 Government primary budget balance 
 
       Source: IMF and Eurostats 
Figure 5.3 highlights that except Turkey, the total government debt continued to rise after 
the fiscal consolidation programs began in Greece, Latvia and Pakistan before they 
eventually started to decline. After the implementation of fiscal adjustments, the ratio of 
public debt to GDP in Greece still increased rapidly from 126.7% in 2009 to more than 
170% in 2011, except for a drop to 159.6% in 2012, it reached a peak of 180.1% in 2014. 
In Latvia, after the introduction of fiscal consolidation programs, the ratio of public debt to 
GDP jumped from 36.6% in 2009 to 47.5% in 2010, before beginning to decline to about 
39% in 2013. In 2014, this figure increased to 40.8% and then dropped to 36.4% in 2015, 
which is slightly lower than it was in 2009. In Pakistan, the ratio of public debt to GDP 
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also increased from 60.5% in 2011 to 63.7% in 2013 then reduced to about 63% in 2014 
and 2015. The effect these implementations had on Turkey was completely different; after 
introducing fiscal consolidation programs, the ratio of public debt to GDP in Turkey started 
to decline immediately from 46.1% to only 32.6% in 2015. It is evident that while all four 
countries used similar fiscal policies – tight fiscal policies - the results were very different. 
The reasoning behind these differences will be discussed later in this chapter. 
Figure 5.3 Total government debt from 2004 to 2015 
 
       Source: IMF and Eurostats 
5.3.2 Preceding economic conditions 
As discussed in the previous section, although all four countries implemented fiscal 
consolidation programs, the outcome of deficits and the issue of public debt as a share 
of GDP varied considerably. There are several possible reasons for this. One reason is 
the level of government debt at the beginning of the fiscal adjustment episodes; the ratio 
of government debt to GDP in Greece was much higher than in Latvia, Turkey and 
Pakistan. This may be because a country with a high level of public debt, the fiscal 
adjustments cost more to implement, making them more difficult to implement than in 
countries with lower levels of public debt.  
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Figure 5.4 provides some useful data on the output effects of fiscal adjustments in four 
countries. As shown in Figure 5.4, after starting to implement fiscal consolidation 
programs, the annual real GDP growth rate in Latvia (2009), Pakistan (2011) and Turkey 
(2009) increased rapidly. Turkey even escaped recession only one year after undertaking 
fiscal adjustments. Annual real GDP growth rate in Turkey increased from -4.8% in 2009 
to 9.2% in 2010. The annual growth rate in Latvia also increased dramatically from -14.2% 
in 2009 to -2.9% in 2010 and reached a positive 5% in 2011, while the annual real GDP 
growth rate in Pakistan increased from 3.8% in 2011 to 4.5% in 2015. The data for GDP 
in Greece shows a completely different trend; after starting fiscal consolidation programs 
in 2009, the annual real GDP growth rate kept decreasing from -4.4% to -8.9% in 2011 
before it eventually began to increase from 2012. However, the real GDP growth rate in 
Greece remained negative in every year since 2008 except 2014 (0.8%).  
Figure 5.4 Real GDP growth rate from 2004 to 2015 
 
       Source: IMF and World Bank 
Another factor which can determine differences in the effectiveness of fiscal consolidation 
programs in Turkey and Greece is the level of total external debt. Figure 5.5 reveals that 
the ratio of total external debt to GDP in Greece and in Latvia was much higher and rose 
more rapidly than it did in either Turkey or Pakistan. Furthermore, as evident from Figure 
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5.5, there is an extremely different post-crisis pattern for gross external debt occurring in 
Greece and Latvia. Since 2010, while the ratio of external debt to GDP has fallen quite 
rapidly in Latvia from 165.8% in 2010 to 132.6% in 2015, this ratio in Greece has 
increased rapidly from 174.5% to 249.5%. This contrasting experience of two European 
countries can be explained in large part by the relatively quick resumption of economic 
growth in Latvia and the continued decline of GDP in Greece (see figure 5.4)                 
Figure 5.5 Gross external debt (total external public and private debt) 
 
        Source: IMF and Eurostats 
In the years leading up to and including the 2008 crisis, all four countries had current 
account deficits (see figure 5.6). The current account deficits, before the crisis, were 
especially large in two EU countries, Latvia (around 20% of GDP) and Greece (nearly 
15% of GDP). The Latvian current account deficit altered dramatically to a current surplus 
in 2009, while in Greece the current account deficit declined relatively slowly. From 2012 
onward, both Greece and Latvia have maintained a modest current account deficit of 
around 2% of GDP. 
Pakistan and Turkey both had a smaller current account deficit before the crisis, in 
comparison to the other two European countries, and went through a much smaller 
modification in their current account deficits post crisis. Turkey had a current account 
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deficit close to 5% or more of GDP every year since 2006 to 2015, except for 2009 when 
it was reduced to 2% of GDP. Pakistan reduced its current account deficit from around 
5% of GDP in the years before the crisis, to around 2% of GDP after the crisis. 
Figure 5.6 Current account balance 
 
                          Source: World Bank 
Analyzing the ratio of external debt to GDP in four countries highlights a negative 
relationship between this ratio and the effectiveness of fiscal policy in terms of reducing 
the public debt-GDP ratio. This means that a tight fiscal policy is likely to be less effective 
in terms of reducing public debt-GDP ratio and vice versa. One obvious explanation for 
this is that when a large proportion of funds for economic activities are sourced from 
overseas, the crowding out effect through interest rate becomes smaller, which means 
that the fiscal multiplier is bigger. Nonetheless, a larger fiscal multiplier means a less 
effective tight fiscal policy (fiscal consolidation programs are less effective) in terms of 
reducing the ratio of public debt to GDP, this is consistent with the discussion in section 
5.2.1. 
5.3.3 Monetary policy and inflation 
As discussed in section 5.2, monetary policy is one of the factors which can influence the 
effectiveness of fiscal policy. This section will review how monetary policy, especially 
exchange rate regimes, can affect fiscal policy in the four countries studied in this chapter. 
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As members of the European Union, Latvia and Greece were easily able to borrow before 
the crisis at relatively low interest rates; this induced the ratio of government debt to GDP 
to increase.  
After 3 years, 2008 to 2011, Latvia received a financial assistance package of up to 7.5 
billion Euros from the IMF and the EU, an amount which is equivalent to about 41% of 
Latvia’s GDP in 2009. Similarly, in 2010 Greece announced an agreement with the IMF 
and the EU regarding a 3-year financial assistance package of up to 110 billion Euros, 
which is equal to 47.6% of Greece GDP in 2009. These financial assistance packages, 
together with the sharp decline of output, explain the substantial increase in the ratio of 
government debt to GDP in these countries. 
Figure 5.7 Exchange rate movements from 2006 
 
                  Source: IMF and World Bank 
Note: Greece used Euros completely as a local currency from 2002, while Latvia started 
using Euros as a local currency from 2014. 
Furthermore, Figure 5.7 reveals that, over the same period, there was a large 
depreciation in the exchange rate in Turkey and Pakistan, whereas this did not happen in 
Latvia and Greece. As members of the European Union, both Greece and Latvia had a 
fixed exchange rate regime, one as a Eurozone country (Greece), the other from 
maintaining an exchange rate pegged to the Euro (Latvia). By 2015 the Pakistani Rupee 
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and the Turkish lira had depreciated by around one-third relative to the Euro and by even 
more in comparison to the US dollar. 
Figure 5.8 The inflation rate from 2006 to 2014 
 
       Source: World Bank 
During the same time period, there are huge differences between the inflation rates of 
these countries, as can be seen in Figure 5.8. The above section considered exchange 
rates between local currency and the US dollar in Greece, Latvia, Pakistan and Turkey, 
therefore, Figure 5.8 also includes the inflation rate of the US, which can help determine 
more about the transformations in real exchanges in these countries. After the global 
financial crisis of 2007-2009, except in Turkey, there was a similar trend in the inflation 
rate; it increased in 2010 (Pakistan and Greece) or 2011 (Latvia and the US) then kept 
decreasing. The inflation rate in Greece was even negative from 2013 to 2015, and in 
2015, the inflation rate in Latvia and USA reduced to just over zero at 0.2% and 0.1%, 
respectively. The different exchange rate regimes highlight the difference in inflation 
outcomes post-crisis; the fixed exchange rate regimes of Greece and Latvia ensured that 
inflation remained subdued in both countries, whereas the depreciation of the nominal 
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exchange rate in Pakistan and Turkey became associated with a relatively rapid inflation 
post-crisis.   
5.3.4 Political economy and credibility 
As discussed in section 5.2, political economy can affect fiscal choices directly as 
governments may spend more, as a temporary solution to numerous problems. Pakistan 
in the late 1990s (prior to the main period of the case study examined in this chapter) is 
a prime example: since the early 2000s, the Pakistan government implemented structural 
policy reforms and improved the economy governance which led to good results, 
including a drop in government debt and a high real GDP annual growth rate (Naseem, 
2008). However, the political instability of Pakistan once again pushed the Pakistani 
economy to a recession in 2007, which was then acerbated by the global financial crisis 
of 2007-2009. The inherent political instability made the government incorporate 
economic reforms and governed the country poorly, which eventually led to an economic 
crisis (IMF, 2009 and IMF, 2012). 
In Turkey, the 2001 political crisis led to political instability, financial instability and further 
panic in the financial market (IMF, 2002). Rodrick (2009) considers these instabilities 
raise doubts about the sustainability of exchange rates based on stabilization programs. 
As a result, there was a massive withdrawal of funds; Turkey faced a second financial 
crisis (the first one was in 1994) since its capital account liberalization in 1989. The AK 
Party won the 2002 election and also won other two general elections in a row after that; 
this led to political stability in Turkey since 2002 to 2015. Since 2004, except for the global 
financial and economic crisis of 2007-2009, the Turkish government had maintained a 
sustainable fiscal stance (see section 5.3.1). The Turkish government’s primary budget 
balance was always positive, except in 2010, and the ratio of government debt to GDP in 
Turkey decreased sharply from 59.2% in 2004 to 32.6% in 2015.   
This section also examines how the risk of government debt default can affect fiscal 
policy; Figure 5.9 shows that from late 2008, the sovereign CDS spread in four countries 
increased sharply during the global financial and economic crisis. The sovereign CDS 
spread in these countries reached its peak during the crisis period in the first quarter of 
2009, reducing sharply in the second half of 2009, all except Pakistan.  
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Figure 5.9 5-year Sovereign CDS spreads (monthly average denominated in USD) 
  
Source: Datastream 
Note: Figure does not include the Sovereign CDS spreads in Greece from September 
2011 to November 2014 as it is extremely high and meaningless for investors. There are 
also several Greek government debt restructures during this period, with the first one in 
mid-2011 (Heinz and Sun, 2014) and an agreement between the Greek government and 
its private creditors in February 2012 with about a 53.5% cut on the face value of the 
Greek government bond (Coudert and Gex, 2013). 
In fact, the crisis in Pakistan was mainly caused by political instability; this can determine 
why the sovereign CDS in Pakistan was much higher than it was in other countries during 
the period November 2008 to May 2010. The sovereign CDS in Pakistan increased 
sharply during the period 2007 to 2010, from about 230 at the beginning of 2007 to more 
than 3000 in 2009/2010. During this time, the ratio of public debt to GDP in Pakistan also 
increased sharply from 54.9% in 2007 to 60.8% in 2010. Contrary to Pakistan, changes 
in the sovereign CDS spread in Turkey were mainly caused by shocks in the financial 
market. It increased sharply during the global financial and economic crisis of 2007-2009, 
and increased again in 2015, when there was a large depreciation in local currency, due 
to investor’s perceptions about the FED’s possible decision to increase interest rates: this 
perception led to a depreciation of local currencies in most emerging markets.   
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Figure 5.9 does not include the sovereign CDS spreads of Greece from September 2011 
to November 2014 as the figures are extremely high and do not divulge any economic 
meaning. At the same time, although Greece implemented fiscal consolidation programs, 
the ratio of public debt to GDP kept increasing dramatically, whereas with a much lower 
sovereign CDS spread, a tight fiscal policy seemed to work better in Latvia and Turkey in 
terms of reducing public debt and restoring economic growth, a perception which mirrors 
the discussion in section 5.2.4.    
5.4 Conclusions    
This chapter’s analysis of four case studies including Greece, Latvia, Pakistan and Turkey 
attempted to define how several factors such as public debt, external debt, monetary 
policy and political economy could influence fiscal policy, especially the effectiveness of 
tight fiscal policies in terms of reducing public debt.  
By choosing four countries all of which have different situations in relation to the factors 
mentioned above, but sharing the same problem (facing unsustainable fiscal deficits); this 
chapter discovered that a higher level of public debt, a higher level of external debt, a 
flexible exchange rate regime, a higher risk level of public debt or a mixture of all of them 
had the ability to influence a country’s choice of fiscal policy and the effectiveness of that 
fiscal policy in terms of reducing public debt and restoring fiscal sustainability. 
There are several possible ways to improve this study: firstly, in some sections such as 
political economy and credibility, it would be better if empirical works could be 
implemented to compare them with the findings of this chapter. However, due to the time 
limit and availability of data, such empirical works have not yet been carried out. There 
may also be other factors which should be taken into consideration if this is the case, this 
chapter could be extended to incorporate these other factors.  
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Appendix 1. Greece 
In 2001, Greece joined the Euro area and became the 12th member of the Eurozone. 
Greece is a developed country whose economy relies mainly on the service sector and 
less upon industry and agriculture. 
Before 2009, Greece was one of the fastest growing economies in Europe. During 2000-
2007 the GDP of Greece increased their average annual growth rate by more than 4.2%, 
more than two times the average figure in the Eurozone (1.9%). The reasoning behind 
the high growth rate of GDP in Greece was down to a rapid increase in domestic demand. 
This growth was supported by an expansionary fiscal policy in Greece. During the period 
2000-2008, public deficits in Greece always exceeded the EU’s Stability and Growth Pact 
threshold of 3% of GDP. The public deficit in Greece even reached 8.8% of GDP in 2004; 
during the same period, although the ratio of public debt to GDP in Greece remained 
stable, it remained very high in comparison with the average figure of the Eurozone. 
Another reason for a rapid increase in domestic demand in Greece during the 2000-2007 
was a credit expansion to households and private businesses at average annual rates of 
29.6% and 14.8%. This was due to a lower interest rate in Greece after joining the 
Eurozone, which also made private debt burdens increase rapidly. After joining the 
Eurozone, the inflation rate in Greece dropped dramatically. The average inflation rate in 
Greece during 1980-2000 was 14.7% whereas the figure during 2000-2011 was only 
3.4%. However, the inflation rate in Greece was still higher than the average inflation rate 
in the European Union over the same period. 
In addition, during the period 2000-2008, the average net saving in Greece was negative; 
meaning the only source of finance for public deficits and private sector debt was external 
debt. Evident from Figure 5.10, in the period 2000-2008, external net annual borrowing in 
Greece was around 10% of GDP, in 2009, 80% of total public debts in Greece were from 
external borrowing. 
Further evidence for rapid accumulation in external debt in Greece over this period can 
be seen in Figure 5.11. In this period, 2000-2008, Greece maintained a negative current 
account balance and external balance. The current account deficit and external deficit in 
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Greece increased dramatically from 2005, whereby the current account deficit increased 
from 7.3% of GDP in 2005 to 14% and 14.5% in 2007 and 2008 respectively, while the 
Greek external deficit also increased from 8.2% of GDP in 2005 to 13% in 2008. 
Figure 5.10 Net borrowing of Greece’s economy from 2000 to 2008 
 
   Source: National Statistical Service of Greece, Bank of Greece 
Figure 5.11 Current account balance and external balance on goods and services 
in Greece 
  
             Source: World Development Indicators, World Bank 
Theoretically, the situation in Greece during 2000-2007 would sooner or later lead to a 
devaluation of local currency so as to reduce the import demand, whilst encouraging the 
export of close external imbalances. However, as Greece was a small economy in the 
Eurozone and used the Euro as their local currency, there was no devaluation in the local 
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currency of Greece. What's more, Greece’s government and private sector could still 
borrow from overseas with a low interest rate just like all other Eurozone economies. 
Hence, the real interest rate in Greece during this period was extremely low due to a low 
nominal interest rate and a high inflation rate (higher than the average of the Eurozone). 
With a high and increasing public debt before 2009, Greece would choose a fiscal 
consolidation; however, their option was an expansionary fiscal policy. According to the 
IMF (2007), one possible reason for this choice was “in view of Greece’s EMU 
membership, the availability of external financing is [was] not a concern”. 
In addition, the global crisis of 2007-2009 increased the cost of debt services which faced 
Greece’s economy. In 2009, the “new” Greek government revised government deficits 
from 3.7% to 12.5% of GDP, at this point Greece officially stepped into a crisis. 
There was a broad consensus amongst the IMF, ECB and European leaders which meant 
that they needed to avoid default on Greek debts as this could lead to a contagion and 
financial turmoil. As a result, in May 2010 one of the first crisis responses was 
implemented, which was a combination of financial assistance from the IMF and 
Eurozone with an austerity package implemented by the Greek Government. A three-
year package accumulating in a 110 billion euros loan to Greece, with conditions on 
economic reform was announced by the IMF (30 billion euros) and the Eurozone 
countries (80 billion euros). As a condition of this package, Greek governments also 
announced an ambitious austerity package which aimed to reduce the budget deficit to 
below 3% of GDP by 2014. This austerity package focused mainly on government 
spending cuts (civil services, health care and pension reforms) and raising revenues 
(increasing the average value added tax rate and taxes on certain commodities such as 
fuel, tobacco and alcohol).  
In 2011, it became apparent that the Greek economy was contracting more than 
expected; meaning further actions were required in order to avoid defaulting on Greece’s 
debt. In June 2011, the Greek government announced the second fiscal consolidation 
program which, together with the first austerity program, aimed to reduce the government 
deficit down to 0.9% of GDP by 2015. Furthermore, European leaders also announced a 
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second financial assistance program which consisted of a 109 billion euros loan to 
Greece, which comprised of a lower interest rate and longer maturities.  
However, because of this a series of crisis responses were implemented, the Greek’s 
ratio of public debt to GDP kept increasing from around 100% before 2009 to 172.1% in 
2011, and in 2012, this ratio dropped temporally to 159.6%,reaching a peak of 180.1% in 
2014 before reducing to 176.9% in 2015.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 156 
 
Appendix 2. Latvia 
Latvia became an official member of the European Union in 2004; from 2000-2007, Latvia 
had one of the highest annual real GDP growth rates in Europe: the reasoning behind this 
rapid development was high consumption and investment in real estate.  
Before 2008, Latvia had one of lowest level ratios of public debt to GDP in the EU. Latvia’s 
government debt remained between 10-15% of GDP from 2000 to 2006. In 2007, it shrank 
to 8.4%, which was still higher than the figures in Luxembourg and Estonia.  
Before the crisis in 2008, Latvia also had a low level government deficit, especially after 
joining the Eurozone in 2004. From 2004 to 2007, the government budget deficit in Latvia 
was less than 1% of the GDP.  
However, even though Latvia had a high real GDP growth rate, and a low level 
government deficit and government debt, Latvia’s economy still showed some early 
warning signs which predicted a crisis. Similar to other Baltic countries (Lithuania and 
Estonia), the rapid real GDP growth rate mainly came from domestic demand, including 
private consumption and investments which were encouraged by the positive views 
regarding the economic conditions, such as negative real interest rates, high GDP growth 
rates and a declining unemployment rate.  
Figure 5.12 Latvia’s current account balance 
 
        Source: Eurostats 
-25
-20
-15
-10
-5
0
5
10
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Latvia's current account balance
 157 
 
Over the same period, the country’s share relating to manufacturing in GDP was 
decreasing, while external trade continued to negatively contribute. A large proportion of 
rapid increasing investment was invested in the real estate sector, which could not 
contribute to medium or long-term development. As can be seen in Figure 5.12, Latvia’s 
current account balance increased quickly. The current account deficit in Latvia increased 
more than five times within 6 years from 3.8% of GDP in 2000 to 21.1% of GDP in 2006. 
Similar to Greece, private debt in Latvia increased sharply after joining the Eurozone as 
the Latvian economy could easily borrow money with a lower interest rate. 
The global financial and economic crisis of 2007-2009 hit Latvia in late 2008 to early 2009; 
this made Latvia’s real GDP drop to 3.2% in 2008. In 2009, Latvia’s real GDP fell by a 
record level, 14.2%. Within two years (2007 to 2009), Latvia’s government debt increased 
dramatically from 8.4% in 2007 to 36.6% in 2009, reaching a height of 55.3% in 2010, 
while Latvia’s government budget deficit jumped from 0.7% in 2007 to 9.1% in 2009. As 
a result of this crisis, the labour demand in Latvia decreased dramatically, with the 
unemployment rate increasing from 7.5% in 2008 to 17.1% in 2009 and 18.7% in 2010. 
During this crisis, Latvia also experienced the biggest alterations to its current account, 
which started with a -20.8% of GDP (deficit) in 2007 to an 8.2% of GDP (surplus) in 2009.  
In order to respond to this crisis, the Latvian government executed a budget consolidation 
program. The Latvian government implemented six consolidation packages within 3 
years; from 2009 to 2012 the fiscal consolidation measures of 16.9% of GDP were 
completed, including approximately 6.7% of GDP taken from the revenue side and 10.2% 
of GDP taken from the expenditure side. The Latvian fiscal consolidation was one of the 
most severe in Europe, with an average fiscal consolidation measurement of 3.4% of 
GDP per year. It is also worth mentioning the importance of the Latvian consolidation 
program; this program was implemented in order to meet the conditions which the IMF 
and the EU had made mandatory which would then allow Latvia to receive a financial 
assistance package of 7.5 billion euros from 2008 to 2011 to help stabilize the Latvian 
economy and restore growth.  
As a consequence of these austerity policies, Latvia’s macroeconomic situation became 
stable; the Latvian annual real GDP growth rate was 5% in 2011 - one of the highest 
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annual growth rates in the EU (only lower than two other Baltic countries Estonia and 
Lithuania), this decreased to 4.8%, 4.2% and 2.4% in 2012, 2013 and 2014 respectively. 
Latvia’s annual real GDP growth rate increased to 2.7% in 2015. The Latvian government 
budget deficit also dropped to less than 1% in 2012 and 2013 before increasing to 1.6% 
and 1.3% in 2014 and 2015. However, these austerity policies also reduced public service 
in both quantity and quality, meaning the Latvian government was eventually able to 
restore adequate funding for public services during 2013-2016 (the post-crisis period).  
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Appendix 3. Pakistan 
According to the IMF, in terms of purchasing power parity, Pakistan’s economy is the 26th 
largest in the world. In 1999, the Pakistani government faced numerous challenges, such 
as high public debt, high fiscal deficit, a weak balance of payments as well as rising 
poverty and unemployment. These difficulties forced the Pakistani government to enforce 
structural policy reforms and improve economy governance. As a consequence, during 
2002-2007, the annual growth rate in Pakistan increased sharply reaching a peak, which 
had not been seen in the last 40 years, of 7.7% in 2004.  
The best alteration during this time was a huge reduction in the Pakistani government’s 
debt. Within just four years, 2003 to 2007, Pakistan’s government debt decreased 20.4 
percentage points from 74.5% in 2003 to 54.9% in 2007. Over the same period, Pakistan’s 
government debt from external borrowing also decreased from 35.6% in 2003 to 24.9% 
in 2007.  
Figure 5.13 Pakistan’s public debt to GDP 
 
      Source: International Monetary Fund 
During 2002-2007, Pakistan’s current account deficit and external deficit for goods and 
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Pakistan’s import demand increased sharply at an average rate of 23% per annum, while 
Pakistan’s exports only grew at an average rate of 13.3%.  
Figure 5.14 Current account balance and external balance on goods and services 
in Pakistan 
   
    Source: World Development Indicators, World Bank 
Since 2007, the situation in Pakistan has worsened. Political instability was one of the 
main factors behind Pakistan’s economic crisis, especially as agenda reforms were not 
implemented properly. The Pakistani government did not adequately manage the 
economy, because the country stepped into a judicial crisis which then transitioned from 
a military government to civilian-elected government. Even though the global financial 
and economic crisis of 2007-2009 was not the main factor for the crisis in Pakistan, it still 
made the situation worse. The global financial turmoil reduced inflow capital to Pakistan 
and reduced the export demand of Pakistan’s economy. The current account deficit 
reached a record level high of 9.2% of GDP in 2008, whilst the annual growth rate of real 
GDP dropped from 6% in 2007 to 1.7% in 2008. Pakistan’s government debt increased 
from 54.9% to 59.6%, which is extremely close to the limit of 60% under the Fiscal 
Responsibility and Debt Limitation Act of 2005. 
Pakistan responded to the economic crisis of 2007-2008 preparing a “homegrown 
stabilization package” of macroeconomic reforms which were designed to improve fiscal 
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between Pakistan and the IMF about a standby arrangement for Pakistan: under this 
standby arrangement the IMF gave Pakistan a financial assistance package of 11.3 billion 
US dollars.  
As a result of the standby arrangement for Pakistan, the current account deficit decreased 
from 9.2% in 2008 to 2.4% in 2009 and has been remaining below 2% since 2010. The 
annual growth rate of real GDP increased from 1.7% in 2008 to 4.5% in 2015; however, 
Pakistan’s fiscal deficit also increased rapidly from 5.2% of GDP in 2008 to 8.4% of GDP 
in 2012. Therefore, the IMF (2012) recommended a set of short-term measures, as the 
IMF believed that reducing the fiscal deficit was the most fundamental task to stabilize 
the macroeconomics and support higher growth: fiscal deficit dropped to 4.1% of GDP in 
2015 as a result of these measurements. The IMF (2015) considers Pakistan’s 
macroeconomics to be one of the most promising, with the possibility of another crisis 
occurring in the future much lower than previous analysis suggested; this is due to the 
effectiveness of stabilization policies in terms of reducing macroeconomic imbalances. 
The Pakistani authorities kept pursuing a fiscal consolidation program in order to bring 
public debt below 60%, as Pakistan’s government debt was still higher than 60% since 
2012. 
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Appendix 4. Turkey 
The IMF (2015) has classified the Turkish economy as being an emerging market; Turkey 
is one of the leading producers of agricultural products, transportation and electronic 
consumer products in the world.  
The Turkish annual growth rate of real GDP fluctuated dramatically from 2000 to 2015. 
The real GDP dropped 5.7% in 2001 when Turkey experienced the 2001 economic crisis; 
growth was restored several years after the crisis. However, the global financial and 
economic crisis reached Turkey and then reduced the Turkish annual growth rate of real 
GDP from 6.9% in 2006 to 0.7% in 2008. In 2009, the real GDP fell to 4.8%, which then 
restored in 2010 and 2011 with an impressive 9.2% and 8.8% growth rate. Surprisingly, 
the annual growth rate of real GDP was only 2.1% in 2012 due to a dramatic reduction in 
domestic demand, which an increase in export could not compensate. The Turkish real 
GDP growth rate then increased to 4.1% in 2013 before dropping to 2.9% in 2014, due to 
an announcement by the FED to implement an interest rate hike in January 2014. After 
this announcement, a significant amount of international funds flowed from countries such 
as Brazil, India and Turkey, which of course, reduced growth in Turkey, with the Turkish 
real GDP growth rate then increasing back up to 3.8% in 2015.     
The government budget deficit in Turkey increased rapidly from 0.4% of GDP in 2006 to 
5.5% in 2009. According to the IMF (2010), there were two reasons for this increase; first 
of all, a loose fiscal policy was already implemented at the time the crisis hit Turkey in 
late 2008, and a stimulate package was implemented in early 2009 so as to boost the 
economy’s demand. These implementations really helped the Turkish economy retract 
its losses after being hit hard by the global financial and economic crisis of 2007-2009.    
The effects of the global financial and economic crisis in late 2008 are evident from Figure 
5.15; whereby the Turkish current account deficit slumped from 5.4% of GDP in 2008 to 
1.9% of GDP in 2009 due to weak demand. However, as imports surged in 2010 and 
2011, and exportation grew at a much slower pace, the Turkish current account deficit 
restored quickly in 2010 and 2011.  
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Figure 5.15 Turkish current account balance 
 
      Source: International Monetary Fund 
During the growth period of 2002-2007, the Turkish government’s debt decreased rapidly: 
this figure was only 39.4% and 39.5% of GDP in 2007 and 2008. There are four main 
reasons behind the reduction in government debt; firstly, around this time the Turkish real 
GDP increased at an average of more than 5% per annum. Also, the Turkish 
government’s primary deficit was extremely low (the primary balance is actually positive) 
before 2009, and there was an appreciation in local currency during this time; whilst, the 
cost of the debt reduced as a result of falling interest rates. During the crisis, the Turkish 
government’s debt increased from 39.5% in 2008 to 46.1% in 2009, after the crisis, the 
Turkish government’s debt decreased gradually to 32.6% in 2015. This low level 
government debt allowed more space for fiscal policies to be implemented in Turkey. The 
IMF suggests that “Turkey’s government debt is sustainable even under different shock 
scenarios” (IMF, 2014, p.41).  
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Chapter 6. Summary and conclusions 
This thesis has presented three research studies which all relate to post-crisis fiscal 
policies. All three research chapters in this thesis have tried to address a number of 
questions about fiscal policy, such as: the speed of fiscal policy adjustments in order to 
bring the level of external debt to a sustainable level; the variety of economic factors that 
influence the effectiveness of fiscal policy and the practical challenges of policy making 
in some individual countries. Detailed findings of each research chapter are discussed in 
the concluding sections of each relevant chapter. The purpose of this chapter is to 
summarise the key findings of these three research chapters. 
First of all, Chapter 3 suggests that a small open economy is able to adjust gradually in 
order to bring that country’s external debt back to a sustainable level within a certain 
amount of time as requested by foreign lenders. The simulation results in Chapter 3 
highlight that small open economies will attempt to delay adjustments for as long as 
possible before implementing the  adjusts gradually.    
While Chapter 4 strongly supports the existence of a relationship between financial 
development, financial openness, the level of external debt, the exchange rate regime 
and the size of a government’s consumption multiplier. 
By analysing four case studies which focus on Greece, Latvia, Pakistan and Turkey 
(Chapter Five) it is evident that fiscal policy choices and their varying results are 
determined by several factors including: preceding economic conditions, monetary policy, 
the financial markets and political economy. 
The findings presented in both Chapter 4 and Chapter 5 suggest that although different 
countries face the same problems (economic recession or fiscal crisis), one countries 
fiscal policy choice may be different to another countries fiscal policy choice because 
there are numerous economic factors that can affect the effectiveness of fiscal policy. 
Therefore, fiscal policies should be issued in a wide context with careful consideration for 
monetary policies, financial markets and the political economy.   
There’s an array of lessons that have been learnt from undertaking this thesis.  
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Firstly, the simulation results presented in Chapter 3 suggest that based upon welfare 
grounds, it is much more desirable to implement adjustments gradually so as to bring 
external debt to a sustainable level. Rapid adjustments are problematic even in broader 
models that take into account other aspects of the economy. For example, when a small 
open economy faces a limited foreign borrowing capacity, there may be a shifting trend 
from consuming tradable goods to non-tradable goods. This transfer will take time as 
labour skills need to be properly trained as well as the amount of capital required for this 
shift in consumer goods; therefore, gradual adjustments seem to be more reasonable.  
There are several reasons to argue for rapid adjustment, one of them is the possibility of 
default. The simulation results from Chapter 3 (see 3.4.3) highlight that although there is 
an agreement between borrowers and lenders, the borrowers may decide to default 
especially if delaying is better for them (in terms of total forward-looking utility). 
Furthermore, gradual adjustment may lead to differing viewpoints between lenders and 
borrowers regarding the speed of adjustments, exchange rate and other institutional 
arrangements.  
Policy-makers should also remember the saying that one size does not fit all. Policy 
choices vary across countries and time periods because its effectiveness depends on the 
economic situation of the specific country. Therefore, a policy should be ideally issued in 
a broad context with careful consideration for many aspects of the economy. 
One lesson learnt whilst researching this thesis is that even in countries facing a public 
debt crisis, implementing a tight fiscal policy may be not the optimal choice especially if 
the fiscal multiplier is extremely high; in other words, a large fiscal multiplier means that 
a tight fiscal policy will be incredibly costly. Therefore, a tight fiscal policy may be less 
effective in terms of reducing the level of public debt.  
There are several suggestions regarding future research which could be completed to 
extend the findings of this thesis. 
In the model used in Chapter 3, the government only runs a simple budget balance; 
introducing government debt into the model will enhance the models usefulness when it 
comes to studying fiscal policies in countries with external debt difficulties. What's more, 
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the model in Chapter 3 may be extended to highlight several other major issues, such as 
the difficulty of switching resources.   
Chapter 4 examines the relationship between several factors in relation to the size of the 
government consumption multiplier. However, there are still many factors which should 
be taken into consideration. Besides, Chapter 4 solely focuses on the size of a 
government’s consumption multiplier, considering the size of a government’s investment 
multiplier as well as a government’s revenue multiplier would aid the research significantly 
and truly highlight the effectiveness of fiscal policies. 
Although Chapter 5 analyses case studies of four countries which have different features, 
it would be better if the study covered a wide range of countries, and it would be great if 
more factors were taken into consideration as this would enable countries to determine 
their fiscal policy choice much more clearly.  
Finally, both Chapter 4 and Chapter 5 could be extended so as to evaluate how political 
consensus and credibility affect fiscal choices and fiscal policy effectiveness. There 
definitely seems to be a gap in the literature.  
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